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Editorial
A financial crisis is usually the most visible element of a global eco-nomic crisis which hits everywhere on the planet, every sector, each and every one of us. Conventional wisdom holds that the financial 
crisis of 1929 led to the prolonged global economic crisis of that era. Some 
question this and instead argue that the 1929 financial crisis was not a 
cause but rather a consequence of the crisis. The same cannot be argued 
of this crisis however. As over the last 30 years finance has been the only 
generally accepted criteria of value creation, the 2008 financial crisis may 
indeed be seen as the source of the global economic crisis.
The focus on value creation, and value creation through finance, stems 
from a decline in human values. Finance has accelerated this decline after 
the fall of Berlin Wall and the rising tide of globalisation. The emphasis 
put on transaction (as opposed to personal relationship), and monetisation 
(of all and everything) became the prevailing values leading us to constant 
growth and development of the world. But this was an illusion. Consider-
ing finance as the criteria of value creation has on the contrary resulted first 
in value extraction and finally—in 2007/08—in value destruction.
Because the decline of human values has been a direct cause of this global 
crisis, it will require more than a change in the regulatory environment to 
enable us to restore the healthy development model that we need.
The decline of values is a direct cause of the crisis
For the last 30 years, true economic value creation has been confused with financial value creation as expressed by the stock market. Based on the assumption that markets cannot be wrong, all efforts have 
concentrated on how to increase stock prices, independently of the real 
value of businesses in terms of products, services, etc. The easiest way to 
increase that value was to focus on the growth of quarterly reports of com-
panies. Regulators and economic actors made these quarterly reports oblig-
atory worldwide, and imposed marked-to-market valuations of portfolios 
detained by the financial industry (banks and insurance companies, i.e. all 
of us), thus dramatically reducing strategic thinking, planning and invest-
ing. Corporate executives, encouraged by pension funds managers (again, 
meaning all of us), accepted being evaluated by financial performance. In 
exchange, they benefitted from stock options plans and bonuses linked to 
stock prices. As a result, they concentrated on devising short-term strat-
egies, financially efficient but economically disastrous, as we can see with 
the decline of our long-term businesses. CEOs and senior executive teams, 
financial analysts and bankers, fund managers and institutional investors 
have gradually shifted their focus exclusively to short-term gains. Signifi-
cant gains. The faster the time frame, the better. At the same time, govern-
ments have brought entire countries into unrestrained budgetary situations 
with the same mentality: delivering short-term benefits to the populace re-
sults in a good return in terms of election votes, and the resulting financing 
through debt has, as we have seen, become a strategic long-term nightmare 
as well as a short-term potential bomb. Here again, we are all involved: as 
beneficiaries of these deficit policies, but also as indirect lenders to these 
countries through our bank deposits, insurance premiums, and pension 
savings.
The decline of values—competence, courage, responsibility, respect, pru-
dence, justice, moderation, honesty—has enabled all of this at all levels, 
not only in business but also in government. And once accepted the trend 
became irreversible: It became not only possible but almost easy to make 
fast fortune in business; It was for decades not only possible but practically 
required to craft state budgets based on deficit spending in order to be 
elected or reelected in politics.
The subprime bubble burst epitomises these moral and professional fail-
ures and is therefore a powerful indicator of this overall decline in values: 
the greed for short-term gains on the real estate market which drove modest 
households to borrow amounts disproportionate to their income; no credit 
analysis which induced humble people to go into personal bankruptcy; no 
financial diligence, leading to packaging irresponsible products with a sim-
plistic rating; no moral responsibility, detaching revenue from risk in selling 
the package to a third party; no sound analysis, enabling buying those prod-
ucts to achieve a few basis point increased return, etc… In a nutshell, pretty 
much a list of combined faults. One simple objective shared from borrow-
ers to lenders: make money (a lot), fast (very fast), and run (very far).
As a result, our children will inherit huge public debts and defaulted gov-
ernments, a shaky financial industry and a fragile economy, and a lot of bad 
habits. Interestingly, those children seem eager to find solutions. And a lot 
of technical solutions have been considered over the last five years.
But we need more than technical solutions. In fact, to compensate for the 
decline in values, technical solutions like processes, rules, and regulations 
had already been devised over the years, long before the crisis. Instead of 
helping, those have gradually tainted all levels of our organisations, busi-
ness as well as governments. A bit like Pravda, which claimed to tell the 
truth as it delivered lies, manuals of ethical conduct and processes devised 
by experts and consultants pretended to reduce the risks. Ironically, those 
have proven to be doubly false: first, they did not address the right issues, 
and in fact increased risks (the crisis is there to prove it, just consider the 
failure of the rating agencies). Second, they killed innovation and promot-
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7ed financial and administrative profiteers who follow processes, instead of 
visionary people who make sound decisions. Changing more rules has been 
the main motto to avoid a new crisis. This may be necessary but is by no 
means sufficient if the value background remains unchanged.
The return to values has to precede the changing of rules
In reality, until now, too many rules have merely masked the generally accepted, yet ultimately flawed assumption that value creation has to be the criteria for development, and finance the criteria of value creation. 
Financial metrics are easy to implement, easy to monitor, easy to pilot. 
Reporting obligations, marked to market valuations as mentioned above, 
identical taxation for short- and long-term gains, stock option plans link-
ing remuneration and share price, aggressive pension funds’ investments 
into stocks versus bonds, etc.—all these measures and rules should be mod-
ified to restore long-term strategic thinking, innovation, and investment. 
They should be reformed in order to restore sound economic and social 
development. And nothing will be achieved without those modifications 
because no actor in business or politics can act virtuously if the rules are 
against him. But this is not enough.
To be really efficient, we need to consider how to restore responsibility, 
competence, courage, prudence, justice, moderation as generally accepted 
principles. We need to speak up, to write, to take a stance on the funda-
mentals, so that the rules are designed to fit a virtuous circle. Obviously, 
we have to apply this to our own way of acting, whatever responsibility we 
have: as managers in respecting and forming our people and promoting 
the right people; as investors in asking for responsible ways to invest our 
funds, individually or through our pension funds; as business leaders, in 
respecting our clients, suppliers, employees, the environment; as politicians 
in serving the long-term interests of the people and the security between 
nations; as board members in putting the right business leaders in place; as 
religious leaders in speaking up and telling the truth, especially when no-
body wants to listen. And then, to propose technical solutions to fit these 
accepted principles.
In short, serving should become a priority and the common good a rec-
ognised objective. Indeed we should stop serving only ourselves and ditch 
individual satisfaction as the main evaluation criterion. We all know that 
human weakness will never allow a perfect world. But to emphasise at least 
the right principles and virtues would help all people of goodwill to enable 
the world to become a better place. It would also reduce the risk of anoth-
er impending financial and economic crisis. Changing the rules without 
addressing a fundamental change in values would leave the common good 
a second-class goal. It is because we try to stick to flawed principles that 
nothing has changed during the last five years.
Towards a Christian Perspective for Action
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Symmetrically, hoping for the best without taking practical measures will 
guarantee failure. So we definitively need both: a strong moral awakening 
and a global reflection on a regulatory environment enabling long-term 
development of the planet. Let us all advocate for replacement of accept-
ed principles and at the same time request the implementation of proper 
changes in existing rules and regulations to discourage short-term thinking, 
encourage sound development (every person and the whole of each person) 
and minimise the enormous risks looming for the next generations.
SECTION ONE
TOWARDS A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE FOR ACTION

¶ Introduction
“No meaningful lessons can 
be drawn from the crisis 
unless the analysis extends 
beyond the received wisdom 
offered by social and eco-
nomic science, to encompass 
the values and assumptions 
on which every diagnosis or 
remedy should stand.”
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What are the lessons that a ‘Catholic perspective’ should or could help to draw from the ongoing economic and financial crisis? What does ‘Catholic perspective’ mean? Does it necessarily im-
ply a ‘naïve’ or ‘uninformed perspective’ or is it simply a perspective which 
attempts to go beyond technicalities, so as to look at the philosophical and 
anthropological assumptions on which technicalities—real and intellectu-
al—stand? In this sense a ‘Catholic perspective’ would mean discussing 
the conclusions of technical analysis in the light of values and principles 
as mediated by the principles of Catholic Social Teaching and ultimately 
derived from our faith in Jesus Christ? According to our view, economists 
and social scientists must be aware of technicalities, but must also reach 
beyond them. Indeed, we are convinced that no meaningful lessons can be 
drawn from the crisis unless the analysis extends beyond the received wis-
dom offered by social and economic science, to encompass the values and 
assumptions on which every diagnosis or remedy should stand.
The Chinese word wēijī means crisis, but it also may simultaneously mean 
danger and opportunity. In this sense, the crisis is a double opportunity: an 
opportunity to better understand the world and an opportunity to design 
the most appropriate directions for actions in the future.
Clearly the financial and economic crisis unfolding for nearly seven years 
now has taken the world by surprise and is unveiling almost daily those 
aspects of the working of the global economy that went unnoticed or unad-
dressed for decades. This simple fact suggests that our present understand-
ing of the world economy and finance is still not complete, and that critical 
elements are either false or missing. Indeed the first lesson stemming from 
the crisis is that the world economy since 2007 has behaved differently 
from the predictions of received wisdom which until recently seemed un-
assailable. The answer given in 2009 by the British Academy of Sciences to 
the benign question asked by Queen Elizabeth when Her Majesty visited 
the London School of Economics in November 2008 gives an idea of how 
self-confident and self-referential is the dominant world-view (see Figure 
1).
The crisis thus grants an opportunity to challenge the popular concep-
tual models for the economy and society, models which adhere to ‘natural’ 
categories of markets and self-interested individuals. By accepting the risk 
of close contact with reality, the Christian perspective rooted in the long 
tradition of the Social Teaching of the Church avoids being trapped in pure 
idealism or ideology as is the case of the still-dominant economic theory. 
The crisis compels us to change our perspective by going to the periphery, 
as Pope Francis often says, and to look at the world from there.
This report is made of three parts. Part I is rather technical in the sense 
that it shows how the mutual relationship between States and Markets has 
progressively changed since the end of WWII to the advantage of Markets. 
Part II examines some dominant features of the world economy in light of 
these systemic changes and identifies a number of deepening asymmetries 
which may be attributed to these changes. Throughout, the term ‘asymme-
try’ is systematically preferred in order to avoid implicit value judgments. 
In its broad sense, ‘asymmetry’ means a lack of harmony, balance, or pro-
portion; even possibly a lack of justice. Indeed, the Christian perspective 
extends beyond these mainly aesthetic considerations to consider the di-
mension of justice and the actions that may be needed to restore or support 
it. 
The Christian ‘lens’ comes truly into play in Part III. It first discuss-
es the anthropological, social, and economic content of the notion of the 
Common Good. The Common Good is indeed the cornerstone of Catho-
lic Social Teaching and all of its other principles—solidarity, subsidiarity, 
the universal destination of goods, the preferential option for the poor, 
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• “It is difficult to recall a greater example of wishful thinking combined with 
hubris.”
• “But the difficulty was seeing the risk to the system as a whole rather than to any 
specific financial instrument or loan.”
• “People trusted the banks whose boards and senior executives were packed with 
globally recruited talent and their non-executive directors included those with 
proven track records in public life.”
• “They believed that the financial wizards have found new and clever ways of 
managing risks.”
• “…a failure of the collective imagination of many bright people, both in this 
country and internationally, to understand the risks to the system as a whole.”
 
Excerpts from the British Academy of Sciences response letter to Queen Elizabeth, 22 July 2009
Figure 1: “Why did no one see the crisis coming?”2
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etc.—derive and relate to it. But the Common Good extends beyond our 
earthly realities as, according to St Thomas Aquinas, only God is its ulti-
mate perfection and horizon. Because of this metaphysical dimension, the 
Common Good fundamentally differs from any human-designed utopian 
society, as such is also bounded by man’s earthly aspirations.
Part III then goes on to identify directions for action inspired by Catholic 
Social Teaching which would help to mitigate or even correct some of the 
most flagrant asymmetries and denials of justice. Such actions would set 
the world on the path of the Common Good. Indeed, it provides a horizon 
for human action even if it is out of reach by purely human efforts. Chris-
tians have a moral duty to act in favour of the Common Good even if they 
know that ultimately only grace is efficient. 
Towards a Christian Perspective for Action
In July 1944, 44 national delegations gathered in the Bretton Woods Hotel Resort in New Hampshire to prepare the institutional frame-work for the post-war global economy. The Conference lasted for three 
weeks and indeed succeeded in setting the framework for post-war inter-
national economic and monetary relations. The coherent set of institutions 
and rules addressing major economic questions was in fact part of a broader 
construct—the United Nations system. The whole UN system was con-
ceived of as ‘international’, i.e. composed of Westphalian-type sovereign 
states. Such a system rested on two important principles:
• For internal, domestic affairs the States are sovereign, which means 
that they reach decisions without external interference; 
• For international affairs, States enter interstate agreements which they 
commit to obey under the fundamental principle of international pub-
lic law: pacta sunt servanda.
By extension, the same international logic applied to the ‘sub-system’ of 
economic and monetary agreements reached in Bretton Woods.
The delegates meeting at Bretton Woods still had a clear memory of the 
pre-war economic and monetary crisis which was one of the important 
causes of WWII. Therefore they first aimed at providing the world with 
an institutional setting able to prevent the same sequence of events from 
happening again.
Despite some political disagreements between the United States and the 
United Kingdom, the conference succeeded in crafting a general agreement 
about the principles along which the new ‘system’ should work, and in set-
ting the corresponding institutional framework.
The logic of the ‘Bretton Woods system’ (hereafter BWS) can be summa-
rised by spelling out its three main principles:
• Free trade should progressively prevail in the post-war world. The 
process of dismantling protectionist barriers should be implemented 
on a smooth and mutually-agreed basis. Indeed, according to view 
prevailing both then and now, free trade always benefits all partners—
albeit possibly in uneven proportions. In other words, increased in-
ternational specialisation enhanced through free trade was expected 
to unleash an additional source of economic growth. By trading with 
¶ Markets contained 
by States: The ‘Bretton 
Woods system’
PART I
LONG-TERM STRUCTURAL TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
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one another, previous enemies will also build mutual confidence and 
trust. The world will thereby progressively be more inclusive and thus 
more peaceful. One should remember that the exclusion of Germany 
after WWI from international economic life was certainly one of the 
meta-causes of WWII.
• Smooth international trade requires a well-functioning and safe 
payment system. The Bretton Woods conference reached three impor-
tant decisions in the field of international monetary relations: 1) States 
joining the system would have to accept as a goal the convertibility of 
their currency, but only for current account transactions (i.e. trade and 
transfers); 2) once declared convertible, the currencies would have an 
internationally agreed, stable exchange rate to the US dollar; 3) the US 
dollar will be convertible at a fixed and internationally agreed price 
into gold. This means that States agreed to surrender their exchange 
rate policy to international agreements and, as in counterpart, they 
preserved their internal monetary autonomy3.
• Current account imbalances are the main systemic risk. While the 
British believed both surplus and deficit situations were equally dan-
gerous for the stability of the system, the ultimately-adopted American 
position saw only deficits as a serious danger. BWS thus built a three 
level response to situations of current account deficits, according to 
their gravity: 1) for temporary deficits: unconditional but limited lend-
ing by the International Monetary Fund; 2) for lasting or structural 
deficits: restructuring advice and conditional lending; 3) for systemic 
imbalances: international re-negotiation of exchange rates. On top of 
these normal remedies, BWS also allowed a series of ‘safeguards’ that 
countries in trouble could activate by suspending temporarily their in-
ternational commitments.
These three principles were the basis for the three institutional pillars of 
the BWS: the World Trade Organisation (previously GATT), the IMF, and 
the World Bank (previously IBRD). From today’s perspective it is clear 
however that three main areas were left outside of the Bretton Woods agen-
da and thus remained institutionally unaddressed by the system, each one 
of them for different reasons:
• The modern ‘development agenda’, mainly because most of the coun-
tries today called ‘developing’ or ‘emerging’ were then still part of co-
lonial empires;
• Agricultural trade issues, because the US in 1949 refused to ratify the 
statutes of the still-born International Trade Organisation; 
• International private capital (i.e. financial) flows, for reasons difficult 
to fully appreciate today—the most convincing argument is of a ‘lack 
of imagination’. At the time of Bretton Woods in 1944, and until the 
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“At the time of Bretton 
Woods in 1944, and until 
the 1960s, very few could 
imagine how important 
international private capital 
flows would become.” 
Beyond the Financial Crisis
1960s, very few could imagine how important international private 
capital flows would become. In the inter-war period, which served as 
reference to the works of Bretton Woods Conference, private flows 
were limited to direct investments.
The break-up of the Bretton Woods system
Tensions in the BWS started to appear by the early 1960s as the wid-ening US trade deficit began to threaten American gold reserves. In order to alleviate tensions with the US, the main partners of the 
system agreed by 1961 to abstain from requesting that deficit countries 
settle outstanding balances in gold. By doing so, the BWS was transformed 
from a de jure hegemonic and US-centred system, into a less asymmetric 
system, where some consensus among the big players was required. 
The ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ was however not enough to save the BWS. 
On 15 August 1971, US President Richard Nixon announced that the 
United States had unilaterally decided to suspend the convertibility of the 
dollar into gold4. 
This unilateral and largely unexpected American decision delivered a 
deadly blow to the logic of the BWS5. Once the fixed dollar–gold exchange 
rate was floated, the ‘dollar exchange system’ had lost its anchor and the 
BWS its raison d’être. Nixon’s decision freed the US from the need to gain 
the consensus of partners, and has established a de facto fully US-centred 
‘dollar standard’—still largely prevailing today. Indeed, efforts after 1971 
by groups of countries to maintain stable—or even managed—exchange 
rates between their currencies remained largely unsuccessful. Only after 
nearly three decades did the European Union manage to agree on monetary 
integration by introducing the €uro, in 1999.
The American decision to let the dollar float irrespective of the global 
consequences may be seen not only as an answer to the US economic dis-
equilibria (which seemed temporary at that time), but also as a response to 
deeper pressures rooted in changes shaping the global economy, namely the 
strengthening of private financial flows. Today, it is clear that during the 
years before 1971, private finance emerged—and was allowed to do so—as 
a new but increasingly important phenomenon, potentially threatening the 
premises of Bretton Woods logic.
Until the late 1950s, private financial institutions, assets, and transac-
tions were mainly domestic6. The relevant financial regulations were also 
internal, in the hands either of the central banks or of ministries of finance. 
During the 1960s, the development of international private financial flows 
was facilitated by the progressive lifting of administrative controls on pri-
vate capital movements and by the subsequent extension of convertibility 
to capital account transactions. These measures, not required by IMF stat-
utes, were amplified by independent transformations of the international 
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financial landscape. These transformations resulted in steeply increasing 
volumes of trans-border private financial flows:
• The euro-dollar. In the mid-1960s the unprecedented financial in-
novation of the euro-dollar opened new horizons in international fi-
nancing possibilities. Euro-dollar balances were made of dollars held 
on the balance sheets of banks outside the regulatory reach of US do-
mestic authorities and available to international actors for the financ-
ing of their transactions outside of the US. The euro-dollar was de 
facto a technically unlimited source of dollars (through credit) to be 
used outside of the US. Such an uncontrolled private source of dollars 
was a clear challenge to the US Federal Reserve on its own turf. Not 
unreasonably, the invention of the euro-dollar is attributed to Soviet 
intelligence. This ground-breaking financial innovation fundamentally 
changed the balance of power between States and Markets;
• Access to monetary gold. Until 1967, access to monetary gold was 
strictly limited to central banks. In 1967, under pressure from private 
financial players, the London gold market opened a window for private 
non-industrial transactions. As the fixed dollar-gold exchange rate still 
prevailed, this move allowed private actors to enter arbitraging activi-
ties which potentially directly threatened US gold reserves; 
• Technological changes. The late 1960s were also the years when major 
advances in telecommunications and information technologies started 
to emerge. Banks—whose main activity is information-related—were 
among the first players to identify new opportunities. Consequent-
ly, they start to internationalise by opening affiliates and subsidiaries 
abroad, mainly in major financial centres such as London, New York, 
Paris, and Zürich.
French economist Jean Fourasité once called the thirty years between 
1945 and 1974 ‘Les 30 Glorieuses’; in the United States, this period is re-
ferred to as the ‘Golden Age of Capitalism’, marked by sustained growth, 
low unemployment and inflation, and limited public and balance of pay-
ments deficits. The de facto devaluation of the US dollar in 1971 and the 
subsequent reaction of oil exporting countries steeply revaluing the price 
of oil in 1973/74, were the expressions of fundamental changes in the 
modus operandi of the global economy. The three decades that followed 
(mid-1970s–2007) can be called the ‘Age of Euphoric Finance’ as they were 
characterised by the growing empowerment of Markets over States as the 
dominant mode of coordination for trans-border economic activities.
18
¶ Enhancing economic 
efficiency: The ideal 
bias
“The fall of the Iron Curtain 
in 1989 provided additional 
ground for and reinforced 
growing popular trust in 
the natural source of market 
forces driven by no-less nat-
ural private interests while 
discarding almost any state 
regulation.”
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States overwhelmed by Markets
Why did sovereign States, parties to the Bretton Woods agree-ments, not agree on masterminding the evolution of private finance by adapting the international framework before it was 
too late? Why have private forces been allowed to triumph over interna-
tional agreements? The most plausible explanation is the lack of vision and 
growing scepticism among States, especially the US, about the possibili-
ty of reaching a new long-term international agreement on international 
money and finance conforming to their conflicting strategic and economic 
interests. In the early 1970s, the US and UK had a lot to gain from a de-
velopment pattern of international finance in which Anglo-Saxon banks, 
financial centres, and technology providers played a leading role. Thus, the 
1971 decision of the US President to ‘suspend’ convertibility of the dollar 
can be seen as an attempt by the US to gain the first-mover advantage in a 
situation where the BWS was heading for an unavoidable collapse due to 
the politically-unchecked emancipation of private international financial 
flows.
Such a non-regulatory approach to nascent international finance strategy 
was in tune with the much broader neo-liberal ideas growing in influence 
in the Anglo-Saxon world and also in some leading international organi-
sations such as the OECD and IMF. Neo-liberalism may appear, at first 
glance, as the extension to other international flows of the more traditional 
free-trade principle. However, neo-liberalism is much more than that: while 
free-trade calls for the abolition of border controls, neo-liberalism as a po-
litical programme proposes curtailing any state intervention. The critical 
neo-liberal economic argument has always been that any state intervention 
or regulation distorts the functioning of markets and hence reduces overall 
efficiency and the aggregate level of output. This forceful argument rests on 
two highly disputable assumptions: 1) ‘competitive markets’ are the natural 
forms of social organisation; and 2) they are expected to appear spontane-
ously in any social space freed from regulation. These two assumptions are 
anything but intuitive. They were and still are strongly disputed also within 
the liberal camp, for instance by the ‘fathers’ of Ordo-liberalismus such as 
Wilhelm Röpke. Despite the presence among Christian thinkers of prom-
inent advocates of neo-liberal ideas, such as Michael Novak, the teachings 
of the Magisterium in the field of Social Doctrine have never adhered ex-
plicitly to these two assumptions. 
The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 provided additional ground for and 
reinforced growing popular trust in the natural source of market forces 
driven by no-less natural private interests while discarding almost any state 
regulation. By the early 1990s, the world was seen by many as reaching 
the ‘end-of-history’ stage. This expression, coined by Francis Fukuyama, is 
characteristic of the state of mind that prevailed in the West from the Mar-
¶ Emerging trans- 
national economy 
¶ Persistent interna-
tional imbalances 
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garet Thatcher and Ronald Reagan era until at least 2007. In this context 
the famous statement ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA) attributed to Thatch-
er means simply ‘there is no alternative to the market’. Later on, the so-
called ‘Washington consensus’ emerged from the same intellectual context. 
It was widely accepted as the expression of ‘ultimate’ economic wisdom and 
used as a blueprint by international organisations.
The collapse of the BWS can be seen as a victory of private mar-ket logic and forces over the classical inter-state logic. This break-through contributed to changing fundamentally the way the global 
economy operates: from a largely inter-state (inter-national) mode of op-
erations in place since the late 1940s, the global economy started to move 
towards a trans-national one. Until 1971, inter-state borders structured 
the world into autonomous ‘boxes’ of national economies made of more 
or less managed internal markets, and connected with the outside world 
by flows of trade and payments. This institutional framework rested upon 
inter-state agreements, functioning according to principles of public in-
ternational law. During the 1970s the density of economic interactions 
between the national economies started to increase rapidly. Trans-national 
networks of enterprises, of markets, and of the ownership of assets or lia-
bilities transformed a world of self-contained boxes into a complex web 
of interdependencies. Today, the heterogeneous elements (states, markets, 
trans-national enterprises and banks) continuously interact across political 
borders according to their own preferences and objectives. These complex 
interactions are governed by a heterogeneous combination of private and 
public institutional, legal and para-legal norms and arrangements (stand-
ards, rules of conduct, soft-law). In this configuration—as the present cri-
sis has shown convincingly—interactions are at least as important as the 
components or elements of the system themselves. In fact, by becoming 
trans-national, the global economy has also become a ‘system’, i.e. a net-
work of non-hierarchical interdependencies.
Therefore the working of the post-Bretton Woods global economy has 
to be analysed on at least three levels: 1) macro-economic, which captures 
the question of imbalances and of the changing roles of central banks; 2) 
meso-economic, which addresses the emergence of transnational financial 
interactions; 3) micro-economic, which allows for stressing the importance 
and rationality of new actors.
Flexible exchange rates were initially seen as only a transitory solu-tion. Indeed, the consensus lost in 1971 on the need for a holistic approach to global monetary and financial issues has not been rebuilt 
until now. The €uro-zone is the only significant exception. 
In the early 1970s, the shared expectation based on received theory was 
that under flexible exchange rates, international trade disequilibria would 
disappear almost automatically. Excess imports of one country were ex-
pected to feed into excess demand for the foreign currency leading to a 
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depreciation of the domestic currency, thus automatically limiting imports 
and contributing to the subsequent current account adjustment. Accord-
ing to the theory, countries were therefore expected to rely more on the 
equilibrating role of foreign exchange markets and would not need to build 
up official reserves (such as gold or dollars), as was the case with fixed 
exchange rates. Furthermore, the flexible exchange rate regime was expect-
ed to provide additional autonomy to national policies even in countries 
otherwise closely economically integrated. This increased autonomy was 
seen by many as a clear advantage in comparison to the fixed exchange rate 
regime under which the monetary policy of the US significantly impacted 
its partners.
From 1971 on, the economic environment for international traders of 
goods and services has fundamentally changed. Under flexible rates, they 
need to take into consideration not only the prices of traded goods, as in 
fixed rate regimes, but also the possible variations of exchange rates. In 
this sense, the break-up of the BWS has de facto ‘privatised’ the exchange 
rate risk. This situation of increased volatility appealed to financial play-
ers and attracted them to foreign exchange markets. Today these markets 
are used today—in uneven proportions, as will be discussed later—by two 
categories of actors: 1) exporters and importers who hedge and cover the 
exchange rate risk of their trading contracts; and 2) financial operators who 
trade in currencies and related instruments as they do in any other financial 
assets, with the sole purpose of making profit in the margins.
The effectiveness of the flexible exchange regime rapidly proved quite dif-
ferent from expectations. From their inception, foreign exchange markets 
have been driven at least as much by financial and speculative concerns as 
by current account and real economy ones. In fact, foreign exchange mar-
kets which theoretically were expected to deliver current account equilib-
rium resulted in contributing to deeper imbalances and higher volatility in 
the market. As shown by Figure 2, in 2010, according to the figures of the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the turnover on foreign exchange 
markets has been approximately 23 times gross world product (GWP), 
which corresponds to approximately 80 times the value of world exports.
After 1971, current account imbalances did not disappear from the 
post-Bretton Woods economic landscape. Quite the opposite, in fact. In 
aggregate terms—as shown in Figure 3—they today amount to about 
1–2% of GWP. On the deficit side the United States and the €uro-zone 
(i.e. Germany) play a prominent role, with China, Japan, and oil exporting 
countries as counterparts on the surplus side.
From a purely technical perspective, current account disequilibria can 
persist as long as the corresponding financing is provided by the contin-
uous flow of international capital transactions. These include all kinds of 
lending and borrowing operations as well as transactions on financial or 
real assets—implying the international transfer of ownership of these as-
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sets. These transactions build up a web of trans-border interdependencies 
which is continuously growing in size and complexity far beyond what the 
amount of imbalance would suggest. Indeed, Figure 4 provides an approxi-
mation of the gross volume of cross-border financial transactions, of which 
imbalances are only the net expression. Until 2008, these transactions were 
Figure 3: Current account balances as a % of GWP8
Figure 2: Annual non-derivative foreign exchange transaction by % of corresponding GDP7
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20 to 30 times larger than net current account imbalances. This reinforces 
the point that in normal times and for the major world currencies, balanc-
ing the needs of current accounts contributes only marginally to foreign 
exchange rate levels. 
Trapped between money and finance:  
New roles for central banks
In the post-Bretton Woods context of unleashed markets and dormant states, the mandates of central banks were adjusted to the new situation. This was done in two ways: 1) in most countries, the independence of 
central banks from the government was reinforced so as to shelter money 
creation from political influence; 2) the mandates of central banks were 
narrowed to focusing on consumer price stability. Consequently, financial 
markets—especially asset price booms and bubbles—as well as the general 
condition of the economy—the US Federal Reserve being a significant ex-
ception—remained, until the crisis, outside the mandates of central banks.
The flexible exchange rate regime, together with free movements of cap-
ital and the growing variety of financial assets increased the spectrum of 
possible instruments to be used for international payments, transactions, 
and the holding of reserves. Thus, central banks of surplus countries have 
today the possibility of holding high quality foreign assets rather than keep-
ing foreign currency in idle cash. This means that as long as countries with 
persistent current account deficits manage to generate high quality (i.e. 
low risk) financial assets which are agreeable to surplus countries, they do 
not need to fear a massive depreciation of their currency. This privileged 
situation has been the case for the last three decades for the US. Indeed, in 
present conditions, not only currency may pay for excessive imports, but 
also high quality assets (financial or real). Today this is precisely the case, as 
countries with persistent current account deficits—like the US and some 
European countries—are particularly competitive in generating a contin-
uous flow of high-grade financial assets such as start-ups, shares of existing 
listed companies, corporate bonds, and state bond bills. Ultimately, these 
assets—and not currency—are used by surplus countries as means of in-
ternational reserves. This situation could well mean that we are, de facto, 
in an ‘Asset Exchange System’ where the difference is progressively fading 
between currency and high-grade financial assets (quasi-money) as means 
of payment.
Today, the classical distinction between money and financial assets has 
lost it clear-cut character and has been replaced by a continuum of qua-
si-money payment instruments with different degrees of liquidity. The 
pricing of the relevant liquidity premiums and related risks was left to un-
regulated markets. Until 2007, this shift from money to the use of liquid 
financial assets for payment and reserve purposes had barely been noticed. 
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It became visible when liquidity drained in some market segments, initi-
ating a potentially suffocating domino effect. Central banks had then to 
intervene by massively employing ‘unconventional instruments’ to pump 
oceans of high-powered central-bank liquidity into the economy. As these 
high-powered credit lines were primarily used by financial intermediaries 
to strengthen their balance sheets, they unsurprisingly did not reach the 
real economy.
Foreign exchange: New class of financial instruments 
Shortly after 1971, a handful of national currencies became a specific class of financial instruments traded on dedicated foreign exchange platforms (forex) which quickly became among the biggest and most 
active financial trading arenas. Despite their role in the global economy, 
forex markets are neither organised nor supervised. Rather than markets in 
an institutional sense, they are simply interconnected closed networks of 
trading desks. It is worth stressing that more than 90% of foreign exchange 
transactions take place between two financial actors. This means that only 
10% of these trades involve at least one ‘real-economy’ party. Put differ-
ently: An imaginary buy/sell of foreign exchange ultimately involving two 
real-economy parties is intermediated by 18 transactions among financial 
players.
As early as 1973, with the first oil shock, it became obvious that global 
trade and finance were in fact using a handful of national currencies. The 
present concentration of foreign exchange transactions in so few currencies 
can be explained by: 1) related political and economic influence; 2) liquid-
ity of national financial markets; 3) economies of scale in providing trading 
and settlement facilities; and 4) the demand for extreme liquidity. Figure 2 
compares the volumes of foreign exchange transactions in national curren-
cies with corresponding gross national products. 
Figure 4: Gross capital flows as a percentage of GWP9
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The primacy of the US dollar in this respect is evident even if the inter-
national role of the €uro is systematically growing. Indeed, if one takes 
the US and €uro-zone products as roughly equivalent, foreign exchange 
transactions involving the €uro were in 2004 about 50% of those involving 
the dollar, while in 2010 the proportion was 60%. When one national 
currency plays a central role in international exchanges worldwide, it gives 
that country a seignoriage-related advantage. Both this advantage of the US 
dollar and its asymmetry in regards to other major currencies have persisted 
with the flexible exchange regime. Since 2004, the seignoriage-related ad-
vantages for the US have started to be shared—but not yet challenged—by 
the €uro.
Commodities and the conquest of new asset classes
In recent decades the discovery, creation, and exploration of new as-set classes has been an important dimension of financial innovation. For a time, real estate prices, mortgages, and other credits packed into 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and other instruments played this 
role, attracting (too) much attention. Today the same has started to be the 
case with insurance linked securities (ILSs). During the last decade, com-
modities have also been heavily transformed into financial assets, as they 
have presented an interesting possibility for diversifying financial risk. As 
King Midas with gold, ‘financialisation’ is the process by which finance 
expands into new domains and transforms into speculative assets anything 
it touches.
Many commodities, vital to the proper working of the real economy, are 
traded in well established markets initially created to provide ‘real’ services 
to producers and customers. Some commodities, such as gold or oil, have 
historically deep markets and a long established role in financial strategies. 
Since the mid-1970s, the number of commodities having a more or less or-
ganised market with related financial derivatives has been steadily increas-
ing. The financial ‘take over’ of other commodities is more recent—it was 
especially visible during the early 2000s. Figures 5 and 6 show the growth 
in the volumes of financial instruments used in commodities markets. 
When financial motives dominate transactions in ‘real’ markets, two 
consequences follow. Firstly, commodity prices become ‘financialised’, and 
thereby more volatile and correlated with other financial markets. In the 
medium term this may lead to a loss of interest in these assets by the finan-
cial community. Secondly, before this potential loss of interest, prices of 
real goods come to depend less and less on the movements of real supply 
and demand. The macro-economic benefits derived from risk diversifica-
tion by using commodities for financial purposes tend to be short lived, 
whereas real micro-economic consequences for commodities producers 
and consumers may extend for longer periods and be strongly negative 
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Figure 5: The price of commodities gets ‘financialised’10
Figure 6: The financialisation of commodities markets in $ billions (US)11
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for the poor. Financialisation of commodity prices and their subsequent 
increased price volatility produce asymmetric effects. Any food price rise 
is a cause for immediate concern for poor households as their purchasing 
power automatically diminishes. On the supply side, any increase in pro-
duction induced by higher prices—in theory to the benefit of the poor—
requires time to appear in the market. This higher production may reach 
the markets in times when the upward trend in prices is reversed. Con-
sequently, financialisation-related volatility of food prices may exacerbate 
rural poverty and hunger.
The long-run effects of food price volatility are particularly negative for 
low-income countries where agriculture still represents a large share of ei-
ther or both national output and national consumption. In these cases, 
a rise in prices immediately hurts poor consumers, while providing little 
expected benefit to poor producers, who face the risks connected to volatil-
ity. Conversely, falling prices tend to permanently worsen the supply side, 
as farmers may be induced to leave the countryside, to disregard existing 
investments, and to abandon farming land, which will easily deteriorate 
into wilderness.
New functions of finance: The risk and return management
The expansion drive of financialisation is nothing other than a tan-gible expression of the shifting expectations regarding financial re-turns and risk management. This shift in expectations translated 
into an exploding demand for financial expertise, instruments, techniques, 
and knowledge. On the supply side, this demand was matched by new 
conceptual and technical answers that grew out of a brand new science 
called ‘market finance’. The ‘founding fathers’ of this new science intro-
duced in the late 1960s a new rationality to financial activities based on the 
risk-return paradigm and provided this rationality with adequate tools for 
action. Only much later were the ‘founding fathers’ awarded Nobel prizes 
to join the pantheon of the still-dominant economic theory: H. Markowitz 
(1991), M. Miller (1990), F. Modigliani (1985), E. Fama (2013), or W. 
Sharpe (1990). As a consequence of this paradigm shift initiated half a 
century ago, the role of finance in modern economies has fundamentally 
changed.
In a traditional macro-economic vision, two main roles are assigned to 
the financial sector. On one side, it is expected to provide payments in-
frastructure and services (national and international), while on the other 
side, its role is to allocate collected savings to viable economic projects and, 
potentially, to help in trading the corresponding financial assets.
In the aftermath of the collapse of fixed exchange rates, financial activities 
took on a growing importance in the modus operandi of the international 
economy, especially with the opening of new possibilities for international 
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(public and private) lending and borrowing as well as for the financing of 
trans-border private activities. By the same token, growing international fi-
nancial markets (the so-called euro-markets) appealed  also to governments 
who saw in them a source for cheap and abundant funding. This opened 
new horizons to public policy and made national public deficits seem less 
problematic. As a consequence of the softening of financing constraints, 
public deficits and debt started to grow.
On the basis of its two classical functions—payments and financing—
and boosted by this paradigm shift, modern finance developed a third—
now autonomous—function: assessing, managing, and allocating risk. Up 
until then, risk allocation was narrowly intertwined with the financing of 
otherwise illiquid projects: once credit was granted, the relevant risk re-
mained on the balance sheet of the lender. New instruments, markets, and 
techniques such as securitisation and derivatives have made it possible to 
trade risk separately from the underlying asset. These innovations generated 
liquid markets for risk instruments and allowed a full-fledged macro-level 
emancipation of the risk allocation function. Today this function accounts 
for a large part of the activity of the financial sector.
The roots of the risk and return paradigm, the pillar of market finance, 
are both in academia and in technology. Risk measurement techniques, as 
well as the notion of risk diversification are a consequence of a conceptual 
breakthrough by H. Markowitz and his fellow Nobel prize winners. Infor-
mation technology provided the tools necessary for the industrialisation 
of these techniques and their use in almost-real time. The contemporary 
techniques known as ‘high-frequency trading’ or ‘nano-trading’ are noth-
ing more than the sophisticated use of present technological possibilities in 
line with the conceptual breakthroughs of the 1950s.
These possibilities started to be implemented at a large scale in trading 
rooms, accounting practices, and in academia in the early 1970s. The 
promises of the risk and return paradigm and related management tech-
niques were in line with the existential fears and corresponding demands 
of an aging but every year wealthier Western population. This population 
discovered in financial techniques and markets a tool for providing for their 
old-age pensions as their families and traditional social structures started 
to fall apart. The idea that finance techniques would be able to provide a 
secure income out of savings accumulated during one’s working life was 
very comforting in a time of expanding individualism and the search for 
self-sufficiency.
This suggests that there was a social demand for risk management which 
coincided with what information technology, regulatory frameworks, and 
intellectual tools were—supposedly—able to deliver. So already in the late 
1970s, retail products and services focusing on ‘risk management’ found 
their way into the market. Later on, regulatory frameworks adapted accord-
ingly—as with the British Big Bang of 1986. 
28 Beyond the Financial Crisis
The underlying rationale of a major part of contemporary financial activ-
ity is the management of risk and return. From the perspective of wealth 
or asset management, the economy and society appear as if made up of 
different but interdependent bits and pieces of reality and more or less 
corresponding financial assets. While the bits and pieces are moved by real 
processes, financial markets value each asset according to these ‘fundamen-
tals’ while also taking into account their relation to other financial assets. In 
this way, risk and return characteristics are identified and the market prices 
the assets accordingly. In the world of assets, the financial wealth manag-
er constantly ‘picks and chooses’—i.e. analyses, assesses, and selects—the 
most appropriate configuration of assets so as to maintain the risk and 
return profile of the institution, fund, or portfolio he manages in line with 
his strategy or client’s expectations. The proliferation of investment funds 
specialising in a given asset class, investment style, or approach delivers to 
the retail client the possibility of taking advantage of diversification even 
with a small investment, while at the same time building an additional 
layer of intermediation. 
The ‘financial manager’ plays a prominent role, as he or she is empow-
ered—directly or indirectly—by wealth holders to evaluate the risk and 
return perspectives of any asset and adjust the portfolio composition ac-
cordingly by buying or selling, often without direct relation to the eco-
nomic performance of the underlying activity. Indeed, asset selection and 
allocation are seldom based on absolute performance, as finance widely 
uses comparisons such as benchmarks or rankings. This means that every 
asset (currency, enterprise, government, etc.) is not judged on its own mer-
its but is compared to others in the same asset class. These methods and 
approaches of external evaluation feed volatility and liquidity into markets 
on which financial managers earn part of their living. By the same token 
however, they increase the distance and magnify asymmetry between the 
active and potentially versatile asset manager and the underlying social and 
economic reality, leaving the latter with a high degree of insecurity as to the 
financial verdict on its management decisions. 
Transnationalisation of production
During the three decades discussed here, driven by an unprecedent-ed reduction in tariffs, the share of exports in gross world product (GWP) almost doubled: from 15% in 1974 to 29% in 200812. 
During the same period, trade composition also greatly changed: interme-
diate goods and services today make up 90% of world exports, up from 
50% in 1950. Intermediate (or semi-finished) goods and services are in-
corporated into final products or more sophisticated intermediate goods in 
successive steps of transformation. In fact, increased trade in semi-finished 
goods indicates that another change has occurred in the global economy: 
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the process of the ‘transnationalisation of production’. Transnational cor-
porations—‘global giants’—have been prominent drivers of this process in 
the ever expanding networks of their subsidiaries, affiliates, strategic part-
ners, and suppliers. Experts in transnational production and distribution, 
these enterprises have developed their competitive edge in masterminding 
the circulation of intermediate goods and services across distant production 
sites, many of which they own or control strategically.
In fact the deepening ‘transnationalisation of production’ also has its fi-
nancial dimension which can be called the ‘transnationalisation of owner-
ship’. Many of the remote production sites belong to the ‘global giants’ and 
as such are part of the foreign investment position of their home countries. 
According to the BIS, the level of aggregate cross-border investment po-
sitions (including portfolio as well as direct investment position) has in-
creased between 1981 and 2012 from about 10% of GWP to over 150%. 
Even if the bulk of this rise is related to purely financial positions, direct 
investment holdings have most probably also progressed at least at the same 
pace as trade flows13. These cross-border investment positions are ‘stock’ 
data. As such they do not capture the yearly gross flow of trans-border 
transactions on corresponding financial and real assets. According to BIS/
IMF estimates, the gross (not net) capital flows have grown from about 
10% of GWP in 1995 to about 35% in the wake of the financial crisis. 
Figures on trade, investment positions, and gross financial flows give an 
idea of the way the contemporary transnational economy works: interme-
diate goods and services are steered through a number of highly specialised 
and geographically scattered sites of production and distribution before 
they reach the final customer. World class operators listed on major stock 
exchanges own or control many of these production sites or distribution 
channels. The contemporary ‘transnational economy’ is able to work in 
the context of flexible exchange rates and global open markets because 
the ‘global giants’ have become experts in careful optimisation—location-
al, technical, economic, financial, fiscal, and regulatory—of their opera-
tions, in the management of their tangible and intangible assets, and in 
the management of related financial risks. Geographic reallocation and the 
shifting of activities between locations, as well as sophisticated financial 
instruments for shifting risks in ever-deeper global financial markets, have 
been instrumental in this multi-dimensional and never-ending search for 
efficiency called ‘globalisation’. In fact, ‘transnationalisation of production’, 
‘transnationalisation of ownership’, and ‘transnationalisation of finance’ 
appear as three faces of the same globalisation process. Financial and real 
globalisation progressed in parallel, complementing each other to a large 
extent.
Macro-economic data on multinational enterprises as a group are lack-
ing. Company reports (available only for listed enterprises) are therefore 
virtually the only accessible source of quantitative information about their 
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size and role. According to our calculations, in 2010, the 800 largest listed 
non-financial enterprises had an aggregate turnover equal to one-third of 
GWP, while the turnover of the 1,500 largest amounted to 45% of GWP. 
These proportions did not change significantly since 2000. What does such 
a proportion mean? Total sales or turnover are primarily accounting figures. 
However they also have a macro-economic meaning. The turnover figure is 
the sum of two components—each very different from an economic point 
of view—1) the value of intermediate goods and services bought by these 
enterprises from their suppliers (about two-thirds of turnover in 2000); 
and 2) the amount of added value generated directly by them (about one-
third in 2000). According to our estimates, the 800 largest non-industrial 
financial enterprises directly generated 11% of GWP and 22% indirectly, 
through their purchases. In order to fully capture the structuring influence 
this limited group of ‘global giants’ exerts on the global economy, a third 
item should be taken into account: the distribution costs necessary to bring 
their products and services to their final customers. These margins could 
well amount to another 20% of GWP. The structuring influence of the 800 
largest non-financial enterprises (through supply chains, their own activity, 
and distribution chains) may amount to up to 50% of GWP. These figures 
however are only plausible orders of magnitude based on best estimates. 
As shown in Figure 7, the 11% which the 800 giants add to GWP is 
roughly equivalent to the aggregate gross product of the 144 least devel-
oped countries in the world. While the 800 enterprises employed 30 mil-
lion people worldwide, those 144 countries represented about 1 billion 
people, fully one-third of the world’s active population. In other words, 
labour productivity in the largest corporations is about 30 times higher 
than the average productivity in the least developed countries.
According to convergent estimates, the loosely defined group of enter-
prises which can be called ‘global giants’ plays also a critical role in trans-
national investment and trade flows. Indeed, the bulk of direct foreign in-
vestments and of international trade flows (up to 80% according to recent 
UNCTAD estimates) involves a rather limited group of world class players. 
In purely financial terms, the aggregate capitalisation of the same 800 
enterprises amounted in 2000 to almost 60% of total global stock market 
capitalisation. This means that nearly two out of every three dollars invest-
ed in world stock markets are invested in shares of these companies. The 
same enterprises which have a structuring impact on 50% of GWP also 
make up 60% of global stock capitalisation. Is this a simple statistical coin-
cidence or does it show convincingly that a limited group of ‘global giants’ 
play a critical role both in the transnationalisation of production and in 
the transnationalisation of finance? When the leaders of these companies 
gather in Davos every winter, they can rightly presume to represent critical 
force in the global economy.
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Transnationalisation of finance
After four decades of internationalisation of financial flows, finance is a transnational, global reality as much a national one. The global financial system is made of two very different layers. At the local 
level, a set of retail financial outfits (institutions or branches) act as ‘last 
mile’ collectors of savings and as distributors of financial products and ser-
vices to private clients and small- and medium-sized enterprises. The corre-
sponding flows are channelled and re-intermediated at a wholesale—often 
global—level and re-dispatched to the local outfits. In their matching activ-
ities (maturity, currency, levels of risk, asset classes) at the consolidated lev-
el, global financial institutions use sophisticated instruments and markets, 
normally only accessible to professionals (such as LIBOR markets). These 
few thousand non-financial ‘global giants’ are Very Important Clients for 
the global players of finance. These clients access the global financial ser-
vices at the global—rather than local—level. There, the ‘global giants’ raise 
abundant and relatively cheap capital on global markets, they buy special-
ised services, carry out their M&A (mergers and acquisitions) activities, 
and manage their treasuries and cash balances. 
Until the mid-1970s, financial activity was carried out mainly within 
national borders. Each country operated according to its own financial 
Figure 7: Economic and financial weight of transnational enterprises14
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tradition in terms of financial assets, institutions, and regulations. Broad-
ly speaking, national savings were used to fund national enterprises and 
investments. Challenges to these situations came progressively from three 
directions:
• The international expansion of enterprises by the multiplication of 
foreign affiliates. This trend, which started immediately after the war, 
allowed for financial resources (savings) accumulated in one internal 
market to be channelled via foreign direct investment flows into fi-
nancing investment projects in another country. This demonstrates 
how trans-border financial and investment activity initiated by multi-
national enterprises shifts savings between different locations.
• Starting from the late 1960s, the number of foreign bank affiliates be-
gan to grow, especially in major financial centres. The consolidation 
and supervision of resulting multinational banks became increasingly 
demanding. After 2008, it has been recognised that these structures 
deserve special regulatory attention in terms of purpose, capital ade-
quacy, and supervision. In 2011, for the first time, the Financial Sta-
bility Board has identified a limited number of transnational banks as 
‘Global Systemically Important Banks’ (G-SIBs). Since then, the list is 
yearly updated. In November 2013, 29 banks were on the G-SIB list. 
They have been selected on the basis of their level of cross-jurisdiction-
al activities, of their systemic interconnectedness, and of their overall 
complexity and size. Figure 8 provides some statistical information 
about this group of banks. Their combined balance sheets trebled in 
size between 2003 and 2007. Since the crisis, the total remained stable 
despite a differentiated evolution of the individual institutions.
• The financial landscape is made up not only of banks and insurance 
companies but also of non-regulated financial institutions with highly 
diversified activities. This so-called ‘shadow finance’ in the global fi-
nancial system is difficult to measure precisely. According to BIS data, 
it amounts to 25% of total financial assets and to about 50% of the size 
of the classical banking sector.
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Figure 8: Assets, employment, and market capitalisation of the 29 systemically important banks15
Part II has two aims: 1) to identify the salient characteristics of the present economic situation, particularly the role of financial activi-ties; 2) to assess—in general terms and without specificity to country 
or region—if and to what extent the experience of Markets overpowering 
States has delivered upon its promises.
The dislocation of the Bretton Woods system as well as the subsequent 
evolution of the modus operandi of the world economy, were largely driven 
by the promises of the economic theory derived from neo-liberal premises 
regarding the natural selfishness of human beings and the natural character 
of markets. This quasi-ideological intellectual framework is very appealing, 
as it promises that a less regulated world will automatically generate in-
creased efficiency, i.e. growing overall output. 
The underlying and fundamental question is about the mutual relation-
ship between higher efficiency and growth on one hand, and the corre-
sponding side effects on the other hand: are these effects inescapable costs 
of growth, or is growth possible without them? In Part III, this trade-off and 
possible ways ahead will be discussed in light of the principles of Catholic 
Social Teaching.
The idealistic trap and ideological blindness 
The risk and return paradigm and its corresponding worldview, dis-cussed in Part I, derive from an intellectual—though not necessar-ily scientific—theory known as the ‘efficient market hypothesis’ and, 
more broadly from the ‘general equilibrium’ approach. The world described 
by the corresponding models has a built in self-organising force. Indeed, as 
long as States do not interfere in the natural functioning of markets, inter-
nal natural forces of interlocked and efficient markets are expected to drive 
the world spontaneously to ever higher degrees of efficiency by extending 
the grasp of markets to every possible good or service. This dynamic is at 
work until the system of markets is complete, i.e. until there is a proper 
market for every possible good or service. 
Such a worldview has two important characteristics: first, any challenge 
to its underlying intellectual premises struggles to find a sufficient basis 
insofar as the worldview takes any critique based on observable reality and 
either discards or reinterprets it as a perfectible distortion of the ideal. The 
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efficient market hypothesis is, in the Popperian sense, non-falsifiable. Second, 
such a worldview may easily inspire policies or a resistance to regulation 
more in line with idealism than with reality. Any policy based on simplistic 
assumptions may be counterproductive: this was the case in international 
finance with the general deregulation leading to the global crisis, as it was 
also the case with less sophisticated situations like the crises in German or 
Spanish savings banks. The recent crisis is but one more demonstration that 
fundamentalism—that is, blind idealism resistant to reality—leads to dis-
ruption or crisis over the medium or long term. This was the case with the 
collapse of Communist economies; this also was the case with the recent 
financial crisis.
We have many examples of idealistic models forging real financial deci-
sions; one deserving of attention is the so-called ‘Modigliani-Miller theo-
rem’16. This theorem encourages financial markets to disregard a company’s 
capital structure—i.e. leverage or the debt-to-equity ratio—when assessing 
its market value. In other words, the share value of a company does not de-
pend on the proportion of owned capital in its balance sheet. For decades, 
markets priced companies on the basis of Modigliani-Miller ‘truth’ while 
disregarding leverage. Only in 2007 and 2008—in light of the many ma-
jor financial institutions on the brink of collapse—did it become evident 
that excessive leverage consistent with the Modigliani-Miller theorem was a 
threat to the world financial system.
Most economic and financial models, though aesthetically elegant, are 
rooted in idealism. Such models are often understood not as abstract ex-
ercises but as guides for how the world ought to be, while assuming that 
agents are ‘perfectly informed’ and ‘rational’. The world of models describes 
the future not in terms of uncertainty but in terms of risk based in proba-
bility. In such a probabilistic environment, any action’s consequences may 
be assessed, creating room for a ‘rational’ utilitarianism. Models are thus 
based both on the anthropological premise of natural selfishness and on 
the assumption that the future can be assessed. Rationality thereby comes 
down to utility maximisation. 
In real life, however, the future is vastly unknown, shaped by actions 
based on incomplete information and even utter ignorance which often 
produce both unintended and unexpected effects. Thus may moral integ-
rity become the compass, for when the consequences of one’s actions are 
not known, rationality must instead attach to the moral quality of one’s 
actions17.
When several main actors make decisions from model-driven rationality, 
it generates convergent behaviours, paradoxically turning models into real-
ity in a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. This works in periods of consensus 
and stability, as with the ideological capture and blindness to reality which 
prevailed during the years of ‘roaring’ financial globali sation. This may ex-
plain both the short-term successes and the depth of the crisis. In the field 
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of economic thinking, the analogous blindness blocked imagination and 
allowed hubris to proliferate (see Figure 1).
Financial capital takes the lead
The development of financial markets discussed in Part I has had two 
important consequences: 1) it has strengthened the importance of financial 
signals in the daily management of listed enterprises; 2) it has turned the 
opinions of financial markets—via lending interest rates—into important 
factors influencing the economic and fiscal policy choices of many govern-
ments. 
The risk and return paradigm has found its way into the internal manage-
ment decisions of enterprises. Tying compensation of top management to 
share prices resulted in investment, placement, personnel, product devel-
opment, and other decisions being based first on financial market consid-
erations. This aligning of interests between management and shareholders 
was perfectly consistent with the ‘shareholder value’ view of business, which 
at that time was growing in importance. This view holds that manage-
ment’s first duty is to maximise shareholder wealth as measured by stock 
prices rather than to care for the genuine interest of the enterprise itself. 
This is seen, for instance, in the preference of large enterprises for external 
growth through mergers and acquisitions over internal growth because it 
produces short-term financial results in the stock price, even though such 
transactions often fail in the medium to long term. The shareholder value 
revolution has destroyed the ontological coherence of listed enterprises, as 
all stakeholders become mere instruments for achieving shareholders’ ob-
jectives18.
Financial valuations and opinions—built on ‘expected’ (i.e. desired) fu-
ture performance—exert strong pressure on real-economy actors to meet 
the targets set for them by financial markets. There is an immense asymme-
try between the distant and anonymous market’s targets and the practical 
decisions needed to achieve these targets at the level of enterprises or public 
authorities. But an even more profound asymmetry has crept in alongside 
this: that between tangible reality (e.g. people, products, exchange) and 
virtual reality (e.g. spreadsheets of figures from analysts and managers). The 
crisis may be the point at which the pendulum swings back from virtual to 
tangible reality; the point where asymmetry may start to shrink.
Financialisation: The expansionist drive of finance 
The very idea of efficient financial risk diversification presupposes the ex-
istence of different classes of assets with loosely—or even negatively—cor-
related returns. According to a widely-used hypothesis in financial model-
ling, correlation strength between different asset classes remains stable over 
time irrespective of the volume of speculative financial capital moving in 
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and out of these investments. This hypothesis overlooks that when the vol-
ume of investments in an asset class greatly exceeds transactions related to 
the underlying activity, the correlation of the corresponding new asset class 
with other classes of assets automatically increases. When an exotic asset 
class becomes easier to access by speculative capital, the level of correlation 
with more traditional classes of assets rises along with it. When prices or 
correlation have reached a certain threshold, speculators may unexpectedly 
dump the asset class while taking it out of their portfolios. Such a sudden 
move may trigger a crisis and affect its real-economy operators—as hap-
pened during the 1997 Asian crisis. 
The application of financial logic to any new asset class has two opposing 
effects: for speculators, it in theory increases diversification potential; for 
real-economy ‘normal’ users of the same asset class, however, the increased 
correlation exposes them to additional risks—e.g. price volatility—which 
they neither understand nor are able to cope with. Furthermore, one can 
argue that an asset class is of interest to speculators—motivated by risk and 
reward—precisely because others are using it without being ‘infected’ by 
financial reflexes. The surge of speculative capital into a given real-economy 
market thereby creates asymmetry between highly mobile speculators ready 
to leave the market without notice and real-economy buyers and sellers 
locked in this market.
Financing the present while inhibiting the future
External imbalances and deficits of all kinds did not disappear in the 
post-Bretton Woods era. On the contrary, they have blossomed. Neither 
flexible exchange rates nor mobility of portfolio capital have significantly 
contributed to facilitating a long-term rebalancing of the external positions 
of countries. Surprisingly, the post-Bretton Woods context—with its mix 
of ‘flexible rates’ and ‘free capital flows’—has instead amplified global im-
balances. 
The years of euphoric financial globalisation clearly encouraged the accu-
mulation of heavy long-term imbalances through the availability of abun-
dant and relatively cheap credit, in spite of warning signs from local finan-
cial cracks or crises. This easy credit, together with liquid markets, affected 
the inter-temporal behaviour of all categories of actors: national and local 
governments, enterprises of all types and sizes, and households. Available 
credit made it possible to soften financial discipline and postpone other-
wise necessary adjustments to ‘better times’.
The inter-temporal budget constraints for government debt and for cur-
rent account foreign indebtedness should in principle have provided a 
meaningful limit to the accumulation of imbalances, as the cost of non-ad-
justment was supposed to rise steadily. However, financial techniques gave 
the impression that unlimited ‘roll-over’ on debt was an option, allowing 
for the unlimited postponement of adjustment. In the midst of financial 
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euphoria, basic principles of sane public finance seemed to have lost cur-
rency. Those principles re-emerged with full strength as the crisis became a 
reminder of the asymmetry inherent to debt relationships. While creditors 
can technically extend unlimited lines of credit—provided the overall risk 
of his position is kept under control—debtors facing increasing indebted-
ness must commit more and more future resources to servicing the debt, 
thus losing control of their future. 
The asymmetric pressure on the debtor to adjust may start at the very 
moment creditors perceive a change in risk level. In such critical moments, 
optimistic sentiments, which sustain cross-border financing, abruptly turn 
to pessimism and financing dries up and becomes more expensive, often 
in a ‘herd-like’ manner. In an instant, as the mood of markets changes 
abruptly—as during the €uro debt crisis—small indebted countries come 
under sudden pressure to re-adjust their economies very quickly. This how-
ever does not apply to all countries. US imbalances tend to be tolerated for 
longer periods, leading to even larger imbalances, both because the whole 
world uses and is thus hostage to the dollar, and also because the US econ-
omy is able to generate valuable financial assets. In financial and monetary 
affairs, some countries are evidently ‘more equal that the others’. 
The period of financial euphoria was in fact prone to increased indebt-
edness among all categories of real-economy actors. Household borrowing 
bet on rising real estate prices, enterprises bet on returns on investments, 
and governments simply borrowed and spent as the most convenient an-
swer to social problems. The mirror image of this trend is the increased 
overall volume of financing and related transactions. Consequently, total 
gross debt of all actors grew much faster than gross domestic products. Fig-
ures 9 and 10 illustrate the €uro-zone and the US situations. In both cases, 
between 2001 and 2010, the absolute increase in gross aggregate debt of all 
agents combined was 3.7 times higher than the increase in domestic prod-
uct. In other words, for every €uro or dollar of value produced during that 
period, 3.7 €uros or dollars of additional debt were created. At least since 
the beginning of the century, these two economies depended on additional 
credit for their daily operations.
The basic asymmetry in any debt relationship is between the debtor in-
hibiting his future with debt to finance present day expenses or investment 
projects and the creditor risking his savings—or expression of past activ-
ities—for the sake of future revenues. The underlying asymmetry might 
well be between the urgency of present needs or opportunities and the 
search to secure the future with resources of the past. This asymmetry is 
further accentuated by the burden of interest which the debtor is obliged 
to pay in nearly all circumstances. The debt-related asymmetries in risk 
exposure pose a number of moral questions which have been abundantly 
debated in almost all spiritual traditions. 
The sequence with which the 2007 crisis started is well known. It shows 
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Figure 9: Growth leveraged by debt—€uro-zone19
Figure 10: Growth leveraged by debt—United States20
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that this asymmetry between lenders and borrowers may suffer exceptions. 
In the US the initial asymmetry between the individual lender and the 
mortgage borrower suddenly was reversed at the macro level. The society as 
a whole—i.e. taxpayers—had to rescue lenders because of the anticipated 
mass insolvency of borrowers. The reason why the taxpayers did step in was 
a fear of the overall collapse of financial systems spilling over to the whole 
economy. The world economy was under the threat of financial ‘Weapons 
of Mass Destruction’. One year later, the same sequence was at work in the 
€uro-zone: a financial system overexposed to over-indebted governments 
needed once again to be rescued by the taxpayers. In these two cases, cen-
tral banks decided to flood the financial system with liquidity created ex ni-
hilo. In both cases, public interventions by governments and central banks 
managed to preserve—at least temporarily—the supposedly intangible 
character of financial commitments. As a result of these interventions the 
pressure has—temporarily—been put back on borrowers.
Unregulated finance: Shadow banking and OTC markets
The expansion of international finance in the 1960s and 70s started in a regulatory vacuum. Financial innovations flourished in private dealings outside the reach of regulators. It took place under the 
auspices of the neo-liberal creed of non-interference and spontaneous mar-
ket efficiency. The British ‘Big Bang’ of 1986—vastly deregulating financial 
services—is a symbolic example of this mood. Much of the expansion in 
financial activities thus happened without proper statistical tracking.
Until the late 1970s, most financial activities were carried out by two 
types of nationally regulated enterprises—retail banks and insurance com-
panies—while investment banking was predominantly conducted in part-
nerships. Later on, innovative financial products and transactions started 
to be carried out either by non-bank and non-insurance companies, or 
by established institutions off-balance sheet. As such, these activities and 
companies were sheltered form the scrutiny of banking and insurance su-
pervisors. The multiplication of off-balance sheet exposures, hedge funds, 
investment funds, and private equity funds is the most known dimension 
of this expansion. Only after the shock of 2008 did the G20 put in place 
the Financial Stability Board with the task of building a comprehensive 
picture of what is widely known today as ‘shadow banking’. According to 
recent BIS/FSB estimates the combined balance sheet of shadow banking 
amounts to 50% of regulated banks’ balance sheets21.
For similar reasons, financial transactions have also been allowed to de-
velop outside of the regulatory perimeter22. Because of its unregulated 
character, the LIBOR serving as an interest rate benchmark deserves some 
attention. The LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offered Rate) has never been a 
proper ‘market price’ despite the fact that it is commonly used as a bench-
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mark in pricing bonds. Technically speaking, LIBOR is a daily benchmark 
used by professionals as a mere reference point. To establish its daily level, a 
limited number of large banks report rates at which they think they could 
possibly borrow. By doing so they communicate an opinion rather than a 
fact of effective borrowing in which a rate is always related to a volume. 
Once the direct link between prices and volumes is severed—which is what 
happened with LIBOR—prices cease to be a ‘reality check’ and instead 
become fleeting information that can be inflated or deflated according to 
wishes and expectations. When used as a benchmark for price setting, in-
formation may lead to serious distortions. Imagine what would happen if a 
stock exchange were to price its shares simply by polling market players for 
opinions as to the appropriate price level of their respective shares, without 
reference to volumes and prices effectively traded. By ignoring the volumes 
effectively transacted, the LIBOR methodology contributed to bolstering 
the illusion of infinite liquidity available in financial markets—an illusion 
for which the world has been paying dearly ever since this liquidity evapo-
rated in August 2007.
LIBOR has become the crucial item of information for pricing almost 
$550 trillion US worth of assets around the globe. Through the technique 
of interest rate swap, LIBOR took on a significance that reflected both the 
banking sector’s control over a significant part of the securities market and 
its belief that the ultimate method has been found for valuing financial 
assets so as to keep the operation profitable for banks and quasi-banks with 
access to the interbank market.
The very fact that the unclear LIBOR methodology was never subjected 
to proper scrutiny by regulators and totally left in the hands of private in-
terests makes clear that monetary and financial authorities—British as well 
as international—deliberately failed to impose any additional scrutiny or 
constraint on the group of banks involved in LIBOR setting. Only today, 
when the rigging and wrongdoing has become evident, are banks being 
investigated and fined.
Many LIBOR related assets are held by unsophisticated clients of finan-
cial institutions, as well as by pension funds, insurance companies, and 
so on. If, as it now appears, LIBOR has knowingly been set several ba-
sis points above the real interbank lending rate—the rate at which banks 
actually transact among themselves—the likely impact on such clients is 
immense. Borrowers may well have been paying too much, lenders earning 
too much, and intermediaries enjoying too large of margins—and this may 
have been going on for decades.
The recent series of financial scandals shows that market discipline is not 
automatically imposed in the absence of supervision and regulation. For 
many advocates of laissez-faire non-intervention—such as Alan Green-
span—these scandals were a painful refutation. Indeed the long list of 
manipulations and wrong-doings—from structured products to LIBOR 
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market rigging—suggests that the final users of these products have been 
the ultimate victims of this professional misconduct by individuals and 
institutions.
Pro qui bono? Deceived and disappointed users of financial products and 
services can rightly ask this question. The answer makes apparent another 
important asymmetry: the asymmetry between professional insiders and 
unsophisticated users. Regulation could have softened—but not prevent-
ed—all of the abuses by professionals which ethics and responsibility would 
have obliged against.
The development of financial activities was made possible because these 
techniques appeared to offer the promise of addressing two everlasting—al-
most eschatological—aspirations of mankind to earthly paradise. The first 
of them echoes directly the Biblical expulsion from the Garden and refers 
to the human aspiration to live without work. Indeed, financial techniques 
promise that properly managed financial capital can earn your living for 
you. The second one is the aspiration to security and stability. Risk man-
agement techniques carry with them the prospect of making the world a 
safe place to live. So, both a riskless world and a workless life may appear 
as if within reach, provided financial techniques are freed from regulatory 
burdens. 
The outstanding, unfulfilled promises:  
The risk of losing systemic trust
During the first three decades of financial euphoria, financial returns were much higher than macro-economic growth and also higher that the economic performance of enterprises. Figure 11 shows 
the growing discrepancy between corporate performance, the compound 
rate of economic growth, and the compound rate of financial returns. Over 
nearly half a century, the US domestic product multiplied by 25 times, cor-
porate bottom line performance by 14 (as of 2009), and compound returns 
on stock markets by 60. Between the mid-1980s and 2007, the financial 
music played for the ears of an ever richer, older Western population, more 
and more eager to secure its future material wellbeing. The financial sector, 
in its role as music band, was charming and dissuading of all fears, assisted 
in this task by the US central bank’s policy of deliberately low interest rates. 
By spending decades generating exuberant returns on stock markets—
well over the growth rates of domestic product and public debt interest 
rates—financial techniques confirmed the impression that humanity had 
finally invented an income-generating ‘perpetuum mobile’ where capital 
gains were able to pay for present expenses. Stock market returns on accu-
mulated capital could thereby pay for decades of leisurely life. These im-
plicitly provided the rationale for the establishment of largely demutualised 
capitalisation-based schemes for pensions, annuities, and life insurance in 
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many developed countries. In parallel, scientific knowledge—largely based 
on models, accumulated and spread by professors of finance—reinforced 
the claim of professionals that risk management and diversification can 
significantly reduce the level of risk in the world.
The Western world took these promises seriously and people as well as 
enterprises entrusted to financial institutions a growing portion of respon-
sibility for caring for their future. Trust was essential to this process: social 
trust in technical and scientific promises of finance, trust in institutions, 
and trust in the alchemic capacity of professionals to turn savings into per-
manent money-making devices.
After three decades of financial euphoria punctuated by only a few lo-
cal and peripheral mini-crashes and crises, the very centre of the financial 
world tumbled in 2007. Suddenly the music stopped. Almost overnight 
the world discovered that its financial system was overburdened with debt 
and therefore much less robust than thought. All this has so suddenly hap-
pened not because the corresponding numbers were inflated overnight, but 
simply because the way of looking at these very figures changed overnight.
In reality, the risk and return paradigm is an inter-temporal approach 
extremely sensitive to the way the future is perceived. In times of opti-
Figure 11: Discrepancy between financial and real economic performance23
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mism—if not outright euphoria—the future appears bright and is expected 
to pay for today’s exuberance. On the other hand, in times of pessimism 
the future appears bleak and today’s efforts have to pay for it. If the mood 
changes, so then does the perception of the future and of risk and its pric-
ing. Such a mood change drives valuations down and the whole financial 
construct trembles and possibly falls apart. In the world of models—unlike 
in real life—behaviour is supposed to be rational (i.e. mood does not ex-
ist)—and therefore the classical financial construct is shockproof. Behav-
ioural finance, a new trend in finance-related research, works closely with 
psychology and aims to understand and anticipate the reasons for irrational 
behaviours such as changes in mood. This research however is in early stag-
es and is not able to offer yet an alternative to classical rational models.
In 2007, the igniting spark came from the residential US housing market. 
When prices stagnated, it provoked a dramatic rise in margin calls on col-
laterals, pushing many borrowers into difficulties leading to foreclosures. 
Consequently, the valuations of mortgage-related financial assets were rad-
ically revised; interbank lending stalled on fears of insolvency, trust and 
liquidity evaporated, and the interbank market ceased to operate. Liquid-
ity—instrumental to flexibility and necessary for market forces to adapt 
and overcome any difficulty—suddenly stalled. The engine at the heart of 
world finance—geared to deliver maximum short-term efficiency out of 
permanent liquidity—was suffocating. The oxygen of financial markets is 
trust: trust in counterparties, but above all trust in promises.
After the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, regulators discovered that 
risk was spreading everywhere, through ever tighter correlations between 
sophisticated securitised assets. The long-lasting trend of securitisation has 
removed risk form banks’ balance sheets onto less visible assets—or struc-
tured products—traded mainly over-the-counter. From a ‘solid-state form’ 
on balance sheets, risk in securities markets became fluid and the dan-
ger was for it to become imperceptibly ‘gaseous’, impossible to detect and 
thereby endangering the whole economy.
In the face of a threat of total collapse, taxpayers were called in to bail-
out important components of the financial system with the hope that this 
would prevent the crisis from spilling over to the real economy. As a con-
sequence, public finances—already in poor shape in many countries—be-
came further strained by the rescue operations on one side, and on the 
other by expenses intended to maintain employment levels. The second 
wave of the crisis came when markets started to put sovereign debt under 
pressure, urging governments to restore public balances. This drastic revi-
sion of valuations had two consequences: putting pressure on those banks 
holding massive government debt and increasing borrowing costs for coun-
tries under scrutiny. At this stage, central banks were called to help, in one 
way or another, taking the distressed public debt out of the market. Cen-
tral banks flooded the financial system with liquidity, preventing any sig-
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nificant financial collapse. These ‘unconventional interventions’ by central 
banks contributed to calm markets, but also to the diffusion of risk across 
all sectors of the economy and society.
What did the experience of unleashing the financial market deliver? It 
demonstrated that in finance—as in other segments of the economy—lib-
eral self-regulation fails at maintaining a sane level of competition. The 
recent crisis also demonstrated that trust is both essential to financial ac-
tivities and yet very fragile. When trust disappears, only public guarantees 
can bring life back to finance. The experience also may have demonstrated 
that trust may have been misplaced—that finance is not able to deliver on 
the eschatological promises for a risk-free and work-free life. Naïve trust, 
after years of illusion, has been upset by reality. In other words, the crisis 
has made apparent a dormant asymmetry or tension which is present in 
every society between eschatological aspirations to security and stability 
and the limited capacity of humanity to achieve it. In this respect, financial 
rationality, instruments, and techniques are no exception.
Systemic risk: Limits to regulation
In 2005, the total value of financial assets amounted to 4 times GWP, while in 1995, it was less than double. In 2005, the value of total fi-nancial transactions was 26 times GWP, while in 1995 is was 7 times. 
In this context of expanding finance, the outbreak of the financial crisis in 
2007 endangered the whole world economy, which suddenly discovered 
that it was hostage to the financial system. 
One of the least disputed lessons of the financial crisis is that ‘system-
ic risk’ not only exists, but really matters. Broadly defined, systemic risk 
appears when multiple interactions between a system’s components create 
feed-back loops impossible to mastermind. Systemic risk is thus related to 
a system’s level of complexity. It materialises when unsolved local problems 
are amplified and multiplied by an unchecked network of feed-back loops 
to the point of bringing the system to the verge of collapse. The financial 
crisis—spreading rapidly from one component to another—put the world 
economy in a situation risking near collapse.
The asymmetry underlying the very notion of systemic risk is obvious: a 
dysfunction rooted in an error or wrongdoing which may spill over and put 
at risk the survival of the whole. The financial crisis has stressed the asym-
metry between, on one side, a sector employing less that 5% of the active 
population worldwide and generating not more than 10% of total product, 
and on the other side, the rest of the economy with all its human and social 
realities. The leverage of finance is due to the sheer volume of total financial 
assets or transactions in relation to GWP. This asymmetry is reminiscent 
of another asymmetry which became evident during a post-war era crisis: 
the oil shocks of the early 1970s, which showed the world the degree of its 
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dependence on energy and oil.
Since the first meeting of the self-proclaimed ‘World Board of Directors’ 
in April 2009 in London, it was clear that the G20 had taken stock of 
systemic risk and was willing to prevent it from materialising. This is also 
acknowledged by the G20 meeting in late 2013. The St Petersburg decla-
ration says: 
“We have agreed and are implementing a broad range of financial reforms 
to address the major fault lines that caused the crisis. We are building 
more resilient financial institutions, making substantial progress towards 
ending too-big-to-fail, increasing transparency and market integrity, fill-
ing regulatory gaps and addressing the risks from shadow banking. We 
will pursue our work to build a safe, reliable financial system responsive 
to the needs of our citizens.”24
In its Annual Report of 2009, the Bank for International Settlements 
has clearly identified two requisite aspects of any effective attempts aimed 
at preventing the materialisation of a systemic crisis. First is reducing the 
level of complexity by extending regulation to the three components of 
the financial system—institutions, markets, and products; second is the 
introduction of a new level of ‘macro-prudential’ oversight and regulation. 
Macro-prudential regulation aims—in theory—to take into account the 
interactions between the system’s components, rather than merely compo-
nents themselves, which is already the aim of micro-regulation.
The well-known ‘Basel’ rules on capital adequacy are a good case in 
point: the first two generations of these rules—Basel I (1988) and Basel II 
(2010)—were clearly micro-prudential. They aimed at strengthening the 
shock-absorbing capacity of individual institutions by imposing capital 
buffers into balance sheets. Today, the situation with Basel III is different, 
as its requirements differ with the degree of systemic importance of the 
institution concerned. That being said, mitigating systemic risk involves 
much more than Basel III alone. In its Annual Report of 2009, the Bank 
for International Settlements proposed an agenda in line with the chal-
lenge:
“Ensuring financial stability requires a redesign of macroeconomic as well 
as regulatory and supervisory policies with an eye to mitigating systemic 
risks.”25
The identification of systemic risk as a specific and serious category of risk 
sheds new light on the old relationship between efficiency and complexity. 
In the pre-crisis decades, increasing complexity was interpreted in terms 
of progressing marketisation and linked with expected efficiency gains, 
while the down-side of this process, namely the piling up of systemic risk, 
continued unnoticed. How to explain this long-lasting misperception of 
reality? Undoubtedly, one of the reasons lies in the prevailing fascination 
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with idealistic promises and the idea of the natural multiplication of mar-
kets—and the subsequent disregard for reality checks. Today, the percep-
tions are changing and systemic risk appears to many to be a consequence 
of increased complexity. In consequence, the critical question to be kept 
in mind concerns the level of acceptable trade-off between efficiency gains 
promised by a non-regulated market system and increased systemic risk. 
There might be a point when returns on additional complexity are lower 
that the controls such complexity implies. At this point, even from an eco-
nomic perspective, complexity would have reached the zone of negative 
returns. It is not impossible that the complexity of finance is pushing the 
world into uncharted waters of negative risk-weighted returns on complex-
ity.
Limited transfer of resources to developing countries
Efficient international financial markets were supposed to allocate savings to the best investment opportunities. If so, low income countries—supposedly opportunity-rich and savings-poor—were 
expected to attract financial resources from high income countries—sup-
posedly opportunity-poor and savings-rich—and use them so as to pro-
mote internal growth. The previous discussion of imbalances has already 
shown that, broadly speaking, this was not the case, as deficit countries 
were de facto paying for their imports with their assets then being stored in 
the vaults of surplus countries’ central banks. This broad picture however 
was too general to capture non-trade related resource flows to what the 
World Bank calls ‘developing countries’ (see Figure 12). While China and 
Russia are included by the World Bank as ‘developing countries’, they have 
been excluded from the analysis here because they are important parts of 
the broad picture of these imbalances.
The structure of this table departs on three main points from the classical 
presentation of North-South financial flows:
• Profit remittances (on foreign investments) by transnational corpora-
tions are included here even if technically they are part of the current—
not capital—account of the balance of payments. These amounts have 
to be taken into account as they are the remuneration of foreign capital 
invested within the country; 
• Migrants’ remittances to home countries also are taken into account 
here because, again, these amounts correspond to unilateral transfers of 
savings. As profit remittances, from the accounting point of view they 
are part of the current account;
• A theoretical ‘net position’ has been calculated by subtracting the lev-
el of international reserves from total outstanding international debt. 
These reserves usually belong to central banks and are either held in 
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cash or, more often, invested in financial assets denominated in foreign 
currency.
Thanks to these adjustments, Figure 12 provides a comprehensive picture 
of transfers of savings and assets and of related payments from and to devel-
oping countries, although the situation of individual countries or regions 
might differ from the aggregate picture. Figure 12 also gives an idea of the 
North-South net financial positions. The numbers in this table deserve a 
few comments: 
• The overall external gross debt of the developing world has been con-
sistently growing and today reaches about $3 trillion US—4% of 
GWP. That being said, the overall net position of these countries—
taking into account their international reserves—is a surplus of about 
$1 trillion US. In absolute terms, this figure is close to 30% of their 
total external indebtedness. 
• Since 2000, the net inflow of non-debt resources to developing coun-
tries has been growing to reach about $350 billion US in 2010. How-
ever, it is worth stressing that migrants’ remittances make up more 
than two thirds of this amount. 
• Investment flows (FDI) cumulated since 2005 are slightly higher than 
net debt inflows over the same period. However, as the existing FDI 
stocks generate substantial returns, amounts of profits which are re-ex-
ported to corporate headquarters have to be subtracted in order to ob-
tain a net investment inflow position. The net inflow of FDI is about 
70% lower than the gross inflow usually presented in international 
statistics.
• The aggregate position of ‘low income countries’—the group of 32 
mainly sub-Saharan countries with a 2010 per capita income below 
$1,005 US—is drastically different. Total debt amounts to $111 bil-
lion US, which corresponds to more than 25% of their aggregate prod-
uct and is almost entirely attributable to public bodies of the developed 
world. These countries manage to raise each year $5–10 billion US in 
net debt while they receive at least double this amount in remittances.
• N.B.: according to OECD data, in 2012, total disbursements of offi-
cial development aid from all sources amounted to $126 billion US. 
This amount corresponds roughly to 50% of remittances and to slight-
ly less than 0.3% of donor countries’ national income. These flows do 
not appear in Figure 12.
Figure 12 is based on official data which do not include improperly re-
ported flows, i.e. corruption related flows or payments for exported raw 
materials which never reach the exporting country. The amounts deposited 
in financial centres and ‘belonging’ to elites in developing countries may 
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well offset the total net indebtedness of these countries, but their precise 
assessment is, for technical reasons, impossible27.
According to various estimates28, FDI flows related to transnational pro-
duction networks are concentrated in a handful of ‘emerging’ countries 
(such as the BRICS), which means that a number of developing coun-
tries—among the poorest—remain outside of the processes of transnation-
al production. Indeed, FDI inflows to developing countries others than 
BRICS amounted to $74 billion US while the outgoing profit remittances 
amounted to $46 billion US. This shows the limits of the inclusive role of 
transnational networks of production. On the consumption side however, 
products and services of ‘global giants’ are imported globally and reach 
the most remote places on Earth. Thus there is an important asymmetry 
between the narrow inclusive reach of production networks that may help 
generate export proceeds for countries and the much wider reach of im-
ported products which generates expenses. 
Parallel to the $28 billion US in net foreign investment, these same 
groups of non-BRICS countries were receiving $83 billion US in portfolio 
investment flows. These flows are purely speculative and highly volatile as 
they chase de-correlated assets in order to hedge global risks. They bring 
volatility to weak local financial markets and speculative revenues to a lim-
ited local elite; they foster the expansion of the local financial sector but 
have a very limited positive impact on the local enterprises listed on stock 
exchanges. Portfolio flows do not mitigate the asymmetry in terms of ac-
cess to stable investment funding between the global giants and the local 
enterprises in the developing world. As for the flow of remittances—which 
are above all ‘love flows’ and which for non-BRICS developing countries 
Figure 12: Financial flows to and from developing countries, excluding trade-related 
payments and official development aid flows (in $ billions US)26
All developing countries, without China & Russia 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
A Net debt inflows 120 4 74 129 316 220 142 360
B Outflow of interest payments on debt 76 100 88 95 110 111 101 103
C Inflow of FDI  (foreign direct investment) 57 108 184 234 319 374 249 278
D Outflow of profit remittances on FDI 27 47 129 173 221 243 191 191
E Inflow of portfolio equity investments 13 7 47 58 96 -47 77 102
F Inflow of workers remittances 50 71 160 190 233 268 252 263
G International reserves (end of year) 341 443 965 1 231 1 676 1 761 1 943 2 195
H Total external indebtedness (end of year) 1 621 1 821 1 992 2 102 2 486 2 717 2 834 3 143
 Net liabilities (H-G) 1 280 1 378 1 026 870 810 955 891 948
1 Non-debt inflows (F+E+C) 120 186 391 482 648 595 579 643
2 Non-debt outflows (B+D) 103 147 217 268 331 354 292 294
Net-non-debt flows (1-2) 17 39 174 215 317 241 286 349
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amount to $59 billion US per year—they only marginally reach enterpris-
es.
Unprecedented growth with inequalities
In purely economic terms, the unleashing of market forces undoubted-ly did deliver. It delivered three decades of uneven but relatively high aggregate growth: according to OECD calculations, between 1975 and 
2010 GWP rose in real terms 3.1 times (1975 = 100); the corresponding 
growth in so-called advanced countries was 2.5 and that of emerging ones 
was 4.7. When expressed in per capita terms which account for different 
demographic dynamics, growth is slightly higher for the advanced econ-
omies and lower for emerging ones. These average figures even out very 
different economic dynamics of countries and regions which are depicted 
in Figures 13 and 14. Despite the dynamic variety of situations, however, 
low-income countries are not significantly catching up in terms of PPP 
(purchasing power parity) per capita. In other words, the growth differ-
Figure 13: Absolute change in GDP per capita (PPP)29
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ential between advanced and emerging economies in PPP per capita has 
not been sufficient to significantly contribute to a convergence of average 
absolute income levels across the globe31.
The overall picture of how global added-value—i.e. gross world prod-
uct—is produced and consumed across the globe changed only slightly be-
tween 2000 and 2010. A simplified, tentative Lorenz curve is presented in 
Figure 15. It takes into account the average per capita income across coun-
tries and thus ignores their internal inequalities. The horizontal axis depicts 
total world population in a sequence of segments, each corresponding to 
the population of one country. The segments are ordered starting on the 
left with lowest to highest PPP per capita. The vertical axis represents the 
total GWP segmented into contributions of each country ordered bottom 
to top, as they appear on the horizontal axis. The resulting curve can also 
be viewed as a succession of stacked triangles, one per country. The base of 
each triangle corresponds to that country’s share of world population; the 
height to its share of GWP. For instance, China generates 14% of GWP 
and has 21% of population.
Figure 14: Changes in GDP per capita (PPP)30
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In aggregate terms, in 2010 as in 2000, the poorest 40% of world popu-
lation produced and consumed about 10% of world income, while, at the 
other end of the pyramid, 40% of world income was generated and con-
sumed by the richest 10% of the population. Between these extremes, 50% 
of income is shared in unevenly distributed proportions by 50% of world 
population. This way of looking at the distribution of world income ig-
nores internal inequalities which—according to many sources—have been 
expanding. On top of this, inequalities between countries would appear 
even greater if nominal income data, not PPP, were used33.
Deepening and expanding asymmetries
The analysis presented in Parts I and II of this paper has exposed a num-
ber of asymmetries that have deepened during the decades of financial eu-
phoria. The list below summarises these findings by classifying these asym-
metries by their underlying dimension. 
Figure 15: International Lorenz Curve 2010 (PPP)32
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Asymmetries of power
• Asymmetry between the reach and scope of political regulations and 
the realm of private economic expansion: the collapse of inter-state 
agreements in the field of foreign exchange regulation and their ab-
sence regarding the flows of capital made the world wide open for the 
international expansion of private actors. By the same token, exchange 
risk has been demutualised, leaving some actors less prepared to cope 
with it. 
• Asymmetry between the regulated and unregulated components of the 
financial universe: the collapse of the Bretton Woods system has set the 
stage for the development of financial markets and institutions outside 
the regulatory perimeter. This uneven treatment created deep asym-
metries between regulated and non-regulated financial actors and was 
one of the factors which amplified systemic risk.
Size matters: Asymmetries between actors
• Asymmetry in the size and transnational reach of enterprises: the pos-
sibilities of transnational expansion have been grasped by a limited 
number of corporations. Today these ‘global giants’ are the backbone 
of the transnational economy, and as such they are able to structure 
and organise the work of tens of thousands of their suppliers and dis-
tributors.
• Asymmetry in legal and market power between the physical economic 
agent (employee or customer) and the ‘global giants’ as moral persons. 
The asymmetry relates not only to size but to the ontological nature of 
these two types of ‘persons’, which size only reinforces. 
• Asymmetry between countries that are net exporters or net importers 
of financial assets. In the last decades the expected massive transfer of 
financial resources from the North to the South did not take place, 
with the bulk of foreign direct investment being concentrated on a 
very limited number of countries.
Asymmetries between capital and the real economy
• Asymmetry between capital and labour: the autonomisation of finan-
cial capital, further reinforced by the dominance of the shareholder 
value approach to management, has fundamentally changed the rela-
tionship between labour and capital within enterprises. Consequently, 
return on capital (financial efficiency) has gained overall pre-eminence, 
with labour, clients, and suppliers being more often than not the ad-
justment variable.
• Asymmetry between the real economy and social constraints and their 
financial and virtual mirror image: financial considerations and ex-
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pectations—intermediated by financial markets—have gained the up-
per hand in setting the targets for listed corporations (and their value 
chains) as well as for public bodies.
Asymmetries in access 
• Asymmetry in the distribution of income: during recent decades, ine-
qualities in income distribution have diminished neither internation-
ally nor nationally to any significant extent.
• Asymmetry in magnitude between the daily needs of 40% of the world 
population and the volumes and values of financial transactions and 
assets. The poorest 40% of the world lives roughly with 10% of GWP, 
while the approximate value of total financial assets is 40 times higher; 
the annual turnover on forex markets is 230 times higher; the value of 
outstanding derivatives is 120 times higher; and the balance sheet of 
the 29 systemically important banks is 10 times higher. These figures 
give an idea about economic and financial disparities between the ‘the 
financial capitals’ of the world and the distant periphery.
• Asymmetry in understanding the intricacies of financial innovation: 
weak or absent regulation was instrumental in the explosion of finan-
cial innovation which in many respects was never properly understood 
by the end-users.
• Asymmetries tantamount to moral hazard or free riding. In these situ-
ations the short-term benefit for one player is said to rationally justify 
behaviours that are detrimental to the group. This is what happens 
when systemic risk materialises as a consequence of free riding by some 
players. 
The preceding pages suggest that the unleashing of markets discussed in 
Part I has had two effects: on one side the aggregate growth of world out-
put; on the other, the building up and deepening of several asymmetries. 
This list is but a survey and could easily be extended. This situation poses 
two important questions: 1) on a general and systemic level, given the intri-
cate relationship between the two realities of aggregate growth and deepen-
ing asymmetries, whether the deepening of asymmetries is an inescapable 
consequence—or even the engine—of economic growth; and 2) on a more 
practical level, largely independent from the first question, what ought the 
Christian attitude be towards these so-called asymmetries. 
Throughout the sections of technical analysis, the word ‘asymmetry’ has 
been systematically preferred to other value-loaded terms such as ‘injustice’ 
in order to avoid implicit value judgments. In its broad sense, ‘asymmetry’ 
means a lack of harmony, a lack of balance, a lack of proportionality, or even 
possibly a lack of justice. That being said, the Christian perspective and rec-
ipe for action must go beyond the aesthetic considerations of ‘asymmetry’ 
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and involve the dimension of justice and take action needed to restore 
or support it. The concern for justice has pre-eminence over the general 
considerations about the relationship between asymmetries and economic 
growth simply because overall efficiency ought not to be seen as a morally 
acceptable justification for a lack of justice. Indeed, as it has been cease-
lessly repeated by Catholic Social Teaching, economic activity has to serve 
the human person and society, not the other way around. In consequence, 
Common Good and integral human development have pre-eminence over 
efficiency. When asymmetries challenge basic requirements of justice and 
of social harmony they require informed corrective action respectful of the 
Common Good. 
The aim of Part III is to replace the technical diagnosis of asymmetries 
into a broader context of Catholic Social Teaching, and more precisely in 
the perspective of its core notion, the notion of the Common Good. This 
perspective will shed light on possible avenues and methods for action.
Is not this the fast that I choose:
 to loose the bonds of injustice,
 to undo the thongs of the yoke,
 to let the oppressed go free,
 and to break every yoke?
Is it not to share your bread with the hungry,
 and bring the homeless poor into your house;
 when you see the naked, to cover them,
 and not to hide yourself from your own kin?
Isaiah 58:6–7
Parts I and II have shown that increased efficiency has undoubtedly contributed to overall economic performance in the ‘Age of Eupho-ric Finance’. However, the same pages also show that these unprece-
dented achievements were accompanied by deepening asymmetries. Many 
of the encountered asymmetries seem to overlap more often than compen-
sate for each other. Therefore, the chances of being on the weak side of one 
asymmetry correlates strongly with (and probably also depends on) the fact 
of being in the same situation in respect of other lines of symmetry. In such 
cases, the multiple asymmetries would combine into one unique multi-di-
mensional reality. The fact that many of these asymmetries overlap simply 
indicates that the weak are at the same time the poor, the vulnerable, and 
the excluded.
The multidimensional character of weaknesses, vulnerability, and poverty 
of these same persons, enterprises, or regions would therefore appear today 
to be systemic34. If the systemic diagnosis is correct, it implies that possible 
remedies must also be systemic, i.e. not only multi-level and multi-actor 
but also coherent. The Christian perspective offers a sufficient framework 
for designing such a multi-faceted, coherent action.
The question of how these asymmetries can and should be addressed de-
pends on the answer to another question: does the deepening of asym-
metries in general, and in particular those described herein, belong to 
accidental consequences of increased economic efficiency and overall pros-
perity, or are they rather inescapable consequences stemming from the very 
‘logic of the system’? Forty years ago, Arthur Okun put his finger on the 
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trade-off between efficiency and equality which he thought of as being an 
inescapable one. Was Okun right? Is the world today facing an either/or 
alternative without any room to manoeuvre? Or are there possibilities not 
only to mitigate or contain asymmetries but drastically to reduce them 
without destroying the efficiency-driven engine of economic growth? If the 
latter is true, what criteria should be used to assess the acceptable and realis-
tic trade-offs? And more fundamentally, are trade-offs between values (such 
as equity) and tools (such as efficiency) acceptable to Christians35?
Part III looks at the ‘systemic conundrum of asymmetries and inequi-
ties’ as a challenge confronting the present world. Catholic Social Teaching 
(CST) may provide an inspiration and a compass for action addressing 
this challenge. Part III has two sections. In the first section, two different 
ways of approaching asymmetries are contrasted and discussed: The ‘effi-
cient equilibrium’ perspective versus the ‘Common Good’ perspective. The 
second section identifies some avenues for action to address the systemic 
causes of asymmetries.  
Efficient equilibrium vs. the Common Good
Efficiency is the key driver of economic and managerial rationality. This 
notion is currently used on the macro-economic as well as micro-economic 
levels; in both cases it refers to resources used in achieving results.
On the micro-economic level, efficiency is closely related to productivity. 
While productivity focuses on the contribution of one factor of produc-
tion to the overall result, efficiency has a broader meaning. It refers to the 
way—often called the rational way—all resources are used so as to achieve 
more with the same, or, conversely, the same with less. The reference point 
of micro-economic efficiency is the internal working of the firm36.
The ultimate goal in all teaching and efforts in modern management is the 
achievement of the highest possible level of efficiency. From the managerial 
perspective, technical efficiency is instrumental for achieving economic and 
financial efficiency. In fact, in all enterprises around the world, more or less 
successful efforts are carried out on two fronts: 1) on the production side 
to minimise the total unitary costs of output and the amount of financial 
capital used; and 2) on the distribution side, to maximise receipts for each 
and every unit sold. In order to achieve this, on the production side, the 
contribution of each and every input is assessed and determined individu-
ally and its remuneration agreed accordingly. A parallel effort takes place on 
the sales side, where the willingness of every potential client to pay is scru-
tinised by sophisticated marketing tools. This overall drive for efficiency 
in any individual firm is however constrained by external elements such as 
the level of market competition. The stronger the competition, the smaller 
the margins to manoeuvre for individual firms in terms of input costs and 
output prices. In the ideal world of economic theory, in which perfect mar-
ket competition sets the reference, paradoxically no margin of manoeuvre 
58
“This concise and very 
elegant theory lies at the very 
root of the neo-liberal world-
view which ... states as an act 
of faith that as state regu-
lation decreases, the degree 
of competition increases, 
which in turn implies higher 
efficiency and a higher degree 
of realisation of the general 
interest.”
¶ General interest
Beyond the Financial Crisis
is left to the management of the individual firm as inputs are priced across 
the economy at their marginal productivity, technology is common, and 
homogenous outputs are sold at one unique ‘market clearing’ price. In this 
ideal world, therefore, allocative efficiency prevails as firms are forced by 
markets either to attain the highest possible level of internal technical effi-
ciency or to exit.
On the macro-economic level, the notion of efficiency refers either to 
the allocative efficiency realised by markets, or to the so-called Pareto effi-
ciency and the subsequent income distribution. Allocative efficiency focuses 
on the way available resources (including labour and capital) are allocated 
to different productions. Macro-economic allocation is meant to be opti-
mal or fully efficient only in model-type situations of perfect competition. 
Under these conditions, the economy produces only those goods and ser-
vices that are of highest importance to customers. The absence of exter-
nalities—i.e. external effects which are not accounted for in the market 
price—is a necessary, though highly unrealistic, condition for a successful 
fully efficient or optimal allocation.
The name Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) is associated with the notion of 
income distribution efficiency. Within the neo-classical world of models, a 
given distribution is optimal or Pareto-efficient when one person cannot 
be made better-off without making someone else worse off37. In an ideal 
world, there are only those who at the same time produce and consume. In 
a situation of efficiency, each of them receives an income which is strictly 
equal to his or her contribution to the overall production effort. Everyone 
is entitled to use these revenues to maximise his or her preferences by put-
ting price-tags on goods and this, in turn, drives production. As the actors 
are supposed to be self-interested, by the same token the situation of alloc-
ative and Pareto efficiency coincides with social optimum or the so-called 
general interest. 
This concise and very elegant theory lies at the very root of the neo-liberal 
worldview which has inspired the recent unleashing of market forces. The 
corresponding political rationality, derived from theory by the way of many 
simplifications and inconsistencies, states as an act of faith that as state 
regulation decreases, the degree of competition increases, which in turn 
implies higher efficiency and a higher degree of realisation of the general 
interest.
The notion of ‘interest’ plays a key role in contemporary econom-ic theorising. For the still-dominant economic theory, general interest is the aggregation of individual—self-centred—interests. 
Without entering into technicalities, the accepted rules of aggregation will 
determine where general interest lies. Are individual interests personal or 
can one consider a common denominator such as a ‘representative’ individ-
ual? Must individual interests be considered in an order of preferences—
as meant by Pareto himself—thereby making aggregation and numerical 
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comparisons impossible? Or can individual interests be expressed in nu-
merical form? And if so, to what extent can the gains of some even out the 
losses of others? These questions have never received a final response. They 
were discussed for centuries by moralists, political philosophers, and scien-
tists. Surprisingly however, the fact that these debates are still open has little 
bearing on economic theory, which fosters general interest as an arithmetic 
aggregation of individual ones by its unique recommendation—greater ef-
ficiency by way of increased competition.
Among the finest intellectual achievements of the still-dominant neo-clas-
sical theory are ‘general equilibrium models’ which consider jointly the two 
sides of economic activity: production and consumption. These models 
formally confirm that if markets are perfect and driven exclusively by ra-
tional self-interest, they will deliver maximum efficiency and the highest 
possible level of satisfaction of the ‘general interest’. These ideal considera-
tions are behind the ideological and simplified political vision which may 
be termed the ‘Ideality-inspired Efficient Equilibrium’ (IEE) view and which 
has inspired many economic policy choices during the last decades. 
Summing up, the justification of unbridled economic rationality derives 
its moral strength from the promise that private interests drive efficiency 
and pave the way for the better fulfilment of the general interest. Despite 
its elegance and formal appeal, IEE rests on five major limitations or am-
biguities:
• By design, the general interest is the aggregation of interests of only 
those who take part in productive activity. Thus, about half of the 
population is left outside of the scope of the narrowly defined general 
interest; 
• Efficient equilibrium rests on the idea that the income of each agent 
is strictly equal to its productive contribution. This supposes that such 
contribution can be established beyond any doubt. 
• General interest—and the related efficient or optimal solution or equi-
librium—is the outcome of the aggregation in which the losses of some 
may be more than off-set by the gains of others. In such calculations 
the absolute level of gains and losses is taken into account irrespective 
of their relative weight on the situation of those affected. While it is 
obvious that losing or gaining one unit does not have the same mean-
ing when one has 10 or 10,000 of such units, the two situations are 
treated equally in this paradigm. 
• Ultimately, any general interest or efficient equilibrium related calcu-
lation is based on pure exchange transactions using monetary equiva-
lents. The underlying assumption is that all of human life and concerns 
can be expressed exclusively in terms of monetary gains, losses, and 
possible compensations.
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• The notion of general interest present in economic theory is deeply 
different from the ‘general interest’ as conceived by Jean-Jacques Rous-
seau and his followers. For Rousseau, citizens intuitively recognise 
where the public good (or interest) lies and are able to surrender to it 
when the public interest and their own private interests diverge. This 
shows that the general interest of Rousseau is based on a pledge about 
the universality of an abstract, public good-centred, enlightened citi-
zen which has little to do with the self-centred, rational, and private 
satisfaction-maximising individual conceived of by economic theory.
In the narrowly idealised world, increased output—i.e. efficiency—may well be achieved by way of deeper asymmetries. Indeed, a widening productivity gap and the corresponding widening income gaps be-
tween individuals as well as between countries may well be instrumental in 
increasing overall, aggregate output, making the whole more efficient. Such 
a situation is fully compatible with classical models of pure international 
trade theory, which show that free trade increases overall production, but 
which are silent about how these gains split among trading partners. Fur-
thermore, model-related efficiency can ideally be achieved despite the fact 
that unproductive members of society are simply ignored or even discard-
ed, which theoretically means they are deprived of their subsistence. 
Another weakness of these models is the fact that they are static. They 
are not able to explain which internal mechanism can drive the world from 
a situation with low competition to one with increased competition, and 
how the promised effects of diminishing inequalities or more inclusive 
growth can be achieved38. In other words, where competition is low, no 
internal market force is able to eradicate monopolistic or oligopolistic rents 
and increase the level of competition. The converse however is not true, as 
perverse dynamics of growing rents derived from proprietary assets, exter-
nalities, dominant market positions, or dominant roles within enterprises 
together with underlying power relations are sources of potential self-deep-
ening distortions. This vicious cycle of ‘distortions-rents’ may further rein-
force asymmetries and inequalities of all kinds, especially between enter-
prises, and between factors of production. 
In the real world where competition is far from perfect and where exter-
nalities flourish, the fact that a built-in automatic mechanism geared to 
greater efficiency is missing in the general construct of the market economy 
is even more problematic. In many real situations power relations, rents, 
and distortions subsist without state intervention, as suggested by the em-
pirical insights presented in Parts I and II. Despite significant evidence that 
markets do not automatically tend to perfect competition, for the neo-lib-
eral mantra, the only prudent way of combating rents and distortions is to 
further increase the room left to private economic rationality. 
Another practical weakness of the IEE approach is its inability to deal 
with inter-temporal choices which involve uncertainty. Financial tech-
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niques domesticate—and pervert—uncertainty by limiting the scope of 
possible events and by assigning corresponding probabilities. In such a 
closed probabilistic world, risk and corresponding hedging techniques, dis-
count rates, and risk premiums seem prudent. They allow for extending 
the limits of IEE models to inter-temporal situations by way of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis. In the real world, however, as the crisis has reminded us, 
probabilistic risk management techniques do not suffice for providing firm 
ground for fully rational inter-temporal calculations. For this reason, IEE 
is essentially merely a static concept. 
The notion of the ‘Common Good’ is central to Catholic Social Teaching. All its principles—solidarity, subsidiarity, the preferen-tial option for the poor, the prominence of labour over capital, and 
so on—are in fact markers on the roads converging towards the Common 
Good. None of these principles are self-sufficient; they complement and 
reinforce each other and combine into the highest common good, which 
is ultimately the unity of all in God. The following quotations help to 
capture the meaning of this concept which has a long-standing presence 
in Christian philosophy and against which modern concepts of general 
interest (both economic theory and the Rousseau-inspired political theory) 
were erected between the 16th and 19th centuries:
“The common good is not the good of the abstract collective or the state, 
nor is it merely the amalgamation of goods of individual members, but 
rather the good of every person both as an individual and as a social being 
in relation to others. … The common good does not exist only on the 
level of state or nation, however, but at the level of every human group 
or community. Thus we can speak of common good of families of asso-
ciations, local communities, the Church, states, nations and of any other 
human group that fall somewhere in between. Moreover, along with the 
particular common good of these different human groups, we can also 
recognise the universal common good of the entire human family. A con-
stant teaching of the Catholic social doctrine has been that whenever a 
human society exists, some sort of authority must also exist to safeguard 
and promote the common good of that society. This goes for the world 
society as well.”39
The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church gives additional 
insights into this key concept: 
“The principle of the common good, to which every aspect of social life must 
be related if it is to attain its fullest meaning, stems from the dignity, unity 
and equality of all people. According to its primary and broadly accepted 
sense, the common good indicates ‘the sum of those conditions of so-
cial life which allow social groups and their individual member relatively 
thorough and ready access to their own fulfilment’ (GS 26.1). 
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The common good does not consist in the simple sum of the particular goods of 
each subject of a social entity. Belonging to everyone and to each person, it is 
and remains ‘common’, because it is indivisible and because only together is it 
possible to attain it, increase it and safeguard its effectiveness, with regard also 
to the future. Just as the moral actions of an individual are accomplished 
in doing what is good, so too the actions of a society attain their full 
stature when they bring about the common good. The common good, in 
fact, can be understood as the social and community dimension of the 
moral good.
The common good of society is not an end in itself; it has value only in refer-
ence to attaining the ultimate ends of the person and the universal common 
good of the whole of creation. God is the ultimate end of his creatures and 
for no reason may the common good be deprived of its transcendent 
dimension, which moves beyond the historical dimension while at the 
same time fulfilling it.”40
The Ideality-inspired Efficient Equilibrium (IEE) and the Common Good perspectives differ fundamentally in almost every aspect. They share however one basic feature: both carry a normative 
load as they identify a kind of ‘perfect society’ and target it as worth being 
achieved. This means that each of them may inspire or justify political and 
economic decisions at all levels of a social system. The following compar-
ison between the general interest and the Common Good does not do 
justice to the whole subject, as it is limited to the four most meaningful 
dimensions for the present argument.
a. Implementing the Common Good: God’s work or human deeds?
The fully efficient equilibrium is referred to as a spontaneous outcome 
of self-centred rationalities intermediated by non-regulated markets. IEE 
describes a situation of permanent tension and latent rivalry between fun-
damentally divergent conflicting interests in everlasting competition for 
the control of limited available resources. Price mechanism is thus only a 
method for conflict resolution among rationally calculating agents. IEE 
requires neither institutions of any kind nor efforts or self-restraint on the 
part of the actors. It is a steady-state idealised mechanical equilibrium re-
sulting from opposing forces. Quite the contrary, private vices (such as 
greed) are expected to drive the total outcome spontaneously towards a 
greater general interest. 
The prerequisites for the Common Good are different: it requires both 
effort and self-restraint by each and every member of the group or soci-
ety, and cooperation among them. The Common Good will not appear 
as a ‘deus ex machina’. It will result from cooperation and convergence—
through conflict mitigation and resolution because parties are open to 
higher levels of the Common Good. The ground for common good has to 
“Things are different with the 
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be prepared step by step, day by day, by continuous and conscious efforts 
in two directions—one structural, the other one virtuous. On one side, 
the betterment of institutions is instrumental to the Common Good. On 
the other side, the virtuous behaviour of persons ultimately contributes to 
changing institutions. In the Christian perspective, the Common Good is 
a reality progressively emerging out of the imperfect world because of the 
moral motivation of the daily deeds of all concerned41. 
According to IEE theory, once markets are perfect the optimal situation 
will last for ever. What exogenous force will bring about such a situation? 
An external shock is required, a kind of ‘act of God’ such as the 1986 ‘Big 
Bang’ in British financial services. However, once the perpetuum mobile 
of efficiency is put in motion, it is expected to run for ever. Therefore, 
Fukuyama’s idea of the ‘End of History’ (see Part I) corresponds fully to 
the self-perpetuating vision of efficient equilibrium. Once efficiency pre-
vails, time as a vector of change and space as the vector of diversity may 
melt away and disappear. The world becomes flat and stalled as perpetuum 
mobile takes over. Things are different with the Common Good: the degree 
of its realisation in any given historical moment depends on the readiness 
of members of the group to act according to their profound vocation of 
brotherly humanity42.
b. The underlying anthropology
One of the key differences between efficient equilibrium and the Com-
mon Good is the underlying anthropology. For the IEE approach, human 
beings are self-centred individuals geared toward maximising their own 
utility or satisfaction, unmoved by others who they consider only as trad-
ing partners. The classical homo oeconomicus—or his grandson homo finan-
ciarius—provides the anthropological reference for the IEE context. The 
anthropological underpinnings of the Common Good are fundamentally 
different: the person—not the individual—is the reference here. According 
to the person-centred view, each human being becomes oneself through 
relationships with other human beings. Every person is at the same time 
autonomous, but not independent from others. The self flourishes through 
constant relation with others. Human persons by nature care for others for 
they can only flourish by giving and receiving love. 
For the Common Good, the fulfilment of ‘each person’ as person (indi-
vidual and relational) is the only legitimate reference. The Common Good 
rests on the principle of the inalienable—non-tradable, impossible to com-
pensate for—dignity of each person. In this narrow sense the Common 
Good is ‘egalitarian’, as each person is equally incommensurable. IEE takes 
a radically different, if not contrary approach, in which the weight of one 
unit in the general interest depends on the absolute ‘amount’ of utility or 
satisfaction it generates. In other words, the weight of each member in so-
ciety corresponds to her or his productive contribution.
The main anthropological difference between the two paradigms dis-
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cussed here lies in the origin and destiny of man: for the IEE theory man is 
a self-defined, possibly even self-created, autonomous calculating self. For 
Christians every person is a child of God anxious to return to his loving 
Father, his beginning and his ultimate end. The earthly life of a Christian 
is the part of this journey where he or she can express through deed his or 
her love for the Father. Because of this difference in anthropology, the two 
paradigms are unbridgeable. 
In the Common Good perspective, human groups (such as families or 
enterprises) are more than aggregations of individuals. Thus the common 
good of each of these groups is more than the sum of its individual com-
ponents. By its very nature, common good cannot be decomposed into its 
building blocks; it is the good of a group, as a group. The raison d’être of the 
Common Good is the perspective of enhancing the fulfilment—including 
also the transcendent dimension of unity in God—of each group and of 
each of its members. It is a fulfilment in line with the personal calling 
of each and every person, that is, respectful of natural differences. In this 
sense, the concept of common good sets a dynamic target and extends the 
concern to the future, and beyond, to the end of times. 
On the contrary, economists’ concept of general interest recognises ex-
clusively the independent individual interest as an ontological reality. That 
being said, these individual interests can be mechanically aggregated into 
larger wholes—such as general interest—or disaggregated, but only for the 
purposes of calculation. IEE is a static concept leaving no room for change, 
evolution, or betterment43. 
c. Horizon of action and responsibility of actors 
General interest is a concept initially rooted in a long tradition of polit-
ical philosophy and political anthropology. When this notion was trans-
posed to economics in the late 19th century and then formalised within 
the IEE approach, a wealth of nuances disappeared, leaving as its only first 
principle the idea that human nature is based on self-interest. When used 
today, in most cases (but not all) the notion of general interest refers more 
to the arithmetic of individual interests and to the ideal of models than to 
philosophical nuances of the previous discussions in political philosophy. 
The Common Good has an even longer intellectual history. Its function 
has always been to provide guidance and a moral compass for individual 
and for collective acts rather than to propose a detailed description of a 
dubious arrival point. Indeed, the Common Good is at the same time the 
ultimate horizon of the end of times and a tension between the present and 
the arrival point. This notion cannot be properly understood without its 
eschatological reference: the ‘Civilisation of Love’ which sets the horizon 
for the earthly, imperfect reconciliation between the personal good and the 
universal Common Good44.
The Common Good sets a horizon and a target beyond the reach of 
purely human forces. Indeed, tensions between the egocentric and relation-
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al dimensions of every human person are part of his nature as corrupted 
by original sin. What gives ultimate consistency to the Common Good is 
the hope that the good of persons and the good of communities do not 
exclude each other but rather that they combine and reinforce each other 
in the long term. In other words, the Common Good epitomises the ev-
er-growing moral quality of human interactions and, ultimately, of human 
societies.
The Common Good is at the same time a realistic hope and a conflict-
ing reality. It is not a deus ex machina but rather results from a constant 
search by the concerned actors for the convergence of the concrete, real 
good of persons and communities. By recognising the conflicting nature of 
common good, one also acknowledges the room to manoeuvre among the 
ambiguities, tensions, and complexities of real life within which economic 
and social actors are bound. Even if it is accepted by Christians that the 
Common Good will not fully be achieved in historical time, the search for 
it does not take place in the fantasy of models but in reality. 
Asymmetries and inequalities are thus normally present in every group 
searching and aiming for the Common Good. They are acceptable as long 
as they are not inequities, injustice, or exclusion—as long as they do not 
hinder members of the community from reaching fulfilment. When this is 
the case, members of the group have the moral duty to take action to restore 
equity and justice—that is, to combat or mitigate relevant asymmetries, 
so as to alleviate their negative consequences on the weakest. In this con-
text, the principles of Catholic Social Teaching are setting the right—in the 
moral sense—directions for action, but they leave the ultimate practical 
responsibility to the actors concerned. In this context, institutions and legal 
norms setting the ground for a social organisation or an authority dedi-
cated to the Common Good may be helpful in channelling the individual 
actions in the appropriate direction. 
In its pure expression, IEE is timeless and spaceless. However, all the 
political choices this vision has inspired stem from a consequentialist—or 
more precisely utilitarian—approach. The only possible justification that 
this paradigm may provide is the level of total expected outcomes (present 
and discounted future) for the agent. Therefore the outcome plays the role 
of moral standard whereby ‘more is better’. In the Christian approach, on 
the contrary, the moral quality of deeds is measured both by the immediate 
impact on each and every one and by its virtuous character. This means that 
actions (economic and political) inspired by the two approaches will differ 
greatly as to the relative weights given to the immediate present and also 
to the moral quality of the action as such. For Christians the immediate 
effects on our ‘daily bread’ are of utmost importance.
d. Fecundity versus efficiency; relations versus transactions
As mentioned above, the IEE construct relies on all present competition 
(confrontation of mutually exclusive aspirations). In the context of this 
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idealised war of all against all, violence is contained by market mechanisms. 
In this war, transactions or contracts can be seen as moments of truce. They 
are minimal points of agreement necessary for exchanging goods and ser-
vices and more generally necessary for a non-violent, but not fully peaceful, 
continuation of social trade. Within the IEE paradigm, transactions and 
contracts are the only patterns of interaction. By definition transactions 
are equivalent, anonymous, instantaneous, or self-liquidating, and do not 
generate externalities. As such they play the important role of temporally 
mitigating tensions, though without resolving them. In fact these tensions 
have to be maintained as they are the very engines of competition.
From the perspective of the Common Good, human beings have more to 
gain from cooperation than from confrontation. By nature, human persons 
are not only individuals but also the nexus of lasting relationships with fel-
low men and women. Economic exchanges, transactions, or contracts are 
expressions of unavoidable tensions and needed compromises. But they are 
just one of the possible patterns of human interaction. Indeed, transactions 
resulting out of confrontations have to be contrasted with relationships as 
expressions of cooperation. A relationship is never efficient in the econom-
ic sense because, at every single moment, it is by definition unbalanced, 
open-ended and multi-dimensional45. 
 Relationships are by their nature the place where incommensurability, 
gratuity, and spontaneity take root. In the short term, relationships appear 
genuinely non-efficient in the market, for they divert resources from oth-
er uses. In the longer term however, the gratuity, risk-taking, spontaneity, 
and incommensurability which are embedded in any relations may prove 
fruitful. These benefits are impossible to anticipate or account for with 
precision, but they may be economic, spiritual, and social—such as mutual 
trust, reciprocity, resilience, or unexpected innovation. 
On the other hand, a transaction in perfect and instantaneous markets is 
always efficient but also atemporal. In the world of perfect competition and 
of general interest, every possible bit of information about possible transac-
tions is accounted for in the price. Externalities are thereby fully internal-
ised, making the prices efficient. This situation leaves no room for gratuity 
and no room for the unexpected. Under the reign of efficiency there is no 
room left for fecundity, which by definition is gratuitous, unexpected, and 
impossible to account for46.
Combating asymmetries:  
Putting the principles of CST in motion 
The Common Good has to be built and thus requires the efforts of Christians and of men and women of good will. These efforts have to be consistently pursued on three levels: on the structuring 
macro-level of institutions broadly understood as setting lasting frames for 
¶ Misplaced trust:  
Destroying the golden 
calf
67Towards a Christian Perspective for Action
human interactions, on the meso level of mechanisms which are the more 
volatile patterns of interactions (such as enterprises or other groups), and 
on the micro-level of direct personal deeds. These levels differ in their lev-
erage. The higher the level of action, the broader will be its potential struc-
turing effects on actions at other levels. Despite the difference in leverage, 
the nature of decisions and actions is the same at every level. At the macro, 
meso, and micro levels persons have to make decisions in unique circum-
stances and implicitly or explicitly take a moral position47.
The second section of Part III explores some issues related to the main 
principles of Catholic Social Teaching, whose efforts inspired by the Com-
mon Good could significantly contribute to reducing asymmetries and 
restoring equity and justice without threatening the basic principle of eco-
nomic freedom on which the construct of the market economy stands.
Since 2007, it has been an open secret that finance has failed to deliver on its promises. There is however less agreement on the reasons for this failure. The most widely recognised of causes of the crisis are the 
many dysfunctions since identified within the world of finance—such as 
greed, abuse of trust (moral hazard), information asymmetry, and conflicts 
of interest. All these dysfunctions would not have done the damage the 
world has witnessed since 2007 if another less-acknowledged cause had not 
gone on unnoticed for decades. Western societies implicitly accepted the 
promises of progress towards a better world built upon technical rationality. 
As financial mavericks were part of these promises of technical rationality, 
the necessary room to manoeuvre was granted to finance. The rationale for 
accepting the deal was the hope and expectation that additional monetary 
resources—generated by finance—would appease the growing existential 
anguish of the West ‘liberated’ from religious myths. Technical rationality 
inspired by financial science spread across free global markets, drowning 
immaterial concerns with material wealth and a false sense of security.
The underlying reason why finance will ultimately deceive is the simple 
fact that finance cannot provide a lasting solution to the existential fears 
of the developed world. In other words, the true reason for the deceit after 
three decades of financial euphoria is that finance did not deserve all this 
trust in the first place. To put it simply: trust was misplaced. Western socie-
ties took financial promises at face value without conducting even minimal 
philosophical ‘due diligence’. The same policymakers and key intellectu-
als that laid the groundwork for financial euphoria have been deliberately 
deaf to generations of moralists who never really stopped warning against 
the dangers of monetary seduction, from the Gospel48 and St John Chrys-
ostom49, to more recent philosophers Jacques Ellul50 and François-Marie 
Monnet51, and finally to Pope Francis in Evangelii Gaudium: 
“One cause of this situation is found in our relationship with money, 
since we calmly accept its dominion over ourselves and our societies. The 
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current financial crisis can make us overlook the fact that it originated in 
a profound human crisis: the denial of the primacy of the human person! 
We have created new idols. The worship of the ancient golden calf (cf. 
Ex 32:1-35) has returned in a new and ruthless guise in the idolatry of 
money and the dictatorship of an impersonal economy lacking a truly 
human purpose. The worldwide crisis affecting finance and the economy 
lays bare their imbalances and, above all, their lack of real concern for 
human beings; man is reduced to one of his needs alone: consumption.
While the earnings of a minority are growing exponentially, so too is the 
gap separating the majority from the prosperity enjoyed by those happy 
few. This imbalance is the result of ideologies which defend the absolute 
autonomy of the marketplace and financial speculation. Consequently, 
they reject the right of states, charged with vigilance for the common 
good, to exercise any form of control. A new tyranny is thus born, in-
visible and often virtual, which unilaterally and relentlessly imposes its 
own laws and rules. Debt and the accumulation of interest also make it 
difficult for countries to realize the potential of their own economies and 
keep citizens from enjoying their real purchasing power. To all this we can 
add widespread corruption and self-serving tax evasion, which have taken 
on worldwide dimensions. The thirst for power and possessions knows 
no limits. In this system, which tends to devour everything which stands 
in the way of increased profits, whatever is fragile, like the environment, 
is defenseless before the interests of a deified market, which become the 
only rule.
Behind this attitude lurks a rejection of ethics and a rejection of God. 
Ethics has come to be viewed with a certain scornful derision. It is seen 
as counterproductive, too human, because it makes money and power 
relative. It is felt to be a threat, since it condemns the manipulation and 
debasement of the person. In effect, ethics leads to a God who calls for a 
committed response which is outside the categories of the marketplace. 
When these latter are absolutized, God can only be seen as uncontrolla-
ble, unmanageable, even dangerous, since he calls human beings to their 
full realization and to freedom from all forms of enslavement. Ethics—a 
non-ideological ethics—would make it possible to bring about balance 
and a more humane social order. With this in mind, I encourage financial 
experts and political leaders to ponder the words of one of the sages of 
antiquity: ‘Not to share one’s wealth with the poor is to steal from them 
and to take away their livelihood. It is not our own goods which we hold, 
but theirs.’ ”52
At the root of the present crisis lies a seductive worldview which, in fact, 
derives from a fourfold confusion—characteristic of our times—which re-
sulted in misplacing trust in financial techniques: 
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• Confusion between finance as a means and finance as an end in 
itself. As a succession of numbers, money is infinite. Hence, the accu-
mulation of monetary wealth theoretically has no limits. The same is 
true of greed, which aims to have more, solely for its own sake, without 
any other external objectives. When the distinction between ends and 
means loses its sharpness, the temptation arises to see the accumulation 
of liquid wealth as self-actualising; 
• Confusion between the person on the other side of the deal and the 
faceless anonymous market. In modern financial markets, anony-
mous crowds of financial asset holders interact through standardised 
contracts. In this perspective the personhood of ‘the other’ disappears 
or dissolves into the faceless mass. In a fully anonymous and deper-
sonalised context where persons are replaced by abstractions such as 
‘market’ or ‘consensus’, the notions of ethics, of ex ante responsibility 
for deeds and their consequences, lose their meaning. At best, respon-
sibility is limited to ex post facto monetary compensation for damage53. 
This confusion may destroy any sense of ex ante responsibility on a very 
large scale;
• Confusion and insensitive trade-offs between the present, the future, 
and often the past. Finance is about inter-temporal dealings in which 
time is just an objective variable in the equation. The use of a discount 
rate gives a financial expression to time, but erases the sense of the ex-
istence of agents in a given historical moment. From a purely financial 
perspective future and present become tradable. This is not the case in 
real life where time has a subjective and irreversible character. Time is 
not just a chronological succession of equivalent and interchangeable 
seconds. It is a set of unique moments of uneven, subjective density 
and importance. Financial lenses do not capture the kairos of time; 
they ignore or even contest its very existence. By refusing the kairotic 
dimension of time, finance threatens to dehumanise it.
• Confusion between reality and virtual reality. At one end, modern 
finance manipulates symbols in an abstract virtual world of formulas 
and spreadsheets. Meanwhile, at the other end, finance deals with pay-
ment flows, ownership, debt, and the creation and trading of assets, 
and as such belongs to the actual world of real human deeds. The legal 
system and other rules (such as accounting) are there to make the two 
coincide. Virtual reality is more than just a passive ‘mirror image’ of 
reality in an era of light-speed information technology, because virtual 
reality and reality are today interdependent. However, the nexus is an-
ything but perfect, in that they often do not fully coincide. The virtual 
picture is often simpler, more straight-forward and with less nuance 
and discontinuity. It is more often about scalable figures than about 
real people and dissentious bricks and stones. Finance, by design, op-
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erates in a smooth virtual reality and only indirectly shapes reality. Be-
cause of the illusory character of virtual reality, financial professionals 
tend to underestimate the resistance and the constraints of reality. 
These four confusions made their way into the minds and perceptions 
of many during the decades of unprecedented expansion of finance. They 
contributed greatly to renewing and reinforcing the idolatry of finance and 
money. The eternal seductive power of money, reinforced by these mod-
ern confusions, contributed to constructing an IEE worldview: a faceless 
world (un-human), timeless (i.e. eternal and beyond history), abstract 
(self-contained, without reference to reality), and self-actualising, a world 
driven free from moral restraint and ultimately driven by the instinct of 
limitless accumulation (greed). 
The crisis took off the masque and helped to discover the full picture of 
progressing idolatry. As mentioned in the Introduction, the crisis must be 
seen by people of good will as an opportunity to take adequate action and 
to renew contact with reality: with the people, with the existential dimen-
sion of time. It is an opportunity to rediscover how constructive finance 
can be when put at the service of a greater cause. 
The present crisis will last as long as misplaced trust in financial techni-
calities is not redirected to where it belongs. Humanity has to free itself 
from monetary and financial idolatry by destroying the golden calf, and 
by doing so, to rediscover its true calling to the Common Good. Catholic 
Social Teaching is of great help, for its core principles are inspiration for 
possible actions leading ultimately to rediscovering the economic and so-
cial dimension of faith. 
Economic discourse is focused on those who are fit for productive ac-tivity. This means that about half of any given society is not directly on the radar of economists. The ‘missing 50%’ is made up of chil-
dren and the elderly at either end of the spectrum, as well as of those whom 
the ‘market’ rejects—for a number of possible reasons—as unfit for pro-
ductive work. From the economic perspective, these groups appear at best 
to be beneficiaries of public transfers; at worst to be burdens and sources of 
cost to society54. Therefore the volume of public transfers is the usual eco-
nomic measure of solidarity. Once defined in this simplistic way, solidarity 
appears automatically as a threat to economic efficiency, because of the 
corresponding taxation and transfers which by-pass market discipline. This 
view of solidarity is too reductive: even if greater solidarity and mitigation 
of inequalities require increased sharing, this does not simply boil down to 
higher taxes and expanded social policies55. 
Solidarity means the sharing of scarce resources—whatever the nature of 
these resources might be. If money can buy a lot, solidarity in its genuine 
sense is multidimensional and extends well beyond money. Solidarity, as 
a horizontal bond within groups, may be effective at different levels and, 
paradoxically, highly efficient in the real world. 
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The first and immediate level of solidarity in any society is family—
narrowly as well as broadly defined. The family is the place which gener-
ates what money cannot buy and which is at least as important for human 
dignity as sheer money. But family is also the place where revenues and 
monetary resources are used for the family’s common good. In Northern 
societies, family solidarity is shrinking to its narrowest limits, as exemplified 
by the number of single-parent households. Where family solidarity ceases 
to function, public or market institutions are called upon to fill in the gaps. 
However they operate only in money- and transaction-related categories. 
In the South, family-based solidarities are stronger, but shrinking especial-
ly in cities. The amounts of remittances sent by migrants back home are 
the best illustration of how strong family bonds of solidarity may be. This 
suggests that, in the North as well as in the South, any act—personal or 
institutional—which increases the autonomy, the role and the resources of 
families is a highly efficient way to enhance solidarity and mutual responsi-
bility in society. In this respect, as well as in many others, public authorities 
should not forget that its role is to serve and strengthen families, not to sub-
stitute for them or to replace them. An often-forgotten principle of CST is 
the subsidiary role of the State in respect to families. Reinforced by public 
means, solidarity within families is thus central to CST.
The second level of solidarity is related to an inclusive labour market. 
The workplace is not only the place where income is earned, it is also where 
one’s capacity to contribute to the common good of the group is recog-
nised. Inclusive workplaces, policies, and attitudes require the willingness 
to share—work and earnings—of all concerned. Like in the parable of the 
eleventh hour workers56, workloads (i.e. productivity) and remunerations 
are to be shared so as to allow for the weakest to earn their living with 
dignity. This means that the enterprise has to be seen also as a community 
pursuing its own specific common good, where internal solidarity has a 
role to play. In this respect, much depends on the way the owners (share-
holders) and the management team understand their roles in developing 
solidarity among the different components of the enterprise. Such attitudes 
run directly against the dominant managerial mantra according to which 
efficiency requires demutualisation and strict equality between the contri-
bution to productive effort and the corresponding remuneration. In most 
enterprises—especially large ones—remunerations are therefore increasing-
ly strictly ‘productivity related’57. 
Solidarity through money transfers is the third level of solidarity. It is 
the most visible, the one on which economists mainly focus, the easiest to 
account for, but also the least personal and the easiest to prevaricate. In the 
world of growing inequalities and exclusion, so-called public social transfers 
play a growingly important role as they serve as back-stop for those who fall 
through the nets of the first two levels of solidarity. The relative size of pub-
lic transfers differs greatly from one region to the other and is also related 
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to the level of income: in the so-called ‘high income countries’ they amount 
to about 12% of national income, while in Latin America they reach 4% 
and in Africa remain around 1% of corresponding national incomes. Total 
monetary expenses on behalf of official development aid amounted in 2012 
to $130 billion US, slightly less than 0.3% of aggregate national income 
of the donor countries. Despite the limited overall amount, for many least 
developed countries, receiving these transfers is critical.
Charity and philanthropy may be seen as the fourth level of solidarity. 
In situations where the third, public level of solidarity is too weak or dys-
functional, charity and philanthropy play an absolutely key role in limiting 
the most acute exclusion. 
The financial crisis has shown the fragility of situations where money 
transfers are called in to replace (shrinking) family solidarity. The fragility 
of a public transfer-reliant social fabric in the North is clearly visible today. 
The non-viable character of this situation and its unsustainable financial 
consequences lie at the root of the recent European debt crisis. Families, 
individuals, as well as enterprises should draw the appropriate lessons from 
this experience and take steps to cure the problem at its root. Institution-
al as well as private efforts should aim at reinforcing genuine solidarities 
on the family and enterprise levels. Such measures, when carried out with 
due attention to the human dignity of all parties concerned, will inev-
itably deepen social relations, thereby preventing exclusion due to their 
face-to-face character. For this very reason, such initiatives also may give 
greater scope to the fruitfulness of inter-personal relations and not only to 
efficiency-driven transactions. Such actions and measures require courage, 
imagination, and inspiration—which CST may provide.
Two other asymmetries identified in Part II could be efficiently re-duced through solidarity-inspired measures: asymmetry between labour and capital leading to the supremacy of the latter, and 
asymmetry between the real and financial dimensions of economic activity. 
Addressing the asymmetry between labour and capital supposes the re-ex-
amination of the purpose of the corporation. Is the enterprise (or corpo-
ration) an instrument in the hands of shareholders to generate returns on 
their investments? Or is it a method of cooperative relations (and not of 
contracts as usually said) between respectful partners with its own, peculiar 
common good58?
The shareholder value philosophy—discussed earlier—carries with it one 
of the most pervasive of such inequities. It is based on the belief that the 
primacy of the interests of virtual and nomadic shareholders a) is natural 
(and therefore rightful and efficient); and b) trumps the interests of the 
employees and clients stuck in real contingencies. In ‘global giants’, this 
fundamental asymmetry is reinforced by the remoteness and anonymity 
of decision centres from places where the decisions produce real life conse-
quences. In order to mitigate these asymmetries, new institutional as well 
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as personal avenues must be opened. From the CST perspective, the most 
important step should be the acknowledgement at the level of enterprise 
and legal framework, of the legitimate existence of an enterprise’s common 
good as a moral but also a managerial value. If it were publicly and legally 
recognised, this common good would acquire its own legitimacy. It would 
consequently open doors to more solidarity among the so-called stakehold-
ers and to more appropriate management behaviour59.
At the macro level, these efforts could be supported by a better alignment 
of speed and volatility between financial transaction (milli- or nano-sec-
onds) and the real processes (in days, weeks, and even years). Increased 
viscosity of financial markets could be enhanced by dedicated tax measures 
giving a premium for greater shareholder fidelity. This of course implies 
that shadow finance is forced to come out of the shadows. 
Most contemporary legal systems agree that, when debt is granted on non-usurious conditions, all consequent obligations have to be paid to the last penny. A credit/debt contract is a peculiar and 
complex transaction as it establishes a lasting asymmetric interdependence 
between payment on the spot and commitments which bind despite an 
unknown future. For centuries, this fundamental asymmetry—acceptable 
credit conditions, interest rates, and the moral obligation to lend to the 
poor and needy—have been addressed by Christian theologians60. 
Much of the moral debate points to the asymmetric distribution of risk 
between the borrower and the lender. Indeed, unlike equity financing which 
creates a de facto partnership and establishes a limited solidarity between 
parties, a credit/debt contract sees to the contrary a borrower assuming the 
risk related to the expected outcome of his project. That is, the borrower 
gambles his future fortunes, while the lender keeps only the residual risk of 
the debtor’s insolvency. As long as the borrower has any resources, he will 
be pressed by the legal system to service his debt. Once he reaches a certain 
threshold, he or she may take refuge in bankruptcy or insolvency which are 
forms of default accepted by modern legal systems. Sharing being central 
to the principle of solidarity, one could argue that solidarity should also 
involve risk sharing. That being said, when the burden of debt becomes 
unbearable, Christians in line with the Old Testament book of Leviticus 
would prescribe an outright debt restructuring in the name of solidarity. 
One of the many asymmetries identified in previous parts refers to those 
who have committed their future for the sake of the present on one side 
(borrowers), and those who have bought these future promises with previ-
ously accumulated savings on the other (lenders). By doing so, the lenders 
may have committed their future destiny to the borrowers. When the bur-
den of debt pushes the debtor into poverty, a moral issue arises for the lend-
er: what is the ultimate level of pressure he can morally exert on the debtor? 
The Pater Noster provides an indication: lenders should be as generous with 
debtors as our heavenly Father is with us. This means, at least, that debt 
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ought to be renegotiated in the name of solidarity when the situation of 
the borrower has changed sufficiently to make the burden on his shoulders 
too heavy for him to carry. Such a renegotiation may also serve the interest 
of long-term efficiency. Thus, unlike legal systems, the Christian view on 
debt stresses the implied dimension of solidarity that binds the borrower 
and the lender. In a Christian perspective—in the name not only of sol-
idarity, but also of justice—debt renegotiation ought to be as frequent as 
required by the changes each of the two parties to the contract experience 
in their situations, needs, and possibilities. This applies to debtor and cred-
itor alike. Indeed, the moral order, unlike the legal one, has no difficulty in 
recognising that debt contracts entail a parallel set of moral responsibilities: 
the responsibility of the borrower for the lender and the responsibility of 
the lender for the borrower. In this way the intrinsic asymmetry of a debt 
relationship can be mitigated when needed.
In the present crisis, until very recently, the prevailing legal position was 
that financial contracts are inviolable: their clauses have to be respected in 
any circumstances. Now the idea of substantial debt rescheduling is mak-
ing progress in international fora. What are the grounds for such change? 
A sudden bout of generosity on the part of the lenders? A new feeling of 
solidarity for the hardship of borrowers? Or rather a fear that if borrowers 
are pushed into default, lenders shall also suffer? The recognition of the 
paradoxical interdependence between lenders and borrowers is at the centre 
of the ongoing ethical and strategic discussions about the pros and cons of 
macro-economic debt restructuring. 
The main reason behind the idea of the Leviticus Jubilee was that the 
over-indebtedness of some would break the community by excluding some 
of its members, by excessively concentrating ownership, or even by trans-
ferring ownership outside of the community. Jubilee, the Sabbath of Sab-
baths, was supposed to occur every 50th year. That year, unpaid debts were 
cancelled as well as transfers of collateral that happened in the meantime. 
The simple existence of such a general and exogenous constraint funda-
mentally changes the relationship between the borrower and the lender. 
By this simple fact the lender becomes interested in the timely and smooth 
repayment of debt and the risk asymmetry between the two parties is re-
duced. The exogenous deadline proposed by the Jubilee is an interesting 
avenue to encourage lenders to take their responsibilities seriously, in the 
name of solidarity and the Common Good; this is especially true when 
credit demand is bullish61.
The principle of subsidiarity is particularly useful in the context of designing political organisations. Subsidiarity aims to preserve the autonomy of smaller social groups. It shelters them from an inva-
sive trend towards centralism. While primarily advocated in the realm of 
politics, subsidiarity should also be used when addressing the question of 
the appropriate size of economic organisations, i.e. of enterprises. 
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Although there is no single method for assessing the size of an enter-
prise (employees, assets, turnover, capitalisation, etc.), it is obvious that the 
size and power position in markets and within global value chains matters 
greatly in economic life. 
As mentioned in the first part of this report, the main drivers of globali-
sation have been very large financial and non-financial enterprises. Many 
factors have driven their growth, such as economies of scale, of scope, or of 
speed. These organisations have expanded through large and complex net-
works of affiliates and partner organisations. The question to be asked in the 
specific perspective of CST is to what extent, and under which conditions, 
does the search for efficiency at the level of one single enterprise justify the 
existence of colossal organisations? Is economic gigantism respectful of the 
principle of subsidiarity? Do these organisations really generate the above 
mentioned returns by themselves, or are they simply siphoning off what 
would otherwise occur to other, often smaller players? In ideal conditions, 
the above two questions are senseless, as perfect competition evens out the 
relative power of every player. But because the ideal and reality differ, the 
principle of subsidiarity applied to the economic context may provide some 
indications of where the limits of gigantism should stand and how larger 
enterprises may respect and support the autonomy of their smaller and 
weaker partners, clients, and suppliers. 
Almost by definition, entrepreneurs and managers do not spontaneous-
ly seek external competition. For obvious reasons, largely inspired by the 
managerial mantra, they search for niches and prefer safe harbours of le-
gally established patents, brands, and labels which lessen competitive pres-
sure. Dominance and market power seem to be, more often than not, the 
outcome of ‘markets’ where competition is not enforced by an external 
body. Unlike on national agendas—including the European one—where 
competition policy and authorities do have a say, global competition policy 
is not yet at the top of any international agenda62.
Not much empirical work has been devoted in recent decades to the level 
of competition and concentration in global markets. Using classical meth-
ods, the limited evidence collected has not thus far shown that globalisation 
increases levels of market-share concentration on an industry-by-industry 
level. However, as shown previously herein, globalisation has changed the 
way the transnational economy works. Indeed, sparse but converging data 
show progress in the macro-economic relative weight of giants and also in 
the relative economic weight of industries where they are dominant (tel-
ecom, internet, automotive, banking, air transport and production, etc.). 
Additional evidence from the global value chain approach suggests that on 
one side, as shown by their consolidated balance sheet, giants are less ver-
tically integrated than they used to be a few decades ago. But on the other 
side, data suggest that their strategic weight and negotiating power has 
increased as they control a growing number of specific (often immaterial) 
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assets which grant them an unsurpassable competitive advantage. Thanks 
to such a privileged position economically and legally defended, the ‘lead 
firms’ can use their pricing power to siphon off technical efficiency gains—
and portions of what theory calls ‘consumer surpluses’—from their supply 
chains, their distribution chains, and from their final clients. In such a con-
figuration, the real power asymmetry between ‘lead firms’ and the smaller 
players goes unnoticed by the classical measures of concentration still used 
by authorities and researchers. A number of recent legal cases in US and 
EU courts have shown how technological intricacies have been used by 
major players in software and computer industries to protect their rents 
not only in relation to their direct competitors but also their suppliers and 
partners.
 The principle of subsidiarity is cited as a reason to contain centralising 
tendencies of political authorities and protect local autonomies and their 
respective common goods. In these discussions, the centralised argument 
of ‘one size fits all’ clashes with demands for local autonomy, cultural di-
versity, shorter decision processes, and possible greater flexibility. Analo-
gous discussions seldom take place in a purely economic context where 
lower prices and higher returns systematically have the last word. From the 
Christian perspective, the question of subsidiarity should be addressed in a 
broader context (i.e. not exclusively efficiency-related). It calls for a way to 
preserve the autonomy of enterprises and their right to grow63.
In order to bring the economic subsidiarity issue onto the agenda, two 
courses of action have to be pursued. On one side, Christian managers 
have to strive to explicitly take into account the needs of the other party 
in their strategic and commercial dealings. In practical terms it means that 
managers of powerful enterprises should pay attention and respect the au-
tonomy of their suppliers and distributors in their negotiations. Some of 
these issues are addressed by initiatives such as ‘ethical sourcing’. The Chris-
tian managers and shareholders should be able to ask, but also answer the 
self-disciplining questions of ‘how big is too big’ or ‘how powerful is too 
powerful’? These questions have meaning only if one cares for a common 
good of a higher level than that of one’s company alone. 
At a public level, measures have to be prepared in order to limit the asym-
metry in the market and the economic power of players. These measures 
derive from the Christian concern for subsidiarity but are perfectly aligned 
with the concern for a realistic betterment of market competition. The 
subsidiarity principle can provide a political compass in this context. This 
principle should be advocated to support partners and local competitors 
to contain the strategic (market) power of global giants. On the regulatory 
level, one could imagine stricter monitoring of abuses of domination in 
economic transactions, including easing conditions and the generalisation 
of ‘class actions’ in continental jurisdictions. One could also think about 
changing the present accounting rules which allow transnational enterpris-
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es to provide only very synthetic information about their local operations. 
Present consolidation rules also provide a shelter to large players in terms 
of their tax and transfer pricing behaviour. Both of these issues may well be 
sources of economic power and rents as discussed above. 
One interesting idea how to contain gigantism comes from the recent 
work of the Financial Stability Board in its important conceptual, fact-find-
ing, and regulatory research on ‘global systemically important financial in-
stitutions’. The idea behind it is that in the financial sphere some institu-
tions are ‘more equal than others’, and as such need special attention and 
possibly a specific regulatory counter-weight. The use of the subsidiarity 
principle in the economic context deserves for a similar conceptual and 
fact-finding work to be carried out on other sectors so as to identify the 
possible ‘systemically important players’. Indeed, some of the well-known 
‘global giants’ might have acquired systemic importance—unnoticed until 
now—in the world society and economy because of their size, the unique-
ness of (often immaterial) assets they control, the complexity of their global 
supply and distribution network, their negotiating power, and so on. Very 
little is known today about these global giants beside what they decide to 
make public, mainly through their annual financial reports. 
In order to correct the fundamentally asymmetric situation which gives to 
global giants a systemic advantage, a conceptual, statistical, and documen-
tary work should be initiated in order to balance systemic advantages with 
systemic responsibilities. For this purpose a dedicated task force should be 
formed within the system of the United Nations, drawing on specific com-
petencies present in organisations such as ILO (industrial relations), WIPO 
(intellectual property), WTO (trade), WHO (pharmaceuticals and health), 
ITU (telecommunications), FAO (agriculture and food), UNCTAD (de-
velopment) and OECD (taxes and finance). Momentum among these or-
ganisations should be generated—with NGOs and developing countries as 
the impetus—in order to overcome the foreseeable resistance of enterprise 
lobbies (such as the International Finance Institute or World Economic 
Forum) and of their home country representatives. One of the possible me-
dium-term outcomes of such work could be the definition of a new inter-
national status and corresponding responsibilities for ‘global systemically 
important enterprises’. Such a status should carry with it stricter regulatory 
and reporting requirements for the enterprises concerned. 
The issue of ownership is an important aspect of Catholic Social Teaching. Land and real estate ownership have always been seen as a guarantee of autonomy for the family and a means to pursue its 
own common good. Consequently, the importance of ownership for the 
proper working of the economy and society has always been acknowledged 
as simultaneously a source of rights and a source of obligations for the own-
er. The balance between rights and obligations deriving from ownership has 
been debated for centuries, but the general idea that ownership carries with 
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it a ‘social mortgage’ which limits the moral right of the owner to exclude 
others from benefiting from the thing owned, is generally accepted in CST. 
The Christian principle of the ‘universal destination of goods’ makes clear 
that by no means can ownership be seen as an absolute moral right of 
excluding the non-owners from accessing the good in question. On this 
point the Christian view is much more demanding for the owner than most 
modern legal systems, as it makes the owner morally responsible for the 
care and best possible use of his or her belongings for the sake of the Com-
mon Good. Hence, the Christian perspective weakens or even inverts the 
asymmetry between owner and non-owner. Calvin, for instance, expressed 
a radical view stressing the burden of responsibility on the shoulders of 
owners for making the best possible social use of the good owned. For 
Calvin, the moral duty and the corresponding responsibility for taking care 
of what was given by God comes first, before the right to personal enjoy-
ment64. Some modern legal systems still maintain vestiges of a ‘social mort-
gage’ as an element of ownership rights. The very fact of assigning own-
ership rights with similar moral caveats allows for linking this discussion 
with the one on subsidiarity. The governance of natural resources as well as 
other physical assets most respects the Common Good—if not necessarily 
Pareto efficiency—when it takes into account all the claims and expectations 
of those immediately affected. 
Our previous discussion of the notion of the Common Good has shown 
the potential tension between competing common goods. Such a tension is 
part of everyday life. It can only be solved by extending one’s perspective to 
a greater common good, i.e. the common good of a higher level. The same 
tension is present in the Christian reading of ‘ownership rights’ because it 
recognises the concurrent legitimacy of classical owner’s rights and of the 
‘universal destination of goods’ principle. The effective articulation of these 
two potentially conflicting presuppositions is not easy and has never been 
easy in history. Many solutions have been invented across cultures, space, 
and time to manage non-appropriable resources, such as the well-known 
‘commons’. Globalisation has contributed to transposing the debate to a 
global level to address the most adequate mode of governance of the ‘global 
commons’, such as the oceans, atmosphere, water resources, the climate, 
and so on.
That being said, much of the intellectual and moral argument around 
ownership dates back to times when the physical goods and natural re-
sources such as real estate were, together with money, the only reference 
of ‘ownership’. Today, the scope of the question is much broader because 
of the recent extension of ownership rights to the virtual world of imma-
teriality. The major difference comes from the fact that immateriality is 
by definition not exclusive. Indeed, ownership rights are put in place on 
immaterial items to protect the owner’s revenue flow (i.e. rents) and not, as 
in the case of goods or services, his possibility to use or consume the items 
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in question.
Things have changed since the time of the first articulation of the princi-
ple of the universal destination of goods, particularly in the latter decades 
of the 20th century. The basic idea that clearly assigned ownership rights 
enhance efficiency and that their protection stimulates innovation is almost 
universally accepted today. The global framework for intellectual proper-
ty rights has therefore been strengthened and expanded. Correspondingly, 
rights to the access and use of immaterial goods such as knowledge, art, or 
genomes of species¬—goods over which it is impossible to exercise physi-
cal control—have been assigned to intellectual property ‘owners’ with the 
resources and sophistication necessary to defend their legal rights within 
existing legal frameworks.
In an economic sense, owning such intellectual property rights allows 
for selling access and generating an income every time the correspond-
ing right is used. This means that immaterial ownership rights, much like 
rights on future revenue streams, are today’s counterparts to financial assets 
and appear as such on company balance sheets (often called goodwill). 
Such assigned ownership rights generate income and returns only because 
they can be enforced by law so as to exclude potential users. As opposed 
to the natural world where scarcity is a reality, in the immaterial world of 
potentially infinite non-exclusive utilisation, scarcity is a pure artefact of 
economic logic and legal engineering65.
Does the search for economic efficiency—or the protection of monopo-
listic rent—morally justify the exclusion of those who cannot afford to pay 
for access to ever larger portions of knowledge and creativity locked in by 
the various instruments of intellectual property protection? What if such 
artificial appropriation takes away from many the means of their subsist-
ence as is for instance the case with seeds and fertiliser in the developing 
world66? 
This drive towards a concentration of control over critical material as well 
as immaterial assets in the hands of a select group of players pushes our 
civilisation towards a fundamental change which Jeremy Rifkin termed ‘the 
Age of Access’. When every single item in immateriality has a fully assigned 
owner, then markets are ‘complete’ in the sense of IEE theory, free riding is 
impossible, and the highest economic efficiency is achieved. However, what 
seems bright in the ideal, is often much bleaker in reality. The extension of 
ownership to immateriality is in many ways analogous to the 19th century 
introduction of ‘enclosures’ in pastoral lands of the United Kingdom and 
the United States. This ‘privatisation’ of previously freely accessible pastoral 
and water resources initiated a deep restructuring in agriculture and sub-
sequent massive migrations of the poor into urban centres. Enclosures did 
set the ground for the Industrial Revolution, but at a cost of massive suf-
fering. Today, these artificial and immaterial estates are being ‘enclosed’ in 
full legality by the extensions of intellectual property rights to the natural 
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endowment and talents received from God. The same logic is increasingly a 
threat to clearly natural flows which used to be known as ‘free goods’: clean 
water, air, or even winds. 
This trend poses the question of moral limits to the appropriation and 
corresponding marketisation of access rights. What in this context is the 
meaning of the broad principle of the universal destination of goods? The 
question has to be addressed simultaneously at the level where legal norms 
are crafted—including at the World Intellectual Property Organisation—
and at the level of every single economic, artistic, scientific, or intellectual 
actor. In the context of globalisation, widespread free riding, and the race 
to gain the prime mover advantage (moral hazard), any isolated virtuous 
behaviour in the field of immaterial ownership rights—e.g. by granting 
free access to a specific immaterial ownership right or good—will have only 
limited impact, as another actor will immediately take advantage of it. In 
order to be effective, such an initiative requires a legal framework which 
grants legally enforceable free public access to a given resource. Examples 
are well known: Wikipedia or Open Source software, e-mail, and partial-
ly the World Wide Web itself. In these cases, clearly assigned ownership 
rights are assigned to the public and pre-empt any further appropriations. 
However these are only imaginative exceptions trying to contain the trend 
towards a comprehensive appropriation of immateriality. Parallel to such 
innovative solutions, a structural change is needed, and the principle of 
the universal destination of goods could be useful as inspiration for na-
tional and international initiatives aimed at containing the appropriation 
trend which is on the flip side also a trend toward economic rent-seeking. 
National authorities—especially in developing countries—and the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation are the places where critical thinking 
and proposals should be discussed and transformed into norms67.
For Christians, the Common Good results from converging efforts mitigating tensions and allowing conflicts to be solved by also dis-covering convergences at higher levels. Today, no global or univer-
sal authority is in charge of the Common Good—the universal common 
good of humanity. Instead we have a network of dynamically interacting, 
interdependent local and partial common goods. The progress towards the 
Common Good could result from these interactions, provided that they 
are adequately streamlined. In the worst case scenario, when local or partial 
common goods are in direct opposition to one another, it will tend toward 
a zero sum. On the contrary, it will tend to the infinite when the same lo-
cal common goods promote each other. Therefore, the way local common 
goods interact is critical for the global outcome. In this respect, lessons 
should be drawn from the systemic crisis of finance. 
Clearly the vulnerability of any system increases with a) its complexi-
ty; and b) the absence of explicit regulatory tools. The complexity of the 
contemporary world is also due to a wide range of self-regulating, self-gov-
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erning, semi-private bodies and networks which are very important for in-
ternational business life. Such bodies produce so-called ‘soft law’, or the 
partially public norms based on international private agreements resulting 
from autonomous initiatives. Such norms have flourished in past decades 
in domains such as accounting and auditing norms, and technical and 
quality standards, but also in finance with the so-called prudential norms 
elaborated under the auspices of the Basel Committee.
In the absence of world government—i.e. an accepted one-dimensional 
hierarchy of power—many influences currently attempt to have their say 
on how local common goods should interact. In order to avoid excessive 
complexity or enduring and overt conflicts between local common goods, 
two conditions have to be fulfilled. The first condition is a) the mutual 
recognition of the irreducibly heterogeneous nature of interacting common 
goods; and b) the corresponding legitimacies of each of these common 
goods. The second condition entails a moral responsibility and accounta-
bility for all local common goods for the care of the Common Good.
It is symptomatic that immediately after the systemic nature of the finan-
cial crisis became evident, the G20 appointed itself as a world governing 
body and explicitly took charge of the earthly dimension of the Common 
Good. However, from one communiqué to the next, it is becoming in-
creasingly clear that the initial ambitions are being trimmed down by po-
litical disagreements. The initial ambition is today out of reach because of a 
lack of adequate instruments for action and the corresponding unfeasibility 
or lack of shared will to build them. Any attempt to break the dead-lock 
has to progress along the two above mentioned lines: a) increasing the co-
herent operation of heterodox legitimacies; and b) the parallel extension 
of mutually recognised responsibility and accountability for the Common 
Good. Both of these lines of action are fully compatible with the Christian 
approach. 
In order to break the current deadlock and move from a non-system to 
a higher level of systemic coherence in the world economy, the notion of 
legitimacy as the source of accepted authority has to be revised. In the con-
temporary trans-national environment, six types of authority, each rooted 
in a specific source of legitimacy not only coexist, but also compete for a 
say in global affairs: 
• Political authority is still the prominent source of power because it ul-
timately commands the use of force. Its legitimacy lies in international 
recognition and a more or less democratic representation mechanism; 
• Economic and technical authority derives its power from the opera-
tional effectiveness of global giants; its legitimacy is rooted in the ca-
pacity of enterprises—especially large enterprises—to act; 
• Expert or epistemic authority, whose knowledge is the source of its 
legitimacy; thus, the participation of experts in decisional processes 
82
“The challenge of global gov-
ernance, of which financial 
governance is a part, consists 
in finding appropriate ways 
to combine these different 
authorities harmoniously 
and coherently in a joint de-
cision-making process so as 
to make them share not only 
power but also the corre-
sponding responsibilities.”
¶ Complexity, system-
ic risk, and systemic 
resilience
Beyond the Financial Crisis
is legitimised. Expertise is often disputed between academia, think-
tanks, and NGOs; 
• Authority of the media, in their original vocation and role of present-
ing independent views and challenges to established opinions. Today 
their power to amplify the actions and opinions of those whom they 
like or hate is immense. For this reason, media are de facto a part of 
any decision-making process. Media derive their legitimacy from their 
power of making noise, of challenging, or even of destroying the repu-
tation of personalities, enterprises, and even regimes or countries;
• Prophetic authority derives its legitimacy from the capacity to speak 
out for the higher good of humanity. Some NGOs and religious lead-
ers pretend to be in this position, but very few are able to speak up in a 
truly disinterested manner in the name of humanity while serving the 
weakest and the Common Good. 
These five authorities differ as to the source of their legitimacy, but they 
all have their place in the process of global decision-making in matters 
concerning the Common Good of humanity. These authorities operate 
regardless: they combine in networks, chains, alliances, partnerships of 
all kinds, norm-setting clubs, etc. The challenge of global governance, of 
which financial governance is a part, consists in finding appropriate ways 
to combine these different authorities harmoniously and coherently in a 
joint decision-making process so as to make them share not only power but 
also the corresponding responsibilities. The progressive implication in the 
global financial and economic governance of systemically important banks 
and enterprises (discussed above) with the corresponding responsibilities 
could be a first but important step towards a constructive way of caring for 
the Common Good. Rather than staying in the shadows as lobbyists, these 
powerful economic and financial entities should willingly accept such a 
possibility of being explicitly responsible and accountable for the universal 
Common Good.
The small steps proposed here will not immediately solve the conun-
drum of global financial and economic governance, nor will they establish 
a ‘world authority’. That being said, they could help prepare the stage, or 
the scaffoldings which could be useful in the future, when the time for a 
world authority will be ripe. 
The contemporary financial crisis has brought to the fore a notion that until now remained hidden: the idea of systemic risk. Systems are made of multi-layered interlocking networks of interacting el-
ements. Complexity is inherent to any system: it means that in some cir-
cumstance the behaviour of the system become impossible to fully predict 
or determine because many feed-back loops interact while connecting the 
same elements. Thus, a system is much more that the simple aggregation of 
its components: interactions and their density matter more than the simple 
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elements. The consequences of an event on a complex system are seldom 
determined by linear causality—they result from multiple, often parallel, 
interactions difficult to mastermind in advance or control in real-time. 
The idea behind the notion of systemic risk is that of sudden vulnerability 
of the system due to a previously undetected weakness which may consist of 
a sequence of minor failures. In certain circumstances, an unusual sequence 
of interactions may abruptly put the survival of the whole system at risk. 
Systemic risk became suddenly visible when the web of interdependencies 
made the whole financial world tremble once Lehman Brothers was pushed 
into bankruptcy in September 2008. Suddenly, the whole world economy 
was at risk. Systemic risk has been described by mathematicians in what is 
known as ‘catastrophe theory’ which shows that in complex systems a priori 
non-significant events may have consequences that jeopardise the whole 
system. In simpler terms, systemic risk is also about the asymmetry be-
tween the acts (or gains) and potential damage that the behaviour of a few 
can inflict on the many. Systemic risk is the negative side of what Winston 
Churchill said about the heroic contribution of the Royal Air Force to the 
victory in the Battle of Britain: “Never in the field of human conflict was 
so much owed by so many to so few.” 
Systemic risk materialises when self-organising and self-stabilising loops 
and mechanisms derail and fail to maintain the internal coherence at a level 
necessary to keep the system working. Beyond this minimal level, if inter-
actions break down or some elements get out of control, the level of coher-
ence dwindles, and the very survival of the system is at stake. Systemic risk 
starts to materialise in areas where ‘no one in charge’, i.e. in places of organ-
isational vulnerability or vacuum. These are also the places where ego-cen-
tric moral hazard naturally flourishes, the places where the unscrupulous 
or the merely unwise choose immediate returns over medium-term general 
collapse. These are also exactly the places where Common Good-centred 
decisions may make all the difference and contribute to systemic resilience.
The question that arises when the notion of ‘systemic risk’ is applied to 
the financial context concerns the reasons that allowed the build-up of fi-
nancial fragility to remain unnoticed—and thus unaddressed—for such 
a long time. There are plenty of highly technical explanations which stop 
short of answering the question posed by Queen Elizabeth at the London 
School of Economics and referred to in the introduction: “Why did no one 
see it coming?” Today two causes are widely recognised: on the macro-level, 
the lack of adequate diagnosis and the subsequent lack of a regulatory re-
sponse framework; on the micro-level, ‘excessive appetite for risk’, meaning 
inadequate perception of risk, or more precisely an excessive self-centred 
appetite for returns despite the high risks—systemic and otherwise—in-
volved. 
In 2007 and 2008, the sudden evidence that ‘no one is really in charge’ 
took the world by surprise. The system was purposely left unattended for 
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decades to its supposed self-regulating mechanisms. As shown in the first 
part of the report, at the time of the beginning of financial euphoria, a 
blind idealistic faith in IEE coincided with the exploitation by the US of a 
moral hazard advantage.
In 2007 and 2008, gigantic public emergency rescue operations came 
first, then the painful evidence started to converge showing that the way 
portions of the system were operating had little to do with its accepted 
representations. At that very moment, the decades of lack of political and 
intellectual realism were starting to take their toll. Banks proved more lev-
eraged and weaker than thought, risk management methods more myopic 
and incomplete, the largest unregulated markets such as LIBOR or Forex 
less perfect and more rigged, shadow finance distorted by conflict of inter-
est, regulators largely captured by the regulated, academics disconnected 
from reality and imprisoned in the IEE paradigm. Indeed, for decades, no 
one was in position either institutionally or intellectually to have the full 
picture of how the world financial system really operated.
Can systemic risk—i.e. systemic vulnerabilities—be mitigated when ac-
tors are unconstrained by a hierarchy or force? Two classical philosophical 
answers are available as discussed earlier: 1) the invisible hand of the effi-
cient self-equilibrating markets; and 2) the shared concern for the Com-
mon Good leading to prudent, self-restraining behaviours with regard for 
‘the other’. In the first case discipline is external to every player, irrespective 
of what he does or attempts to do, and the pressure of the others intermedi-
ated by the markets will either force him to order or annihilate him. In the 
second case limits have to be set and enforced by the interior moral force 
of every actor. 
Between the idealistic ideas of ‘spontaneous markets’ and the ‘spontane-
ous strive for the Common Good’, a third, intermediary position appears 
as a realistic avenue. The crisis has shown that mitigation of systemic risk 
requires both elements: the external discipline of markets and law, and a 
high moral stance and self-restraint of actors. In the years preceding the 
financial crisis, both elements were largely missing. 
Writing in 1948, François Perroux, an overtly Christian French econ-
omist, identified already that capitalism (in the sense of the free market 
economy) is not self-sufficient and needs to be supported by a moral frame-
work which it will, paradoxically, tend to destroy. Perroux warned about 
this paradox in which he saw a congenital weakness of capitalism. He said 
the following:
“A way of thinking that is prior and alien to capitalism sustains, for a var-
iable period of time, the framework in which the capitalist economy op-
erates. But owing to the latter’s very expansion and success, inasmuch as 
it receives the esteem and gratitude of the masses and fosters among them 
a taste for material comfort and well-being, it undermines the traditional 
institutions and mental structures on which every social order depends. 
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Capitalism erodes and corrupts. It consumes vast quantities of vital ener-
gy whose rise it does not control. Political leaders need a rare cool-head-
edness in their diagnosis, and an exceptional energy in administering the 
treatment, if they are to detect and ward off this ailment in good time.
Not only does capitalism fail to supply the principles and resources for the 
political order that it needs, but its development threatens the require-
ments and techniques of political integration. Capitalism cares nothing 
for morality; yet all politics is based on morality, indeed metaphysics. 
Capitalism seeks unbridled freedom; yet no political society can be viable 
without intervention, restriction and balancing of freedoms. Capitalism 
benefits from breaking up natural communities and intermediate groups; 
yet no political organisation can be maintained or established without 
them. Capitalism cannot accept arbitration in the economic order; yet all 
political power is arbitration, and must not be excluded from any area of 
society.”68
The challenge for the future is to rebuild again the forces of capitalism 
from outside (by regulations) and from inside (by virtuous behaviours). 
Some specific avenues and possible lines of action have been envisaged 
above. The question of ‘how’ remains however open. This concluding part 
offers a perspective on the inescapable systemic transformation.
Systemic transformation: Replacing structures of sin with 
structures for the Common Good
What is needed is a smooth systemic change from a system geared solely to efficiency towards a system geared toward the Com-mon Good. As in most systemic transformations, change has 
to take place simultaneously at four different levels of the social system: at 
the levels of worldview, of institutions, of mechanisms, and of behaviours. 
At each of these levels, the Christian perspective inspires.
Caring for the Common Good requires a realistic—as opposed to an a-priori—worldview. Realism implies careful observation rather than deductive thinking, asking questions rather than jumping to 
conclusions, the capacity to take changes and new conditions into account, 
and to revise previous conclusions rather than hold to dogmatic rigidity. 
Realism is conducive to risk-taking in the name of charity and mercy, while 
idealism can at best deliver only blind justice. 
The still-dominant economic theory and the management mantra are 
rooted in deductive thinking. They provide a powerfully coherent and aes-
thetically appealing framework for analysis and a reassuring inspiration for 
subsequent action. However, this IEE framework is built on assumptions 
which pretend to be approximations of the real world but are, in fact, fun-
damentally (not accidentally) and irretrievably counter-factual. Therefore, 
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the construct of contemporary theory is part of an imaginary world, only 
loosely related to reality. Two consequences stem from this. On one side, 
policy makers and managers have to look for the sources of inspiration for 
their actions outside of the box of theory. By doing so, they have to take 
on the responsibility and the risk of forging new paths in the uncharted 
waters of reality. On the other side, the academic disciplines of economics, 
management, and finance have to urgently reconstruct themselves around 
the realistic premises of sound anthropology and its relationship to the 
Common Good69.
The recent crisis has demonstrated—surprisingly to many—that in-stitutions matter. They express, and by the same token condition, the normal patterns of behaviours and determine the related con-
sequences. Formal or informal institutions are not immobile. They change 
because the formal legal structures change, but also because dominant pat-
terns of behaviour change, usually as a result of a deeper change of cultural 
values. The relationship between institutions and individual behaviours is 
therefore two-sided. On one side, structures influence behaviours, but on 
the other side, exemplary and innovative patterns of behaviour may also 
change institutions. This happens every day70.
Pope John Paul II introduced a moral dimension into the world of insti-
tutions when he used the notion of ‘structures of sin’71. He used this term 
to describe man-made institutional settings which condition and incen-
tivise other individuals—often in subordinate social positions—to wrong-
doing or conversely to disincentivise doing good. Such structures have a 
strong leverage effect—they can be seen as ‘multipliers’ of behaviours across 
society. In the case of structures of sin, sinful behaviours are multiplied 
which may thereby have a major impact on the society as a whole. At the 
origin of such structures or institutions are individual sins—greed, pride/
egoism, or disloyal or untruthful aims—which then translate into specific 
organisational or legal structures. Through structures of sin, individual sins 
are turned into social ones.  
Individual and group courage, virtue, and exemplarity are needed to pre-
vent such structures of sin from emerging and to denounce, derail, and 
eradicate their actions where they exist already. The social multiplier at 
work in the ‘structures of sin’ may however be reversed and used with mor-
ally opposite consequences. The individual search for the Common Good 
(local and universal), concern for ‘the other’, and commitment to justice 
and equity, combined with courage and imagination put in motion at struc-
turing moments, may help the emergence of new patterns of behaviour or 
even organisational or legal structures which then become ‘structures for 
the Common Good’.
 Such achievements may ultimately be consolidated by corresponding 
legal and institutional changes. At that very moment ‘structures for the 
Common Good’ may flourish and replace structures of sin. Where the lat-
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ter were destroying trust and solidarity, ‘structures for the Common Good’ 
will leverage them. Once in place, such structures will act as enhancers and 
multipliers of individual efforts and give them a social dimension. Drops 
end up making oceans. Social habits—in the sense of morally good habits 
(habitus)—are those drops which end up wiping out mountains72. 
The only question is: how many will have sufficient courage and faith to 
dare to put the structures for Common Good in motion?
Abandoned to the overwhelming rule of the ethos of efficiency, to-day’s world is sacrificing the seeds of its future fecundity for the sake of immediate results. By harvesting where we have not sown, 
all reserves and resources are being exhausted, including the future which 
has been in recent years massively pre-empted and mortgaged for the sake 
of the present. Any fecundity needs some obscurity, calm, and idleness, 
which amount to pure waste when looked at from the perspective of imme-
diate efficiency. Fecundity is a promise, not a certainty, and as such has even 
less place in pure economic or financial reasoning. That being said, human-
ity and civilisation are paradoxically the fruits of the gratuitous fecundity 
of God’s gift. A Christian perspective on economic and financial life has to 
underline that future fecundity requires that some resources remain today 
seemingly idle. As fecundity is not a contractual obligation, the necessary 
resources are put aside on the basis of sheer trust in promise, hope, or faith. 
In everyday life, the tension between the requirements of efficiency and 
those of fecundity can be made clearly visible by contrasting transactions 
and relations. Efficient transactions in the IEE sense are moment of truce 
in the economic war of all against all. If transactions are anonymous and 
impersonal, quite the opposite is true for relations, which are by definition 
nodes of cooperation. Only when parties know each other personally and 
in their peculiarities might they enter a relationship. This means that most 
relations have a built-in dynamism, as opposed to self-contained and static 
transactions. If transactions are complete because they are built on equiva-
lent exchange, then relations, by definition, are a succession of imbalances. 
By contrasting relations with transactions, the peculiarities of each form of 
social interaction clearly appear73. Transactions, by their commitment to 
instantaneous efficiency, deliver immediately everything which can be har-
vested at once. However, relations are the place of fecundity; they balance 
the fruits of past efforts with the seeds of future results.
The important question of our times is to restore the adequate propor-
tion between these two forms of social interaction. In the efficiency-driven 
world, much of what until recently was a matter of relationships is today 
either a matter of market or of administrative transactions. Although the 
situation may seem different in much of the developing world—where 
Market and State do not function fully—the trend of breaking relation-
ships is universal, especially in urban centres. Deepening asymmetries, 
growing exclusion, and inequalities are largely by-products of the social 
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fabric of relationships falling into pieces under the pressure of transactional 
individualism geared to the overall quest for efficiency. The issue is thus not 
to ban or condemn transactions as such, for they are necessary. Rather it is 
to mind the appropriate proportion and balance between the two. A purely 
transactional world of IEE is inhuman, but the totally relational society—
closed society or sticky society—may also be dangerous and potentially 
perverse. 
Christian tradition and teaching is articulated around the vision of man 
as a ‘relational’ being who is unable to survive on his own. Man needs to 
be in constant relationship with God and his brothers and sisters, showing 
that, even though transactions may play an important role, this role will be 
merely instrumental with respect to the existential character of relations. 
In this sense, the present crisis can be seen as a rebellion of human nature 
against the excessive role played by transactions. The Christian proposi-
tion may therefore be summed up as a call to restoring the pre-eminence 
of relations over subservient transactions in every sphere of life, including 
financial and economic life.
In order to prepare for the future, the idle reserve resources needed for 
fecundity—in the metaphoric sense—have to be restored. For the time 
being, most of the available resources are engaged in a global just-in-time 
economic carousel. In order to free some of these resources, including time, 
limits have to be set as to the extent of purely transactional dealings geared 
toward immediate efficiency. Social as well as individual emphasis must 
shift from transactions and immediate efficiency to relations and medium- 
or long-term fecundity. Such shift requires that the incentives—not only 
material and monetary, but also moral—be developed to encourage long-
term commitments in all areas of the economy and the financial sector. 
 Such changes have to take root in groups—families, associations, and 
companies—before they will reach the social level. Rediscovering relations 
means changing the dominant patterns of social and economic interac-
tion to progressively instil adequate habits. Here again the notion of hab-
itus—virtuous habits—embedded in corporate cultures, family traditions, 
or even in social ethos all have their meaning. Ethics and socially virtuous 
habits may be both the cradle and the consequence of structures for the 
Common Good. Ultimately, neither structures for the Common Good nor 
relational habits will appear unless adequate decisions and actions are made 
at all levels of society.
Social systems function or fail to function because of infinite numbers of daily micro-decisions. The majority of these decisions are trivial and automatic but few can be called ‘defining moments’ because they 
leave a mark either on the decision maker himself or on the context in 
which he acts74. As mentioned above, behaviours and individual decisions 
may initiate major systemic changes by destroying powerful structures of 
sin and replacing them with structures for the Common Good. Such were 
the examples of Gandhi, Mandela, or Walesa. The key commonality of 
such behaviours is that they are focused not only on outcomes—unpredict-
able in all three cases—but on the moral quality of action. 
The never-ending pursuit of virtuous behaviour should be at the very 
centre of the Christian life. The four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, 
fortitude, and temperance are mutually reinforcing and complementary. 
They provide the necessary tools for action to anyone who cares about the 
Common Good and is willing and ready to take risks in its name. Virtues 
are a call for commitment and risk taking for the Common Good in both 
its earthly and its transcendent dimensions. In fact, the call for virtuous 
action is reinforced for Christians by the three theological virtues: faith, 
hope, and charity (love). Jean-Loup Dherse used to say that cardinal virtues 
suffice to make man feel responsible for the co-creation of the world (the 
earthly dimension of the Common Good), but only when man is animated 
by the theological virtues is he or she able to take responsibility in co-re-
demption (the transcendent dimension of the Common Good)76. And that 
is what the Christian Common Good is ultimately about.
Virtuous behaviours imply a balance between the assessment of conse-
quences and the intrinsic moral quality of the act. This last dimension is 
tantamount to moral risk-taking which theological virtues may inspire. 
Each of these dimensions has two possible polarities: either it is self-centred 
or it is group- or society-centred. For actors behaving in the realm of eco-
nomic and financial activities, the self-centred impact will be measured by 
what may be called ‘economic performance’ measured at an actor’s level by 
a given metric. The group-centred impact will be assessed at the social level. 
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Figure 16: Informed decision framework75
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When it comes to the intrinsic moral dimension of an act, the self-centred 
point of reference will be the internal moral standard, while the social ref-
erence will be provided by the measure of ‘compliance’ either with law or 
with a local procedure. 
Figure 16 provides a graphic presentation of these two dimensions. The 
N-S axis represents the impact dimension, while the E-W represents the 
moral quality dimension. While the vertical dimension refers more to the 
material consequences of actions—a consequentialist approach—the hori-
zontal one captures the virtue load of a decision or action. The graphic 
presentation suggests that what is at stake is the importance of achieving 
balanced decisions. This is especially difficult in the context of economic 
life where performance is the ultimate target, and compliance the unique 
constraint. The graph reminds that the concern for others—for justice and 
equity—has to be part of every decision inspired by Christian values. The 
same is true for the moral quality of the action. 
Unlike efficiency-driven econo-centric behaviours prescribed by IEE, 
ethical behaviours will care about the impact of decisions not only on one-
self but also on ‘the other’. Taking responsibility and being accountable to 
others and to the Common Good is rooted in concern for ethics and jus-
tice. The urgent systemic transformation which this paper has described in 
its main components can be achieved smoothly only if behaviours inspired 
by the care for the Common Good outweigh those geared exclusively to-
ward pure efficiency; if networks of relationships based in multidimension-
al reciprocity regain some advantage over efficient transactions; if structures 
of sin are substituted by structures for the Common Good. But all these 
changes require as a condition that human minds free themselves from the 
seductive promises of the golden calf.
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SECTION TWO
RECENT CHURCH TEXTS ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

¶ General remarksConsidering the importance of the financial crisis, we might be surprised to find 
relatively few documents on the sub-
ject. Apart from the hurried docu-
ment issued by the Pontifical Coun-
cil for Justice and Peace in 2011, we 
can only rely on a quite limited set 
of texts and interventions by popes 
and nuncios at the UN both in New 
York and Geneva. On the one hand 
this is to be expected, yet on the oth-
er hand this does not do justice to 
reality. First and foremost, finance 
is not among the topics usually ad-
dressed by Catholic Social Teaching 
(CST). A lack of understanding of 
the functioning of complex finan-
cial architecture and probably some 
underestimation of their growth 
and importance over the last three 
decades certainly explains why the 
Catholic Church has not addressed 
the topic more forcefully. But the 
official interventions are only the tip 
of the iceberg. Not reproduced here 
are the many letters, recommenda-
tions, and interventions by popes, 
bishops’ conferences, or Church 
committees to political leaders, in-
ternational organizations and civil 
society leaders. 
Most of these omitted documents 
are letters asking leaders to rise up 
to the crisis and dare to tackle its 
ethical dimension. On the level of 
personal behaviour: exalted greed, 
dishonest behaviour, lack of respon-
sibility; on the level of government 
and international institutions: lack 
of proper regulation, no place for 
the common good in finance. But 
mainly, bishops ask politicians and 
leaders to see to the poor and the 
more vulnerable. They plead not 
to cut social programs, to tackle 
the ‘new poor’ near and far that the 
crisis has created—those dealing 
with unemployment, loss of homes 
or food programs, displacement 
through migration, and so forth. In 
one word they plead with the lead-
ers to help the victims of the crisis; 
those who have lost everything to it. 
On this second level the Catholic 
Church has been very active indeed, 
especially through its own many 
relief agencies around the world. 
These may be in fact the most real 
answer given by the Church to the 
crisis. 
However, as we are dealing here 
with the financial crisis at the level 
of ideas, this introduction shall fo-
cus on the texts issued by the pon-
tifical magisterium on the financial 
REACTIONS TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS BY THE PONTIFICAL 
MAGISTERIUM: REVIEW AND INTRODUCTION TO THE TEXTS
MATHIAS NEBEL
Director, Caritas in Veritate Foundation and Chaire Jean Rodhain, Institut Catholique de Paris
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crisis, trying to see how the social 
tradition of thought of the Church 
could be extended and applied to 
this crisis. Without much surprise, 
we find more general and elaborated 
answers in Benedict XVI’s encycli-
cal Caritas in Veritate and Fran-
cis’ apostolic exhortation Evangelii 
Gaudium, as well as in the Justice 
and Peace document ‘Toward re-
forming the international financial 
and monetary system in the context of 
global public authority’.1 Then there 
are several smaller addresses by the 
Holy See at international agencies 
that are more specific, but also more 
creative and practical. The encyc-
licals articulate the longstanding 
principles of CST applicable to the 
crisis; the addresses are more con-
cerned with the consequences of the 
crisis and its victims far and near. 
Indeed, the nearer we get to the ac-
tual people affected by the crisis or 
dealing with it, the more the passion 
we see in the writing. Humanitar-
ian urgency—the need to help the 
poor—becomes the main intention 
of the writer.
The two popes, as would be expected, do not venture into the realm of practical 
action, but stay at the level of the 
root causes of the crisis. Almost eve-
ry document follows what could be 
called a basic pattern of argument. 
They usually begin with a summary 
analysis of the financial crisis, then 
go on to state that self-regulation 
has not worked and reform is nec-
essary. They then turn quickly to 
signal the moral roots of the crisis, 
lambasting greed, risk taking, lack 
of prudence, dishonesty, and laissez-
faire policies and starkly remind that 
to function, financial markets must 
not be separated from ethics. A free 
market economy, for all its rightful 
autonomy, must serve the common 
good if it is to fulfil its social utility. 
As a third and last step in this basic 
pattern, the popes then appeal to 
the States or international agencies 
to address these root causes, reform 
financial markets, and enforce regu-
lation on its actors. Responsibility 
for the common good and solidar-
ity rather than exclusion shall be the 
criteria of this reform. Care for the 
poor and the vulnerable must be of 
special concern as they are the first 
victims of the crisis. 
This basic pattern uses terms and 
criticisms that are not new and will 
be familiar to most readers. I thus 
do not intend to detail the argu-
ment for why the free market has 
to serve the common good or why 
greed cannot be the criterion for 
wealth creation, but will instead 
focus on some of the more original 
features that were brought up by the 
two popes on the topic of the finan-
cial crisis. Here are some of these 
features: 
1. The self-regulation of finan-
cial markets has dramatically 
failed. Both Francis and Ben-
edict are adamant. There is a 
need to reform and regulate 
financial markets; to bring po-
litical and ethical governance 
to international finance. This 
means to stop making the as-
sumption that market freedom 
is tantamount to an absence 
of regulation. A free market 
economy requires ethics and 
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political governance if it has to 
remain free. The economy must 
serve the human community 
and not be a mere disconnected 
instrument of wealth creation. 
The crisis is a stark reminder 
in the eye of both popes of the 
need for ethics. The wide dis-
ruption and suffering brought 
by the financial crisis on the 
economy and the society, es-
pecially the poor, clearly shows 
the consequence of refraining 
from exerting governance over 
modern financial flows. 
2. The trickle-down effect is an 
illusion. Pope Francis has one 
of the starkest condemnations 
of the notion that wealth crea-
tion will per-se ultimately reach 
the whole society. Empirical 
experience and research prove 
that increased wealth creation 
tends to enhance extremes, not 
to reduce them. While wealth 
concentrates on one end, on 
the other end vast numbers 
of people get progressively ex-
cluded from the economy, af-
fecting their very survival. Fi-
nancial markets—through the 
crisis—are seen as paradigmatic 
of a system of wealth creation 
that works against the poor and 
against humanity. 
3. At the root of the economy there 
is a logic of gift and reciproc-
ity. Perhaps one of the most in-
teresting and moving elements 
brought by Pope Benedict in 
the debate is that gift and reci-
procity matter in financial mar-
kets. His argument runs along 
the following lines: The crisis 
was one of trust between insti-
tutional lenders. When even in 
the short term, forecasts could 
not be made based on the trust-
worthiness of other actors, en-
gaging in reciprocal activity did 
not make sense anymore. The 
collapse of confidence was also 
the collapse of financial activity. 
Thus under the logic of reci-
procity, another logic is at work 
that allows the former to exist. 
Gift and reciprocity, so says 
Benedict, are the twin elements 
of the basic grammar of love 
that creates trust in relation-
ship and thus enables stable, 
long term interactions. Com-
plex societies like ours tend to 
take trust as a given, something 
that simply exists and allows for 
the smooth functioning of our 
institutions. The financial crisis 
laid bare that the logic of the 
market—the logic of exchange, 
reciprocity, and contract—rests 
on the deeper logic of gift with-
out counterpart that looks for 
trust to exist between social ac-
tors. 
4. International financial mar-
kets require new forms of re-
sponsibility and solidarity. 
This is another constant ele-
ment of Benedict’s thought on 
the crisis. The starting point 
is the following: the growth 
of international finance in the 
past decade has deeply altered 
the power of States. It has put 
objective limits on their sov-
ereignty, specifically over their 
domestic economies. This trend 
is however not seen by the Pope 
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as something merely negative, 
since he seems to understand 
sovereignty rather as a responsi-
bility. Confronted with the loss 
of national governance over the 
economy, Benedict XVI says 
we ought to find new, creative 
ways to fulfil the responsibil-
ity to protect that defines sov-
ereignty. In keeping with the 
dynamic of the universal com-
mon good, he sees sovereignty 
more as a dynamic reality. The 
notion of sovereignty is not 
limited to a notion so greatly 
linked to the Nation-State and 
exclusive control of a territory 
and a population. International 
financial markets show how the 
responsibility to protect is now 
a shared reality that can only be 
tackled together or not at all. 
This is the main narrative that 
drives him to mention the need 
for a global political authority. 
However, the responsibility to 
protect is broader in Benedict’s 
usage than in its international 
definition. It is a responsibil-
ity we have toward future gen-
erations and a responsibility 
we bear for the poor and the 
vulnerable. He spells out four 
dimensions of responsibility in 
one text: responsibility toward 
ourselves, responsibility toward 
other nations, responsibility for 
our common world, and re-
sponsibility for the other who 
suffers.
5. Financial crisis and the need 
for a world political author-
ity. With the financial crisis in 
mind, Benedict XVI argues that 
the case for a global political au-
thority is stronger than before. 
This should not be an authority 
imposed by anyone, but freely 
seen as a necessity by all nations 
and commonly agreed with re-
spect for subsidiarity. It should 
seek and serve the common 
good and have the means to en-
force its governance, but not to 
impose it against the will of any 
member. It should be a political 
as well as a moral rule. Clearly 
enough, much more than a spe-
cific political system, the Pope 
points here to the practical need 
emerging in a globalised world 
for stronger governance bodies 
that will not leave forces that 
exceed Nation-States without 
political and moral governance. 
The world political author-
ity being directly linked to the 
search of the universal common 
good, it belongs to the eschato-
logical horizon toward which 
we are meant to work but will 
not reach but at the end of time. 
These five points, once brought 
back to the debate on the root caus-
es of the financial crisis, open new 
perspectives on the question. But 
besides their direct, personal inter-
ventions on the matter, the Holy 
See also has repeatedly taken posi-
tion on the crisis. These interven-
tions precede and complete the ones 
made by the popes.  
Among the interventions of the Holy See, a special men-tion must be made of the 
ones at the UN. They are by nature 
more sensitive to the place and tim-
ing of the address and must there-
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fore be understood in the context of 
the discussion at the time. 
The first follows the immediate af-
termath of the 2008 onset of the cri-
sis and was given at the UN General 
Assembly by Msgr Migliori. The 
document still glows with the first 
outrage toward the unfolding crisis. 
The Holy See lambasts the “disre-
gard for regulatory and supervisory 
structure and the contempt for ac-
countability rules and transparency” 
and the lack of a “complete and 
effective regulatory system.” How-
ever, the crisis is already seen not as 
merely technical but having an ethi-
cal root: the collective failure of the 
social responsibilities of corporations 
and public institutions regarding in-
ternational finance. The crisis reveals 
the negatives of the social function of 
corporations and public institutions 
in the market and therefore the 
shared duties they have toward the 
common good. The intervention 
outlines three major failures: 
1. Failure of banks, governments, 
and international financial 
institutions to enforce at the 
highest level the rules they 
implemented at lower levels. 
Developing countries, ordinary 
citizens and bank consumers 
were submitted to hard scrutiny 
whereas developed economies, 
governments, and bank man-
agement were lax in their own 
administration. 
2. Failure to exert prudent gov-
ernance for the common good, 
especially from government 
and banks. “Government is the 
exercise of the virtue of pru-
dence in the enactment of leg-
islative and executive measures 
capable of directing social activ-
ity toward the common good” 
(2008/10). Excessive risk tak-
ing by bank management and 
sheer ignorance by government 
of the systemic risk was created 
by large under-regulated finan-
cial institutions to the society.
3. Failure of the general public 
to resist an economic system 
based on increased and un-
controlled consumption. Not 
only is the trend unsustainable, 
but also offends the dignity of 
the consumer as a rational crea-
ture and the dignity of others. 
Some months later, in December 
2008, a second intervention was 
made by Msgr Migliori at Doha as 
a follow up to the ‘Monterrey Con-
sensus on Financing for Develop-
ment’. The point made by the docu-
ment is that in the same way that 
we have developed an approach to 
development as having to be sus-
tainable, we should now see and 
seek sustainable finance: “sustainable 
financing should meet the present 
capital needs for development, while 
ensuring the long term preservation 
and increase of resources. It is time 
[…] to reaffirm the principle of sus-
tainable financial development, ap-
ply it to financial markets and thus 
create truly sustainable capital man-
agement” (2008/12). Lending is a 
necessary social activity connecting 
savings to production and must re-
main at the service of production if 
it wants to remain reasonable. “If 
lending is seen merely in terms of 
trading off financial resources with-
out regard for their reasonable use, 
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it fails to be a service to society” 
(2008/10). Moreover, financial sta-
bility and security is a social good 
that drives job creation, stable fis-
cal revenue, and long term growth. 
Therefore, governments should see 
as one of their priorities to guaran-
tee such stability and security. 
The two statements made by Msgr 
Tomasi were made at the Human 
Rights Council in Geneva in 2009 
and 2010. Therefore they tackle the 
crisis through the lens of human 
rights protection and look mainly 
to the negative social impacts of 
financial market failure. The crisis 
has cut millions of jobs, pushed an 
additional 53 million people be-
low the threshold of $2 USD a day, 
threatens MDG achievement, and 
is a serious threat to international 
peace. The poor bear the brunt of 
the crisis, usually a distant victim of 
a crisis far from the actual financial 
markets. 
The imbalances created by the 
crisis are caused, says Msgr Tomasi, 
when economic action a) is seen 
merely as an engine for wealth crea-
tion; b) is detached from political 
action and justice. “To engage in 
financial activity cannot be reduced 
to making easy profits, but also must 
include the promotion of the com-
mon good among those who lend, 
those who borrow and those who 
work” (2010). Free financial mar-
kets should be framed by solidarity, 
justice, honesty, and the principle of 
‘reciprocity and gift’. 
Most interestingly, the Holy See 
states that the focus of concern in 
the reform of the financial system 
“should shift from goods and servic-
es to the persons who are the recipi-
ents of these services” (2010). The 
question is not one of techniques 
but of what becomes of human be-
ings in financial markets. By giving 
priority to human beings, says Msgr 
Tomasi, we can “modify the rules 
that govern the financial system to 
serve concrete change” (2010).
As seen before, the texts are fragmentary in nature and may disappoint people who 
would have expected a more solid 
argumentation from the Church. 
But easy condemnations are more 
often than not the signs of super-
ficial analysis. The complexity and 
gravity of the crisis was not grasped 
immediately nor was an analysis 
ready-made to apply to the case in 
CST. Rather the contrary. As the 
documents show, there is indeed 
very little done in CST on the spe-
cific nature of financial assets, inter-
national financial flows, and finan-
cial market exchange. Much could 
and actually should be said. The 
present report intends precisely to 
engage the question of a Catholic 
perspective on what has happened 
and what is now unfolding as the 
landscape emerging ‘beyond the cri-
sis’.
Notes
67. This document is not reproduced herein. Available at: http://www.vatican.va/roman_
curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20111024_nota_
en.html (accessed 22 April 2014).
¶ Fraternity, Economic 
Development and Civil 
SocietyIn a climate of mutual trust, the market is the economic institu-tion that permits encounter be-
tween persons, inasmuch as they are 
economic subjects who make use of 
contracts to regulate their relations 
as they exchange goods and services 
of equivalent value between them, 
in order to satisfy their needs and 
desires. The market is subject to the 
principles of so-called commutative 
justice, which regulates the relations 
of giving and receiving between par-
ties to a transaction. But the social 
doctrine of the Church has unceas-
ingly highlighted the importance of 
distributive justice and social justice 
for the market economy, not only 
because it belongs within a broader 
social and political context, but also 
because of the wider network of re-
lations within which it operates. In 
fact, if the market is governed solely 
by the principle of the equivalence 
in value of exchanged goods, it can-
not produce the social cohesion that 
it requires in order to function well. 
Without internal forms of solidarity 
and mutual trust, the market cannot 
completely fulfil its proper economic 
function. And today it is this trust 
which has ceased to exist, and the 
loss of trust is a grave loss. It was 
timely when Paul VI in Populorum 
Progressio insisted that the economic 
system itself would benefit from the 
wide-ranging practice of justice, 
inasmuch as the first to gain from 
the development of poor countries 
would be rich ones. According to 
the Pope, it was not just a matter of 
correcting dysfunctions through as-
sistance. The poor are not to be con-
sidered a “burden”,1 but a resource, 
even from the purely economic 
point of view. It is nevertheless er-
roneous to hold that the market 
economy has an inbuilt need for a 
quota of poverty and underdevelop-
ment in order to function at its best. 
It is in the interests of the market to 
promote emancipation, but in order 
to do so effectively, it cannot rely 
only on itself, because it is not able 
to produce by itself something that 
lies outside its competence. It must 
draw its moral energies from other 
subjects that are capable of generat-
ing them.
Economic activity cannot solve all social problems through the simple applica-
tion of commercial logic. This needs 
to be directed towards the pursuit of 
the common good, for which the po-
litical community in particular must 
CARITAS IN VERITATE
POPE BENEDICT XVI
29 June 2009
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also take responsibility. Therefore, it 
must be borne in mind that grave 
imbalances are produced when eco-
nomic action, conceived merely as 
an engine for wealth creation, is 
detached from political action, con-
ceived as a means for pursuing jus-
tice through redistribution.
The Church has always held that 
economic action is not to be re-
garded as something opposed to 
society. In and of itself, the mar-
ket is not, and must not become, 
the place where the strong subdue 
the weak. Society does not have to 
protect itself from the market, as if 
the development of the latter were 
ipso facto to entail the death of au-
thentically human relations. Admit-
tedly, the market can be a negative 
force, not because it is so by nature, 
but because a certain ideology can 
make it so. It must be remembered 
that the market does not exist in the 
pure state. It is shaped by the cul-
tural configurations which define 
it and give it direction. Economy 
and finance, as instruments, can be 
used badly when those at the helm 
are motivated by purely selfish ends. 
Instruments that are good in them-
selves can thereby be transformed 
into harmful ones. But it is man’s 
darkened reason that produces these 
consequences, not the instrument 
per se. Therefore it is not the in-
strument that must be called to ac-
count, but individuals, their moral 
conscience and their personal and 
social responsibility.
The Church’s social doctrine holds 
that authentically human social re-
lationships of friendship, solidar-
ity and reciprocity can also be con-
ducted within economic activity, 
and not only outside it or “after” 
it. The economic sphere is neither 
ethically neutral, nor inherently in-
human and opposed to society. It is 
part and parcel of human activity 
and precisely because it is human, it 
must be structured and governed in 
an ethical manner.
The great challenge before us, ac-
centuated by the problems of devel-
opment in this global era and made 
even more urgent by the economic 
and financial crisis, is to demon-
strate, in thinking and behaviour, 
not only that traditional principles 
of social ethics like transparency, 
honesty and responsibility cannot 
be ignored or attenuated, but also 
that in commercial relationships the 
principle of gratuitousness and the 
logic of gift as an expression of fra-
ternity can and must find their place 
within normal economic activity. 
This is a human demand at the pre-
sent time, but it is also demanded 
by economic logic. It is a demand 
both of charity and of truth.
The Church’s social doc-trine has always maintained that justice must be applied 
to every phase of economic activity, 
because this is always concerned 
with man and his needs. Locat-
ing resources, financing, produc-
tion, consumption and all the other 
phases in the economic cycle inevi-
tably have moral implications. Thus 
every economic decision has a moral 
consequence. The social sciences and 
the direction taken by the contem-
porary economy point to the same 
conclusion. Perhaps at one time it 
was conceivable that first the crea-
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tion of wealth could be entrusted 
to the economy, and then the task 
of distributing it could be assigned 
to politics. Today that would be 
more difficult, given that economic 
activity is no longer circumscribed 
within territorial limits, while the 
authority of governments continues 
to be principally local. Hence the 
canons of justice must be respected 
from the outset, as the economic 
process unfolds, and not just af-
terwards or incidentally. Space also 
needs to be created within the mar-
ket for economic activity carried out 
by subjects who freely choose to act 
according to principles other than 
those of pure profit, without sacri-
ficing the production of economic 
value in the process. The many eco-
nomic entities that draw their ori-
gin from religious and lay initiatives 
demonstrate that this is concretely 
possible.
In the global era, the economy is 
influenced by competitive models 
tied to cultures that differ greatly 
among themselves. The different 
forms of economic enterprise to 
which they give rise find their main 
point of encounter in commutative 
justice. Economic life undoubtedly 
requires contracts, in order to regu-
late relations of exchange between 
goods of equivalent value. But it 
also needs just laws and forms of re-
distribution governed by politics, 
and what is more, it needs works 
redolent of the spirit of gift. The 
economy in the global era seems to 
privilege the former logic, that of 
contractual exchange, but directly 
or indirectly it also demonstrates 
its need for the other two: political 
logic, and the logic of the uncondi-
tional gift.
Notes
1. John Paul II, Centessimus Annus, 28.
In our time humanity is expe-riencing a turning-point in its history, as we can see from the 
advances being made in so many 
fields. We can only praise the steps 
being taken to improve people’s 
welfare in areas such as health care, 
education and communications. At 
the same time we have to remember 
that the majority of our contempo-
raries are barely living from day to 
day, with dire consequences. A num-
ber of diseases are spreading. The 
hearts of many people are gripped 
by fear and desperation, even in the 
so-called rich countries. The joy of 
living frequently fades, lack of re-
spect for others and violence are on 
the rise, and inequality is increas-
ingly evident. It is a struggle to live 
and, often, to live with precious lit-
tle dignity. This epochal change has 
been set in motion by the enormous 
qualitative, quantitative, rapid and 
cumulative advances occurring in 
the sciences and in technology, and 
by their instant application in dif-
ferent areas of nature and of life. We 
are in an age of knowledge and in-
formation, which has led to new and 
often anonymous kinds of power.
Just as the commandment “Thou shalt not kill” sets a clear limit in order to safeguard the value 
of human life, today we also have to 
say “thou shalt not” to an economy 
of exclusion and inequality. Such an 
economy kills. How can it be that it 
is not a news item when an elderly 
homeless person dies of exposure, 
but it is news when the stock mar-
ket loses two points? This is a case of 
exclusion. Can we continue to stand 
by when food is thrown away while 
people are starving? This is a case of 
inequality. Today everything comes 
under the laws of competition and 
the survival of the fittest, where the 
powerful feed upon the powerless. 
As a consequence, masses of people 
find themselves excluded and mar-
ginalized: without work, without 
possibilities, without any means of 
escape.
Human beings are themselves con-
sidered consumer goods to be used 
and then discarded. We have cre-
ated a “throw away” culture which 
is now spreading. It is no longer 
simply about exploitation and op-
pression, but something new. Exclu-
sion ultimately has to do with what 
it means to be a part of the society 
in which we live; those excluded are 
¶ No to an economy of 
exclusion
EVANGELII GAUDIUM
POPE FRANCIS
29 November 2013
¶ No to the new  
idolatry of money
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no longer society’s underside or its 
fringes or its disenfranchised – they 
are no longer even a part of it. The 
excluded are not the “exploited” but 
the outcast, the “leftovers”.
In this context, some people con-
tinue to defend trickle-down theo-
ries which assume that economic 
growth, encouraged by a free mar-
ket, will inevitably succeed in bring-
ing about greater justice and inclu-
siveness in the world. This opinion, 
which has never been confirmed 
by the facts, expresses a crude and 
naïve trust in the goodness of those 
wielding economic power and in 
the sacralized workings of the pre-
vailing economic system. Mean-
while, the excluded are still waiting. 
To sustain a lifestyle which excludes 
others, or to sustain enthusiasm for 
that selfish ideal, a globalization of 
indifference has developed. Almost 
without being aware of it, we end 
up being incapable of feeling com-
passion at the outcry of the poor, 
weeping for other people’s pain, 
and feeling a need to help them, as 
though all this were someone else’s 
responsibility and not our own. The 
culture of prosperity deadens us; 
we are thrilled if the market offers 
us something new to purchase. In 
the meantime all those lives stunted 
for lack of opportunity seem a mere 
spectacle; they fail to move us.
One cause of this situation is found in our relation-ship with money, since 
we calmly accept its dominion over 
ourselves and our societies. The cur-
rent financial crisis can make us 
overlook the fact that it originated 
in a profound human crisis: the de-
nial of the primacy of the human 
person! We have created new idols. 
The worship of the ancient golden 
calf (cf. Ex 32:1-35) has returned in 
a new and ruthless guise in the idol-
atry of money and the dictatorship 
of an impersonal economy lacking 
a truly human purpose. The world-
wide crisis affecting finance and the 
economy lays bare their imbalanc-
es and, above all, their lack of real 
concern for human beings; man is 
reduced to one of his needs alone: 
consumption.
While the earnings of a minority 
are growing exponentially, so too 
is the gap separating the major-
ity from the prosperity enjoyed by 
those happy few. This imbalance is 
the result of ideologies which de-
fend the absolute autonomy of the 
marketplace and financial specu-
lation. Consequently, they reject 
the right of states, charged with 
vigilance for the common good, 
to exercise any form of control. A 
new tyranny is thus born, invisible 
and often virtual, which unilater-
ally and relentlessly imposes its own 
laws and rules. Debt and the ac-
cumulation of interest also make it 
difficult for countries to realize the 
potential of their own economies 
and keep citizens from enjoying 
their real purchasing power. To all 
this we can add widespread corrup-
tion and self-serving tax evasion, 
which have taken on worldwide di-
mensions. The thirst for power and 
possessions knows no limits. In this 
system, which tends to devour eve-
rything which stands in the way of 
increased profits, whatever is fragile, 
like the environment, is defenceless 
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rather than serves
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which spawns violence
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before the interests of a deified mar-
ket, which become the only rule.
Behind this attitude lurks a re-jection of ethics and a rejec-tion of God. Ethics has come 
to be viewed with a certain scornful 
derision. It is seen as counterproduc-
tive, too human, because it makes 
money and power relative. It is felt 
to be a threat, since it condemns 
the manipulation and debasement 
of the person. In effect, ethics leads 
to a God who calls for a committed 
response which is outside the cat-
egories of the marketplace. When 
these latter are absolutized, God can 
only be seen as uncontrollable, un-
manageable, even dangerous, since 
he calls human beings to their full 
realization and to freedom from 
all forms of enslavement. Ethics – 
a non-ideological ethics – would 
make it possible to bring about bal-
ance and a more humane social or-
der. With this in mind, I encourage 
financial experts and political lead-
ers to ponder the words of one of 
the sages of antiquity: “Not to share 
one’s wealth with the poor is to steal 
from them and to take away their 
livelihood. It is not our own goods 
which we hold, but theirs”.1
58. A financial reform open to 
such ethical considerations would 
require a vigorous change of ap-
proach on the part of political lead-
ers. I urge them to face this chal-
lenge with determination and an 
eye to the future, while not ignor-
ing, of course, the specifics of each 
case. Money must serve, not rule! 
The Pope loves everyone, rich and 
poor alike, but he is obliged in the 
name of Christ to remind all that 
the rich must help, respect and pro-
mote the poor. I exhort you to gen-
erous solidarity and to the return of 
economics and finance to an ethical 
approach which favours human be-
ings.
Today in many places we hear a call for greater secu-rity. But until exclusion and 
inequality in society and between 
peoples are reversed, it will be im-
possible to eliminate violence. The 
poor and the poorer peoples are ac-
cused of violence, yet without equal 
opportunities the different forms of 
aggression and conflict will find a 
fertile terrain for growth and even-
tually explode. When a society – 
whether local, national or global – is 
willing to leave a part of itself on the 
fringes, no political programmes or 
resources spent on law enforcement 
or surveillance systems can indefi-
nitely guarantee tranquility. This is 
not the case simply because inequal-
ity provokes a violent reaction from 
those excluded from the system, but 
because the socioeconomic system 
is unjust at its root. Just as goodness 
tends to spread, the toleration of 
evil, which is injustice, tends to ex-
pand its baneful influence and qui-
etly to undermine any political and 
social system, no matter how solid 
it may appear. If every action has 
its consequences, an evil embedded 
in the structures of a society has a 
constant potential for disintegration 
and death. It is evil crystallized in 
unjust social structures, which can-
not be the basis of hope for a better 
future. We are far from the so-called 
“end of history”, since the condi-
tions for a sustainable and peaceful 
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development have not yet been ad-
equately articulated and realized.
60. Today’s economic mechanisms 
promote inordinate consumption, 
yet it is evident that unbridled con-
sumerism combined with inequal-
ity proves doubly damaging to the 
social fabric. Inequality eventually 
engenders a violence which recourse 
to arms cannot and never will be 
able to resolve. It serves only to offer 
false hopes to those clamouring for 
heightened security, even though 
nowadays we know that weapons 
and violence, rather than providing 
solutions, create new and more seri-
ous conflicts. Some simply content 
themselves with blaming the poor 
and the poorer countries themselves 
for their troubles; indulging in un-
warranted generalizations, they 
claim that the solution is an “educa-
tion” that would tranquilize them, 
making them tame and harmless. 
All this becomes even more exas-
perating for the marginalized in the 
light of the widespread and deeply 
rooted corruption found in many 
countries – in their governments, 
businesses and institutions – what-
ever the political ideology of their 
leaders.
Notes
1. St John Chrysostom, De Lazaro Concio, II, 6: p. 48, 992D.
ADDRESS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTESIMUS  
ANNUS—PRO PONTIFICE FOUNDATION
POPE BENEDICT XVI
Clementine Hall, 13 June 2009
Thank you for your visit which fits into the context of your annual meeting. 
I greet you all with affection and 
am grateful to you for all that you 
do, with proven generosity, at the 
service of the Church. I greet and 
thank your President, Count Lor-
enzo Rossi di Montelera, who has 
expressed your sentiments with fine 
sensitivity, giving an overview of 
the Foundation’s work. I also thank 
those who, in various languages, 
have wished to express your com-
mon devotion. Our meeting today 
acquires special meaning and value 
in the light of the situation that hu-
manity as a whole is experiencing at 
this time.
Indeed, the financial and eco-
nomic crisis which has hit the in-
dustrialized, the emerging and the 
developing countries, shows clearly 
that certain economic and financial 
paradigms which prevailed in recent 
years must be rethought. Therefore, 
at the international congress which 
took place yesterday your Founda-
tion did well to address the topic of 
the search for, and identification of, 
the values and rules which the eco-
nomic world should abide by in or-
der to evolve a new model of devel-
opment that is more attentive to the 
requirements of solidarity and more 
respectful of human dignity.
I am pleased to learn that you 
examined in particular the interde-
pendence between institutions, so-
ciety and the market, in accordance 
with my venerable Predecessor John 
Paul II’s Encyclical, Centesimus an-
nus. The Encyclical states that the 
market economy, understood as: 
“an economic system which recog-
nizes the fundamental and positive 
role of business, the market, private 
property and the resulting responsi-
bility for the means of production, 
as well as free human creativity in 
the economic sector” (n. 42), may 
be recognized as a path to economic 
and civil progress only if it is ori-
ented to the common good (cf. n. 
43). However, this vision must also 
be accompanied by another reflec-
tion which says that freedom in the 
economic sector must be circum-
scribed “by a strong juridical frame-
work which places it at the service 
of human freedom in its totality,” 
a responsible freedom, “the core of 
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which is ethical and religious” (n. 
42). The above-mentioned Encyc-
lical appropriately states: “just as 
the person fully realizes himself in 
the free gift of self, so too owner-
ship morally justifies itself in the 
creation, at the proper time and in 
the proper way, of opportunities for 
work and human growth for all” (n. 
43).
I hope that by drawing inspira-
tion from the eternal principles of 
the Gospel it will be possible, with 
the research inherent in your work, 
to elaborate a vision of the mod-
ern economy that is respectful of 
the needs and rights of the weak. 
My Encyclical dedicated to the vast 
topic of the economy and work is, 
as you know, due to be published 
shortly. It will highlight what for 
Christians are the objectives to 
pursue and the values to promote 
and to defend tirelessly, if we are to 
achieve a truly free and supportive 
human coexistence. I likewise note 
with pleasure all that you do for 
the Pontifical Institute for Arab and 
Islamic Studies (PISAI), to whose 
goals you and I attribute great value 
for an increasingly fruitful interreli-
gious dialogue.
Dear friends, thank you once 
again for coming! I assure each 
one of you of my remembrance in 
prayer, while I warmly bless you all.
ADDRESS TO THE SIXTEENTH PLENARY SESSION OF 
THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
POPE BENEDICT XVI
Consistory Hall, 30 April 2010
I am pleased to greet you at the beginning of your Sixteenth Plenary Session, which is de-
voted to an analysis of the global 
economic crisis in the light of the 
ethical principles enshrined in the 
Church’s social doctrine. I thank 
your President, Professor Mary Ann 
Glendon, for her gracious words of 
greeting and I offer you my prayer-
ful good wishes for the fruitfulness 
of your deliberations.
The worldwide financial break-
down has, as we know, demon-
strated the fragility of the present 
economic system and the institu-
tions linked to it. It has also shown 
the error of the assumption that 
the market is capable of regulating 
itself, apart from public interven-
tion and the support of internalized 
moral standards. This assumption 
is based on an impoverished no-
tion of economic life as a sort of 
self-calibrating mechanism driven 
by self-interest and profit-seeking. 
As such, it overlooks the essentially 
ethical nature of economics as an 
activity of and for human beings. 
Rather than a spiral of production 
and consumption in view of nar-
rowly-defined human needs, eco-
nomic life should properly be seen 
as an exercise of human responsibil-
ity, intrinsically oriented towards 
the promotion of the dignity of the 
person, the pursuit of the common 
good and the integral development 
– political, cultural and spiritual – 
of individuals, families and socie-
ties. An appreciation of this fuller 
human dimension calls, in turn, for 
precisely the kind of cross-discipli-
nary research and reflection which 
the present session of the Academy 
has now undertaken.
In my Encyclical Caritas in Veri-
tate, I observed that “the current 
crisis obliges us to re-plan our jour-
ney, to set ourselves new rules and 
to discover new forms of commit-
ment” (No. 21). Re-planning the 
journey, of course, also means look-
ing to comprehensive and objective 
standards against which to judge the 
structures, institutions and concrete 
decisions which guide and direct 
economic life. The Church, based 
on her faith in God the Creator, 
affirms the existence of a universal 
natural law which is the ultimate 
source of these criteria (cf. ibid., 
59). Yet she is likewise convinced 
that the principles of this ethical or-
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der, inscribed in creation itself, are 
accessible to human reason and, as 
such, must be adopted as the basis 
for practical choices. As part of the 
great heritage of human wisdom, 
the natural moral law, which the 
Church has appropriated, purified 
and developed in the light of Chris-
tian revelation, serves as a beacon 
guiding the efforts of individuals 
and communities to pursue good 
and to avoid evil, while directing 
their commitment to building an 
authentically just and humane so-
ciety.
Among the indispensable princi-
ples shaping such an integral ethi-
cal approach to economic life must 
be the promotion of the common 
good, grounded in respect for the 
dignity of the human person and 
acknowledged as the primary goal of 
production and trade systems, polit-
ical institutions and social welfare. 
In our day, concern for the common 
good has taken on a more markedly 
global dimension. It has also be-
come increasingly evident that the 
common good embraces responsi-
bility towards future generations; 
intergenerational solidarity must 
henceforth be recognized as a basic 
ethical criterion for judging any so-
cial system. These realities point to 
the urgency of strengthening the 
governance procedures of the global 
economy, albeit with due respect for 
the principle of subsidiarity. In the 
end, however, all economic deci-
sions and policies must be directed 
towards “charity in truth”, inas-
much as truth preserves and chan-
nels the liberating power of charity 
amid ever-contingent human events 
and structures. For “without truth, 
without trust and love for what is 
true, there is no social conscience 
and responsibility, and social action 
ends up serving private interests and 
the logic of power, resulting in so-
cial fragmentation” (Caritas in Veri-
tate, 5).
With these considerations, dear 
friends, I once more express my 
confidence that this Plenary Session 
will contribute to a more profound 
discernment of the serious social 
and economic challenges facing 
our world, and help point the way 
forward to meet those challenges in 
a spirit of wisdom, justice and au-
thentic humanity. I assure you once 
more of my prayers for your impor-
tant work, and upon you and your 
loved ones I cordially invoke God’s 
blessings of joy and peace. 
INTERVIEW WITH THE JOURNALISTS DURING THE 
FLIGHT TO MADRID ON THE OCCASION OF THE 26TH 
WORLD YOUTH DAY
POPE BENEDICT XVI
Papal Flight, 18 August 2011
Fr Federico Lombardi, SJ: 
Your Holiness, times are changing. Europe and the Western world in general are 
going through a profound economic 
crisis which is also showing dimen-
sions of serious social and moral 
hardship and great uncertainty for 
the future which is becoming par-
ticularly acute for young people. In 
the past few days we have seen, for 
example, what happened in Great 
Britain when rebellion and aggres-
siveness were unleashed. At the same 
time there are signs of generous and 
enthusiastic commitment, of vol-
untary service and of solidarity, of 
young believers and non-believers 
alike. In Madrid we shall meet a 
large number of marvellous young 
people. What message of hope can 
the Church provide to encourage 
youth throughout the world, espe-
cially those who feel discouraged to-
day and are tempted to rebel?
The Holy Father: 
It is this. In the current economic crisis what formerly appeared in the previous great crisis has been 
confirmed: namely, that the ethical 
dimension is not alien to economic 
problems but an internal and fun-
damental dimension of them. The 
economy does not function with a 
self-regulation of the market alone, 
but it needs an ethical reason if it 
is to function for man. And once 
again Pope John II’s words in his 
first social Encyclical become ap-
parent: man must be the centre of 
the economy and the economy can-
not be measured according to the 
maxim of profit but rather accord-
ing to the common good of all, that 
it implies responsibility for others 
and only really functions well if it 
functions humanly, with respect 
for others. And with the different 
dimensions: responsibility for one’s 
own nation and not only for one-
self; responsibility for the world — 
even a nation is not isolated, even 
Europe is not isolated but is respon-
sible for the whole of humanity and 
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must always think about economic 
problems in this key of responsibil-
ity for the other parts of the world 
too, for all who suffer, who thirst 
and hunger, who have no future. 
And so — a third dimension of this 
responsibility — is responsibility for 
the future.
We know we must protect our 
planet but, all things considered, 
we must protect a functional ser-
vice of employment for everyone 
and realize that tomorrow is also to-
day. If today’s young people have no 
prospects in life then our own life 
today is misguided and “wrong”. 
Therefore the Church, with her so-
cial doctrine, with her doctrine on 
responsibility to God, proposes the 
readiness to give up the maxim of 
profit and to see things in the hu-
manistic and religious dimension: 
in other words existing for each 
other. Thus new ways can also be 
found. The throngs of volunteers 
who are working in various parts of 
the world, not for themselves but 
for others, and who thereby find 
the meaning of life, show that it is 
possible to do this and that an edu-
cation in these great goals, such as 
the Church tries to provide, is fun-
damental for our future.
INTERVENTION BY THE HOLY SEE AT THE 63RD  
SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
ADDRESS OF H.E. MSGR CELESTINO MIGLIORE
New York, 30 October 2008
Many economists and ana-lysts are agreed that the crisis can be attributed 
to a lack of a complete and effective 
regulatory system, but even more to 
a widespread disregard for regula-
tory and supervisory structures, to 
say nothing of the rules of account-
ability and transparency.
My delegation endorses this view 
and would go one step further: 
the real crisis does not appear to 
be merely financial, economic and 
technical. Rather, it extends to the 
broader realm of ethical codes and 
moral conduct. Unbridled profiteer-
ing and the unscrupulous pursuit of 
gain at any cost have made people 
forget basic rules of business ethics.
Our reaction should not be limit-
ed to deploring the crisis and offer-
ing formal expressions of sympathy 
to the poorer countries and social 
strata which have been affected. We 
need to come up with the ways and 
means to avoid similar crises in the 
future.
In some cases, governments and 
institutions which rigorously im-
plemented rules at the lower cus-
tomer level were lax in maintaining 
that same rigor at the higher level. 
The same could also be said with 
regard to the economic systems of 
poorer countries. International fi-
nancial institutions which strictly 
implemented conditionalities and 
oversight in developing countries 
neglected to do so when oversee-
ing developed economies. Now that 
the latter have collapsed, the former 
also have to bear the consequences.
Government is the exercise of the 
virtue of prudence in the enactment 
of legislative and executive measures 
capable of directing social activ-
ity towards the common good. The 
principle of subsidiarity requires 
that governments and large interna-
tional agencies ensure solidarity on 
the national and global levels and 
between generations.
A second observation pertains 
to the responsibility of those who 
work in the financial sector. Lend-
ing is a necessary social activity. 
Nonetheless, financial institutions 
and agents are responsible for en-
suring that lending fulfils its proper 
function in society, connecting sav-
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ings to production. If lending is 
seen merely in terms of trading off 
financial resources without regard 
for their reasonable use, it fails to be 
a service to society. When attempts 
are made to conceal the real risk that 
loans will not be repaid, savers are 
cheated and lenders become actual 
accomplices in theft.
It must not be forgotten that at 
the edges of the financial system 
there are retired persons, small fam-
ily businesses, cottage industries and 
countless employees for whom sav-
ings are an essential means of sup-
port. Financial activity needs to be 
sufficiently transparent so that in-
dividual savers, especially the poor 
and those least protected, under-
stand what will become of their sav-
ings. This calls not only for effective 
measures of oversight by govern-
ments, but also for a high standard 
of ethical conduct on the part of fi-
nancial leaders themselves.
A third, and perhaps even more 
basic, observation has to do with 
the general public and its choice 
of values and lifestyles. A lifestyle, 
and even more an economic model, 
solely based on increased and un-
controlled consumption and not on 
savings and the creation of produc-
tive capital, is economically unsus-
tainable. It also becomes unsustain-
able from the standpoint of concern 
for the environment and, above all, 
of human dignity itself, since the ir-
responsible consumer renounces his 
own dignity as a rational creature 
and also offends the dignity of oth-
ers.
Looking towards the future, there 
is a need to restore credibility and 
authenticity to lending, which al-
ways needs to be a part of the prod-
uct chain of goods and services, and 
not an independent activity.
Above all, however, there is a need 
to invest in people. Once the inevi-
table financial salvage operations are 
over, governments and the inter-
national community should invest 
their money in aid to the poorest 
populations.
The relatively recent and positive 
experience of microcredit shows 
that, paradoxically, those who, from 
the standpoint of cold hard finan-
cial calculation, seem least suitable 
to receive credit, are by and large the 
most serious and reliable borrowers.
The history of developed coun-
tries also demonstrates that grants 
for health, education, housing and 
other basic services benefiting the 
weakest socio-economic levels of so-
ciety, families and small communi-
ties, ultimately prove to be the most 
profitable investments, since they 
alone ensure the harmonious func-
tioning of society as a whole.
¶ Financing for 
development
INTERVENTION BY THE HOLY SEE AT THE DOHA 
CONFERENCE (QATAR)
ADDRESS OF H.E. MSGR CELESTINO MIGLIORE
Doha, 1 December 2008
Six years ago, world leaders gathered in Monterrey, Mexi-co, to begin a new process for 
addressing together the needs of the 
poorest among us. At that time, the 
world was reeling from the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001, and 
the subsequent economic decline, 
but despite these hurdles, it still 
came together to craft the Monter-
rey Consensus which created a new 
vision for a shared future.
Today, we meet in Doha, Qatar, 
to assess the lessons learned and to 
create ways and means for realizing 
the vision of Monterrey. However, 
again we come with a cloud hanging 
over our heads: the anxiety over the 
economic and political consequenc-
es of an unprecedented financial 
crisis and the persistent devastating 
presence of terrorism, as evidenced 
by the tragic events in Mumbai, In-
dia.
This crisis presents an enormous 
challenge in finding ways to address 
the concerns of those most in need. 
At its root, the financial crisis is not 
a failure of human ingenuity but 
rather of moral conduct. Unbridled 
human ingenuity crafted the sys-
tems and means for providing high-
ly leveraged and unsustainable cred-
it limits which allowed people and 
companies alike to pursue material 
excess at the expense of long-term 
sustainability. Unfortunately, we are 
now seeing the effects of such short-
term greed and lack of prudence, 
and as a result those who recently 
were able to rise out of extreme pov-
erty are now likely to fall back. We 
often speak of sustainable develop-
ment as an overarching principle for 
developing countries.
Sustainable development meets 
the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their needs. 
Likewise, sustainable financing 
should meet the present capital 
needs for development, while ensur-
ing the long-term preservation and 
increase of resources. It is time for 
developed and developing countries 
alike to reaffirm the principle of 
sustainable financial development, 
apply it to financial markets and 
thus create truly sustainable capital 
management. Such is the great chal-
lenge of this Conference: nothing 
less than to ensure, in a sustainable 
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way, the financing for development.
Global development is, at its 
heart, a question not only of techni-
cal logistics but more fundamental-
ly of morality. Social and economic 
development must be measured and 
implemented with the human per-
son at the center of all decisions. 
The last six years have seen an in-
crease in aid flows and encouraging 
developments in a number of indi-
cators and statistics. However, ques-
tions remain: how many people do 
not have access to food, how many 
live with fear of war and oppres-
sion, how many do not have access 
to even basic healthcare and how 
many lack decent employment to 
provide a living wage for themselves 
and their families? Unfortunately, 
the answer remains: too many.
These are the questions and con-
cerns which must be at the heart of 
our strategies in order to ensure that 
development is measured not only 
by capital gain but more important-
ly by lives sustained.
Since Monterrey, we have again 
seen the importance for each and 
every country to uphold good gov-
ernance in order to provide the 
means for personal as well as global 
development. Governmental lead-
ership which provides for effective 
financial systems, just taxation, re-
sponsible spending and good stew-
ardship of the environment, sets 
the foundation for countries upon 
which to build. Transparency, the 
rule of law and good governance 
guarantee the stability and financial 
certainty needed in order to provide 
job creation, tax revenues and long 
term growth. Further, good govern-
ance, respect for human rights and 
social stability assure the means for 
civil society actors, including faith-
based organizations, to offer the life 
saving and life affirming services 
which are oftentimes beyond the 
capacities of national and local gov-
ernments.
National governments need the 
cooperation of the international 
community in order to acceler-
ate economic and human develop-
ment. Since Monterey we have seen 
renewed commitment towards the 
target of 0.7% Gross National In-
come in Official Development As-
sistance (oda).
However, we still remain far be-
hind this goal and have recently 
seen a slight decline in oda. Too of-
ten developed countries state that 
development assistance is too cum-
bersome, yet such an explanation 
lacks sincerity, especially when we 
see the increase of military spending 
at levels many times greater than de-
velopment assistance. Similarly, the 
recent financial crisis demonstrates 
that when political will is com-
bined with concern for the com-
mon good we are able to generate, 
within months, substantial funds 
for financial markets which are far 
greater than the total amount of oda 
expended since Monterrey. Sure-
ly, it goes without saying that the 
same political will and concern for 
the common good of the financial 
systems applies to the poorest and 
most vulnerable.
The international community 
must also give greater respect for 
the voices of those countries and in-
dividuals most in need of financial 
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assistance. The Bretton Woods in-
stitutions need to be refocused and 
the so called G-8 and G-20 coun-
tries must ensure that the voices of 
those who are in such need of de-
velopment assistance are heard and 
respected. A purely top down ap-
proach to development will remain 
insufficient unless greater concern is 
given to those whose lives and coun-
tries are at stake.
The United Nations continues to 
serve as a vital forum for bringing 
all voices together in order to foster 
greater global solidarity. Likewise, 
renewed attention must be given 
to ensuring more just and equita-
ble trade systems. These days we 
have heard many calls for a greater 
commitment to implementing the 
Doha-Round trade talks. However, 
these talks will continue to languish 
unless countries express the neces-
sary political fortitude to promote 
fair trade and make the inevitable 
required sacrifices. Further, trade-
distorting subsidies, financial specu-
lation, increased energy prices and 
decreased investment in agriculture 
have recently given rise to lack of 
access to the very thing which is 
necessary for life namely food. This 
economic volatility, which strikes at 
the heart of human existence, gives 
greater urgency to finding a com-
mon commitment to addressing 
global trade and development.
Uncertainty and anxiety seem 
to prevail at this particular point 
in time. However, the virtues and 
principles which have led the glob-
al community out of so many cri-
ses remain; that of solidarity with 
our global community, just and 
equitable sharing in resources and 
opportunity, prudent use of the 
environment, restraint from seek-
ing short-term financial and social 
gain at the expense of sustainable 
development, and finally, the po-
litical courage which is necessary to 
build a world in which human life is 
placed at the center of all social and 
activities. By embracing these fun-
damental principles we will help to 
create a world in which social, eco-
nomic and spiritual growth is acces-
sible to all.
INTERVENTION BY THE HOLY SEE AT THE SPECIAL 
SESSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL ON THE 
WORLD FINANCIAL CRISIS
ADDRESS OF H.E. MSGR SILVANO M. TOMASI
Geneva, 20 February 2009
As we are daily reminded by the 
media, the world financial crisis has 
created a global recession causing 
dramatic social consequences, in-
cluding the loss of millions of jobs 
and the serious risk that, for many 
of the developing countries, the 
Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) may not be reached. The 
human rights of countless persons 
are compromised, including the 
right to food, water, health and de-
cent work. Above all, when large 
segments of a national population 
see their social and economic rights 
frustrated, the loss of hope endan-
gers peace. The international com-
munity has a legitimate responsi-
bility to ask why such a situation 
developed; whose responsibility it 
is; and how a concerted solution 
can lead us out of the crisis and fa-
cilitate the restoration of rights. The 
crisis was caused, in part, by prob-
lematic behaviour of some actors in 
the financial and economic system, 
including bank administrators and 
those who should have been more 
diligent in monitoring and account-
ability systems; thus they bear much 
responsibility for the current prob-
lems. The causes of the crisis, how-
ever, are deeper.
Reflecting, at that time, on the 
1929 crisis Pius XI observed that: 
“… it is obvious that not only is 
wealth concentrated in our times 
but an immense power and des-
potic economic dictatorship is con-
solidated in the hands of a few, who 
often are not owners but only the 
trustees and managing directors of 
invested funds which they adminis-
ter according to their own arbitrary 
will and pleasure” (QA, 105). He 
also noted that free competition 
had destroyed itself by relying on 
profit as the only criterion. There 
are economic, juridical and cultural 
dimensions of the present crisis. To 
engage in financial activity cannot 
be reduced to making easy profits, 
but also must include the promo-
tion of the common good among 
those who lend, those who borrow, 
and those who work. The lack of an 
ethical base has brought the crisis to 
low, middle and high income coun-
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tries alike. The Delegation of the 
Holy See, Mr. President, calls for re-
newed attention to the need for an 
ethical approach to the creation of 
positive partnerships between mar-
kets, civil society and States.
The negative consequences, how-
ever, exert a more dramatic impact 
on the developing world and on 
the most vulnerable groups in all 
societies. In a recent document, the 
World Bank estimates that, in 2009, 
the current global economic crisis 
could push an additional 53 million 
people below the threshold of $2 
a day. This figure is in addition to 
the 130 million people pushed into 
poverty in 2008 by the increase in 
food and energy prices. Such trends 
seriously threaten the achievement 
of the fight against poverty in the 
Millennium Development Goals 
by 2015. Evidence indicates that 
children, in particular, will suffer 
the most from economic hardship, 
and a strong increase in the infant 
mortality rate in poor countries is 
forecasted for 2009.
It is well known that low-income 
countries are heavily dependent 
upon two financing flows: foreign 
aid and migrant remittances. Both 
flows are expected to decline signifi-
cantly over the next months, due 
to the worsening of the economic 
crisis. Despite the official reaffir-
mation of commitment by donors 
to increase Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) in accord with 
the Gleneagles agreement, cur-
rently most donors are not on track 
to meet their target for significant 
scale-up of ODA by 2010. Moreo-
ver, the most recent figures reveal a 
slowing down of aid flows. This re-
sults in worry that a possible direct 
effect of the global economic crisis 
will be a major reduction of aid to 
the poor countries. On the other 
hand, remittances from migrant 
workers already have been reduced 
significantly. This threatens the eco-
nomic survival of entire families 
who derive a consistent share of 
their income from the transfer of 
funds by relatives working overseas.
The Delegation of the Holy See, 
Mr. President, would like to fo-
cus on a specific case in this crisis: 
its impact on the human rights of 
children, which exemplifies, as well, 
what is symptomatic of the destruc-
tive impact on all other social and 
economic rights. At present some 
important rights of poor people are 
heavily dependent on official aid 
flows and on workers’ remittances. 
These include the right to health, 
education, and food. In several 
poor countries, in fact, educational, 
health and nutritional programmes 
are implemented with the help 
of aid flows from official donors. 
Should the economic crisis reduce 
this assistance, the successful com-
pletion of these programs could be 
threatened. By the same token, in 
many poor regions, entire families 
can afford to have their children 
educated and decently nourished 
due to remittances received from 
migrants. If the reduction of both 
aid and remittances continue, it will 
deprive children of the right to be 
educated creating a double negative 
consequence. Not only will we pre-
vent children from the full exercise 
of their talent that, in turn, could 
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be put to use for the common good, 
but also the preconditions will be 
established for long-range economic 
hardship. Lower educational invest-
ment today, in fact, will be translat-
ed into lower future growth. At the 
same time, poor nutrition among 
children significantly worsens life 
expectancy by increasing both child 
and adult mortality rates. The nega-
tive economic consequences of this 
go beyond the personal dimension 
and affect entire societies.
Mr. President, let me mention 
another consequence of the global 
economic crisis that could be par-
ticularly relevant for the mandate of 
the United Nations. All too often, 
periods of severe economic hardship 
have been characterized by the rise 
in power of governments with du-
bious commitments to democracy. 
The Holy See prays that such conse-
quences will be avoided in the pre-
sent crisis, since they would result 
in a serious threat for the diffusion 
of basic human rights for which this 
institution has so tenaciously strug-
gled.
The last fifty years have wit-
nessed some great achievements in 
poverty reduction. Mr. President, 
these achievements are at risk, and 
a coherent approach is required to 
preserve them through a renewed 
sense of solidarity, especially for the 
segments of population and for the 
countries more affected by the cri-
sis. Old and recent mistakes will be 
repeated, however, if concerted in-
ternational action is not undertaken 
to promote and protect all human 
rights and if direct financial and 
economic activities are not placed 
on an ethical road that can prioritize 
persons, their productivity and their 
rights over the greed that can result 
from a fixation on profit alone.
The Delegation of the Holy See wants to restate its con-viction that the perspective 
of human rights provides a positive 
contribution for a solution to the 
current financial crisis. Even though 
some signs of recovery seem visible, 
the crisis continues to aggravate the 
conditions of millions of people in 
their access to the basic necessities 
of life and has adversely compro-
mised the retirement plans of many. 
This situation, therefore, calls for 
new regulations and a sound global 
system of governance that ensures 
a sustainable and comprehensive 
path to development for all. In the 
establishment of new regulations 
and reliable governance there exists 
a unique opportunity to address the 
root causes of the crisis and to af-
firm an integrated approach to the 
implementation of all economic, so-
cial, civil and political human rights 
as outlined in the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights.
United Nations reports give plen-
ty of evidence regarding the many 
negative consequences of the finan-
cial crisis: the scandal of hunger, 
the growing inequality worldwide, 
millions of unemployed people and 
millions of others reduced to ex-
treme poverty, institutional failures, 
lack of social protection for count-
less vulnerable persons. These im-
balances, the Holy Father reminds 
us in the recent encyclical Caritas 
in veritate “are produced when eco-
nomic action, conceived merely 
as an engine for wealth creation, 
is detached from political action, 
conceived as a means for pursuing 
justice through redistribution.”1 Eq-
uity and justice are essential criteria 
in the management of the world 
economy.
The enjoyment of human rights 
becomes possible when States trans-
late principles into law and make 
change on the ground a reality. 
While the State is the first actor 
in the implementation of human 
rights, it cannot fail to collaborate 
with all other players in its own civil 
society and with the international 
community, interconnected and 
interdependent as we are in today’s 
INTERVENTION OF THE HOLY SEE AT THE HIGH LEVEL  
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ADDRESS OF H.E. MSGR SILVANO M. TOMASI
Geneva, 3 March 2010 
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globalized world. In fact, the com-
mon goal is the protection and re-
spect of human dignity that binds 
together the entire human family, a 
unity rooted on the four basic prin-
ciples of the centrality of the human 
person, solidarity, subsidiarity and 
the common good. In this context, 
the review of the Human Rights 
Council should aim also at making 
change on the ground a reality and 
the concrete implementation of hu-
man rights, its priority.
An important message conveyed 
by Pope Benedict XVI in Caritas in 
veritate in this moment of economic 
crisis is the invitation to overcome 
the obsolete dichotomy between 
the economic, social and ecological 
spheres. Markets and freedom are 
important requirements in building 
a healthy society, but the context 
within which they operate is global 
and must include the universal prin-
ciples of honesty, justice, solidarity 
and in addition the principles of 
‘reciprocity and gift’.2 The focus of 
concern in the reform of the finan-
cial system, and the economic mod-
els that are operative in government 
programs and corporate policies, 
should shift from goods and services 
to the persons who are recipients of 
these services; in this way, they have 
access to the resources to improve 
their position in life and thus place 
their talents at the service of their 
local community and the universal 
common good. The social doctrine 
of the Church has always pursued 
such a goal with special care for the 
more vulnerable members of so-
ciety. In fact, by giving priority to 
human beings and the created order 
that supports them on their earthly 
journey, we can modify the rules 
that govern the financial system 
to serve concrete change, to move 
away from old habits of greed that 
led to the present crisis, and to pro-
mote effective integral development 
and the implementation of human 
rights since “the primary capital to 
be safeguarded and valued is the hu-
man person in his or her integrity.”3 
Notes
1. Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, 36.
2. Ibid. “The great challenge before us, accentuated by the problems of development 
in this global era and made even more urgent by the economic and financial crisis, is 
to demonstrate, in thinking and behaviour, not only that traditional principles of social 
ethics like transparency, honesty and responsibility cannot be ignored or attenuated, but 
also that in commercial relationships the principle of gratuitousness and the logic of gift as an 
expression of fraternity can and must find their place within normal economic activity. This 
is a human demand at the present time, but it is also demanded by economic logic. It is a 
demand both of charity and of truth.”
3. Ibid at 25.
The devastating impact of the recent financial crisis on the world’s most vulnerable 
populations has been highlighted in 
almost all the interventions made so 
far in this General Assembly because 
it really is a concern shared by gov-
ernments and citizens all over the 
world. Indeed, the dark shadow of 
this crisis is likely to frustrate efforts 
made so far to help reduce poverty 
and only add to the skyrocketing 
numbers living in extreme poverty.
At the same time, the current eco-
nomic crisis has also given rise to 
unprecedented international politi-
cal cooperation, evident in the three 
successive high-level G-20 meetings 
in Washington, London, and Pitts-
burgh during 2009. These meetings 
were able to reach agreement on 
emergency measures to reignite the 
world economy, including fiscal and 
monetary stimulus packages that 
have prevented a global catastrophe. 
Overall, the G-20 deliberations 
have received the moral support of 
most UN members, even recogniz-
ing the low ratio of member partici-
pation in them.
Nevertheless, the stabilization of 
some economies, or the recovery of 
others, does not mean that the crisis 
is over. Moreover, there is a general 
perception about the lack of sound 
political and economic foundations 
needed to ensure longer-term stabil-
ity and sustainability of the global 
economy. Indeed, the whole world 
economy, where countries are high-
ly interdependent, will never be able 
to function smoothly if the condi-
tions that generated the crisis per-
sist, especially when fundamental 
inequalities in income and wealth 
among individuals and between na-
tions continue.
Against this background, my dele-
gation underscores the view that we 
cannot wait for a definitive and per-
manent recovery of the global econ-
omy to take action. A significant 
reason is that the re-activation of 
the economies of the world’s poor-
est people will surely help guarantee 
a universal and sustainable recovery. 
But the most important reason is 
the moral imperative: not to leave 
a whole generation, nearly a fifth of 
the world’s population, in extreme 
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ADDRESS OF H.E. MSGR CELESTINO MIGLIORE
New York, 24 March 2010
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poverty.
There is now an urgent need to 
reform, strengthen and modernize 
the whole funding system for de-
veloping countries as well as UN 
programs, including the specialized 
agencies and regional organizations, 
making them more efficient, trans-
parent, and well coordinated, both 
internationally and locally. In the 
same vein, the crisis has highlighted 
the urgent need to proceed with the 
reform of the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, 
whose structures and procedures 
must reflect the realities of today’s 
world and no longer those of the 
post World War II period.
As pointed out in the Doha Dec-
laration, of December 2008, a re-
formed IMF should be able to ac-
complish fully its original mandate 
of stabilizing currency fluctuations 
and ought to be provided with 
mechanisms for preventing financial 
crises. The functions of the Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF) would ac-
quire greater legitimacy if they were 
developed in close collaboration 
with the Fund and other relevant 
UN bodies, such as UNCTAD. The 
international community, through 
its appropriate bodies, such as the 
IMF, the FSF and others, should be 
able to make proposals to improve 
banking regulations. It should be 
able to identify and define the capi-
tal requirements for banks, liquidity 
requirements, transparency meas-
ures, and accountability standards 
for the issuance and trading of se-
curities. Equally important are the 
regulatory norms for the para-bank-
ing activities and control of rating 
companies. We would do well not 
to wait for consensus on all these is-
sues but move ahead in areas where 
there is already broad consensus, 
such as uniform international ac-
counting standards.
On the other hand, the inter-
national community, through the 
World Bank and relevant multi-
lateral agencies, should continue 
to give priority to the fight against 
poverty, particularly in LDCs. In 
this context, as part of the emergen-
cy measures of developed countries 
to address the crisis, contributions 
to the World Bank destined to fight 
extreme poverty should have high-
est priority. Although the financial 
crisis made it necessary to increase 
aid to middle income countries 
through the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD), the World Bank must con-
tinue to give priority to loans under 
the International Development As-
sociation (IDA), which assists low 
income countries and provides re-
sources for food security.
To this end, we must continue to 
review the distribution of voting 
rights in both these financial insti-
tutions so that emerging economies 
and developing countries, includ-
ing LDCs, are duly represented. 
Similarly, it may be desirable to in-
troduce, at least for key decisions, 
‘double majority’ approval, so that 
decisions are made not only accord-
ing to quotas but also on the basis of 
a numerical majority of countries.
At the end of World War II, the 
international community was able 
to adopt a comprehensive system 
that would ensure not only peace 
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but also avoid a repetition of global 
economic disruption. The institu-
tions that emerged from the Bretton 
Woods Conference in July 1944 had 
to ensure the launching of a process 
of equitable economic development 
for all. The current global crisis of-
fers a similar opportunity requiring 
a comprehensive approach, based 
on resources, knowledge transfer 
and on institutions. To achieve this, 
all nations, without exception, need 
to commit themselves to a renewed 
multilateralism.
At the same time, the effective-
ness of measures taken to overcome 
the current crisis should always be 
assessed by their ability to solve 
the primary problem. We should 
not forget that the same world that 
could find, within a few weeks, tril-
lions of dollars to rescue banks and 
financial investment institutions, 
has not yet managed to find 1% of 
that amount for the needs of the 
hungry - starting with the $3 billion 
needed to provide meals to school 
children who are hungry or the $5 
billion needed to support the emer-
gency food fund of the World Food 
Program.
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